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Abstract 
Worldwide, the protection of minority shareholders in public corporations has received most of 
the corporate scholars’ attention. This tendency, therefore, has been reflected in the negligence of 
the same group but in close corporations. A close corporation minority shareholder confronts 
distinctive issues caused by the locked-in structure of close corporations. The lack of liquid 
secondary market, the oppression by majority shareholders, and the high expectations held by 
minority shareholders all contribute to the minority shareholders’ concern that they may be 
deprived of a voice in management or opportunistically be taken advantage of by those in power. 
Although these structural issues are hardly touched upon in the international corporate debates, 
jurisdictions have varied in their approaches to addressing these issues and providing protection 
for minority shareholders. The protection may flow from the contractual approach, the statutory 
approach, the judicial approach, or a combination of the three approaches. 
 
This research demonstrates these issues, and the approaches developed to address them. After that, 
it explores in depth the statutory approach adopted in the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 to protect 
the interests of shareholders as the Law advances different rules for corporate governance than 
their counterparts in other jurisdictions. The study also evaluates the strengths and defects in the 
Law as it presents an analysis and critique of the statutory treatment of minority shareholders’ 
problems, their statutory protection as well as the public and private enforcement. Finally, the 
research identifies areas where reforms and changes are needed and thus propound some policy 
prescriptions to the Saudi legislature to optimize its corporate governance. A new approach to the 
corporate governance of close corporations, one that is perceptive of their unique nature and 
features, is necessary to strengthen the statutory protection for minority shareholders, who fail to 
protect themselves contractually. 
 
Keywords: close corporation, minority shareholder protection, controlling shareholder, Saudi 
corporate law, corporate governance, director compensation, related-party transactions, 
shareholder assembly, shareholder oppression. 
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Introductory Chapter 
 
 
“[P]eople enter closely held businesses in the same manner as they enter marriage: 
optimistically and ill-prepared.”1 
 
 
Part I. Preface 
In the corporate world, joint-stock corporations have been of great significance to lure 
investors into investments in major economic projects. This has placed a burden upon the 
legislative bodies around the world to keep up with their rapidly changing activities and behaviors 
and regulate them accordingly. Laws and regulations, in general, have worked effectively toward 
achieving their goals to enhance the market and encourage huge capitals to invest in such 
corporations. 
Despite the continuous qualitative and quantitative development given to the laws and 
regulations of this type of entity, several issues in some jurisdictions are still unsolved. Such issues 
appear from the inevitable division between majority shareholders and minority shareholders as a 
consequence of the nature of the dominant ownership structure. Most of the time such a partition 
entails the oppression of minority shareholders and the obstruction of right exercising, mainly in 
close corporations. It is thought that the oppression of minority shareholders has been considered 
as “an inherent structural characteristic of the close corporation form.”2 
Many close corporations are founded based on companionships, familial bonds, and close 
relationships between shareholders.3 However, these relationships do not form a legal shield upon 
                                                 
1 Charles W. Murdock, Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon 
Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 426 (1990). 
2 See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder 
Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1256 (2009). 
3 See infra Chapter 1, Part I, B. 
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which the minority shareholders can rely. Close corporations have recorded most of the conflicts 
and shareholder battles in courts. In response to the widespread dilemma, legislatures around the 
world have approached the issue in a variety of ways, including reviewing and reforming corporate 
governance principles and decision-making process within the entity. Other countries have 
enhanced judicial scrutiny as the voice of the minority is muted or obstructed. 
The ninth of November of 2015 was a significant turning point in the history of the corporation 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the long-awaited Companies Law was enacted and introduced 
to the public, which superseded the forty-four-year-old Companies Law.4 It was a sweeping change 
and development in response to the increasing demand to fill the gaps and correspond to national 
and international changes. The new Law enhances corporate governance principles and ensures an 
encouraging corporate atmosphere that is conducive to corporations enhancing their values, 
activities, and growth as well as their contributions to the Saudi Arabian economy.5 
 The change in the corporate field and the dire need to examine the newly-introduced Law 
enthused me as a researcher to probe and assess the legislative approach into protecting minority 
shareholders in close corporations. Therefore, I devote this research to explore the issues of 
minority shareholders, evaluate the statutory protection they enjoy in light of the 2015 Companies 
Law in Saudi Arabia, appraise the enforcement’s quality of the Law, and introduce some lessons 
to be gained from far-off jurisdictions to improve and reform existing laws, if any. 
                                                 
4 See infra Chapter 2, Part I, A (2 and 4). 
5 See New Saudi Arabian Companies Law, DLA Piper, November 12, 2015 
[https://www.dlapiper.com/en/saudiarabia/insights/publications/2015/11/new-saudi-arabian-companies-
law/].  
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Part II. The Importance of the Topic 
Several causes inspired me to commit my doctoral thesis to the study of minority shareholders’ 
protection in closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia, given its growing importance, legally, 
socially and economically. First, the Saudi market encompasses thousands of closely held 
corporations that make significant contributions to the economy. Nevertheless, most of these 
corporations, if not all, have ignored the rights of minority shareholders to actively take part in the 
corporate management, or at least oversee the corporate activities as specified by the Law.  
Second, since these minority shareholders are the weak, they are often oblivious to their 
fundamental rights. Some of these rights are attached to the shares (e.g., the right to vote and the 
right to receive dividends), while others are guaranteed by the Law (e.g., preemptive rights, the 
right to a representative and the right of access to corporate books and records). 
Third, the oppression of minority shareholders and the obstruction of exercising their rights 
have been regarded as one of the controversial issues in the corporate world today as some 
scholarly writings have discussed the subject worldwide. Accordingly, countries vary in 
approaching and addressing the issue. The variation is attributable to the dominating ownership 
structure in the state. Some countries, for instance, have dispersed ownership (e.g., the U.S. and 
U.K.) while others, such as Saudi Arabia, have concentrated ownership.6 Consequently, different 
ownership structures differ in their impacts on the corporate governance principles needed to 
redress the issue, such as the extent of board independence and derivatives’ procedures. 
Most importantly, one of the themes of the Saudi 2030 Vision is “opening Saudi Arabia for 
further businesses […] and improving its business environment.” Such a vision can be achieved 
only if does the market gain the trust and confidence of foreign investors to invest their capitals in 
                                                 
6 See infra Chapter 2, Part II,  
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the market. This involves that related-investment laws and regulations are protective of minority 
shareholders and able to earn investors’ confidence in “the resilience and potential of [Saudi] 
national economy.”  
Since this study is regarded as one of the first academic studies that undertake the analysis and 
assessment of the corporate governance of the 2015 Companies Law, it will be of great help for 
the Saudi legislature and for the Saudi public to look at the law and the protection it promotes 
through an academic lens. Given the importance and the size of the Saudi market alongside the 
pivotal role played by corporations, such an area of law should receive much attention from legal 
scholars who examine current laws and reconsider its concepts and principles. Academics, more 
than others, should study and criticize contemporary laws to ensure that they serve their proclaimed 
objectives. 
For the reasons mentioned above, I devote my SJD research to articulate the dilemma of 
minority shareholders in closely held companies in Saudi Arabia. The study carries out an in-depth 
academic investigation about the minority shareholders with a thoroughly analytical and critical 
review of the Companies Law. The primary goal of this research is threefold: first, to spot the 
loopholes in the Law and its failure to statutorily protect minority shareholders; second, explore 
and accentuate the protective aspects of the 2015 Companies Law; and third, make several 
recommendations to improve the quality of the legal system and enhance the enforcement of the 
law. 
Part IV. Research Questions and Challenges 
The study answers the fundamental question of whether minority shareholders of the joint-
stock companies are protected in Saudi Arabia theoretically and practically. In answering this 
question, the following questions emerge:  
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1. What is the significance of answering this main question? 
2. Why should minority shareholders be protected? 
3. What is the difference between ex ante and ex post protection? 
4. What does “minority shareholders” mean? What constitutes minority shareholders and vice 
versa?  
5. What is the importance of statutory protection for minority shareholders?  
6. What kind of legal aspects should the legislature protect? 
7. How has the Saudi legislature protected the interest of minority shareholders via the new Law?  
8. Has the new Law failed in corresponding to issues concerning the minority? 
9. What are the practical obstacles in the way of statutory protection for minority shareholders? 
10. What legislative improvements should be made to the Saudi Companies Law? 
11. What are the legal measures to bring about the necessary improvements? 
Part V. Methodology and Research Approach 
The goal of the thesis is mainly to explore the statutory protection for minority shareholders 
under the Companies Law of 2015. Therefore, both the methodology and method for the research 
have been selected accordingly.  
The thesis is built upon a case study approach. Stake defines the case study approach as “the 
study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances.” 7 it gains more importance if the conducted research has “a very special 
of interest.”8 A pair of reasons can justify the choice of the case study to approach the research 
questions and attain the research objectives. First of all, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is 
                                                 
7 See ROBERT STAKE, THE ART OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH (SAGE PUB. LTD. 1995). 
8 Id. 
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regarded as a very complicated legal system that has always caused legal perplexity, “not only for 
foreigners but also among Saudis themselves.”9 A lot of inconsistency and uncertainty have been 
attributed to the double nature of its legal institutions where “modern legal arrangements and 
institutions combine and interact in a rather contradictory way, with Islamic applications and 
attitudes.”10 To deal with such complex settings, the case study methodology has been believed to 
be best positioned to the scrutiny of a particular condition of the position of a specific case.11 
The scarcity of sources and writings about the Saudi legal system in general and the subject 
matter, in particular, is another ground justifying the case study approach, as it is deemed a 
significant methodology when there is a gap in the literature encompassing the legal position of a 
specific case.12 
To accomplish the thesis’s goals and to answer the questions above, some research methods 
have been rejected in favor of the normative study. The dissertation is mainly normative within a 
conceptual and analytical framework. To that end, the research, as mentioned above, aims at 
presenting issues concerning the Saudi regulations of joint-stock companies, particularly exploring 
and analyzing the 2015 Companies Law and then assessing the efficacy of its statutory protection 
for minority shareholders by comparing its protective aspects to more advanced laws and 
regulations of other legal systems. In this regard, it has been pointed out that one of the main 
objectives of comparative law is to facilitate legislative reforms and legal improvements.13 Laws 
                                                 
9 FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (LAMBERT ACAD. PUB. 2014). 
10 Id. 
11 See CATHERINE CASSELL & GILLIAN SYMON, ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE METHODS IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH, 324 (SAGE PUB. LTD 2004). 
12 See Izak Benbasat, David K. Goldstein and Melissa Mead, The Case Research Strategy in Studies of 
Information Systems 11 MIS QUARTERLY 396, 370 (1987). 
13 See Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 
115 (1989). 
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such as the United States and the United Kingdom’s are broadly used as guidelines for the needed 
reforms in most developing and transitional countries, including Saudi Arabia. Note that this is not 
a comparative study. Instead, it utilizes comparison as a way to advance and support an argument 
on the one hand, or refute and exemplify a position on the other. 
Primary and secondary sources are used throughout the study. However, due to the dearth of 
academic literature dealing with businesses in Saudi Arabia and the apparent lack of secondary 
resources on the subject matter, it is essential to refer to the secondary resources of other advanced 
legal systems in analyzing and discussing the case of Saudi Arabia. 
A. Primary Resources 
The study mainly undertakes the analysis and evaluation of the protection for minority 
shareholders in close corporations in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, many regulations and laws 
governing the corporation in Saudi Arabia are the starting point of this thesis. Such laws and 
regulations are the Companies Law of 2015, the Law of Commercial Court, and other regulations 
and ministerial guidelines.14 
In the context of cases and precedents concerning the topic, the recentness of a reporting 
system⎯alongside the newness of the Law⎯ in Saudi Arabia makes it challenging to acquire 
details of judicial decisions, so it is difficult to articulate on the judicial approach in interpreting 
and applying the Law. In addition, policy statements, guidelines and administrative decisions by 
authorities (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) concerning the close corporations are 
of paramount importance to the study and analysis in this thesis. Last, Other primary resources of 
other advanced legal systems (e.g., the Model Business Corporation Act in the United States) are 
                                                 
14 See generally infra Chapter two, Part I. 
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of great help in achieving the aims of the study. 
B. Secondary Resources 
The research questions and challenges demand a thorough investigation of different sources 
from several disciplines, including those concerning finance, politics and the theories of 
regulations. The thesis often references secondary resources (e.g., books, law review articles, and 
reports) to draw a full and clear vision of the theoretical and practical aspects of the subject matter. 
As articulated above, the research builds on several previous academic writings (in other 
countries) that have elaborated on the issues of minority shareholders in close corporations. These 
resources are sometimes used to propose a blueprint for reforming related-Saudi laws. Journal 
articles and internet sources provide essential, up-to-date information and qualitative analyses to 
the research to mirror what has been on the ground. 
All primary and secondary sources are fully referenced throughout the thesis in compliance 
with the Bluebook standard for citation of legal resources. It should be emphasized that most of 
the references are secondary even though primary sources of the laws and the regulations are 
favored continuously and given primacy over secondary sources. It is wished that the weight of 
referencing does not disturb the quality and the course of the arguments demonstrated throughout 
the research. 
Part VI. The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. At the outset of 
every chapter, there is a motivating hypothetical that illustrates the issue and helps the reader have 
a clear sense of the subject matter under the spotlight. 
Chapter one is a foundational, expository chapter that establishes a necessary layer to 
comprehend the issues that minority shareholder status triggers in close corporations. It is divided 
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into three sections. First, it starts with defining the terms “minority shareholder” and “close 
corporation”. Second, it spotlights common issues that arise out of the close corporation’s structure 
worldwide. The third section contains a conceptual categorization of strategies that are used to 
tackle the issues. The categorization is premised upon the source from which each strategy flows. 
The second chapter aims at delineating the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia and establishes the 
legal ground upon which a corporation is incorporated and regulated. It is divided into two 
sections. The first section offers a comprehensive overview of the legal structure governing Saudi 
corporations. This includes a historical snapshot of the inception and the developments of the Saudi 
corporate laws and regulations. The second section maps out the unique structure of ownership in 
the region. This encapsulates, on the one hand, the ownership structure of publicly-traded 
corporations—including state-controlled corporations, and family-controlled corporations— and 
the ownership structure of closely held corporations by state and family, on the other hand. 
Chapter three investigates the internal legal framework of joint-stock corporations in Saudi 
Arabia according to the default rules of the Law regulating corporate institutions, operations, and 
other corporate affairs. This chapter is intended to dissect the rules through an analytical and 
critical lens, rather than descriptive one, yet the description of the rules is provided to comprehend 
better the detailed analysis and constructive criticism of the Law that follows. First, it starts with 
a straight procedural section about the incorporation requirements, including the incorporation of 
a one-person corporation. Second, it casts light on the role of shareholder and shareholder 
meetings, through which they exercise most of their rights, yet it does not exhaust all shareholder 
matters as most of them are examined in a later chapter designated to the statutory protection of 
minority shareholders. Third, the chapter probes the rules of corporate management, including the 
composition of the board of directors, its meetings, and its duties and responsibilities along with 
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the remuneration-rewards rules. Fourth, it casts light on the role of the external auditor, including 
its appointment, powers, and tasks. In the end, the chapter concludes with an in-depth analysis of 
the procedural and substantive rules regulating close corporations. 
Turning to chapter four, it presents a case study of minority shareholder protection in Saudi 
Arabia. It is divided into five sections. The first part introduces the reader to minority shareholders’ 
issues in Saudi Arabia and the factors that affected the change in the policy of protecting their 
interests, leading to an indispensable role of the law in the region. The second part offers an 
analysis of the statutory shareholder rights, including defining the “statutory right” and 
categorizing them into two groups. The third part demonstrates⎯through analytical reading⎯how 
the Law is an effective device to curtail oppressive conduct, and how it handles minority 
shareholders’ issues, including minority’s directorial representation, dilution of interests, 
unmarketability of shares. The fourth part underscores the role of formalism in the Law in one 
section and highlights some issues and limitations associated with this statutory approach in the 
other. 
The fifth chapter scrutinizes the second component of the research theory, enforcement of the 
Law in Saudi Arabia as it is a major player in protecting minority shareholder’s interests. Laws 
and rules alone do not suffice to protect minority shareholders. Instead, they are to exist 
interdependently. For this reason, this chapter expounds the role of the judiciary ex post, as it is 
the sanctuary for all disgruntled and oppressed shareholders on the one hand, and the principal 
enforcer of the law on the other. To do so, the chapter first provides a foundational stone of the 
historical development of the corporate judiciary in Saudi Arabia. Second, the chapter 
differentiates between the role of the judiciary in enforcement into two subsections: public 
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enforcement and private enforcement. Under each category, the chapter examines the nature of the 
judicial interventions ex post and accentuates the protective aspects of such interventions.  
The conclusion features the findings of previous analyzed chapters. It also provides overall 
recommendations that have emerged from the analysis as well as illuminate the obstructions and 
limitations that have been tackled in the study and offer some suggestions for future research. 
Part VII. The Scope of the Study 
The dissertation covers the regulations and laws of closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia. 
Public corporations are excluded because they have been the subject of several scholarly studies. 
In a few stances, I refer to the corporate law of a member country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) due to the possible integration of the six states facilitated by their cultural, social, and 
ideological similarities. 15 Overall, it should be emphasized that the examination of the Saudi 
aspects is given greater weight than models from other countries to allow for better solutions and 
recommendations and to comply with the research methodology of case-studying the protection of 
minority shareholders within Saudi Arabia.  
Turning to the research tools, interviews and questionnaires were thought unsuitable because 
such methods would meet practical barriers due to language differences, a possible lack of 
cooperation, and difficulties to access unpublished cases and precedents. Moreover, the possibility 
of subjective bias among individual actors involved in the examined system (along with the 
political, regulatory and commercial requirements of confidentiality) would hinder any reliable 
                                                 
15 The GCC is an Arab regional organization of six Arab countries; United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. It was founded in 1981, and its headquarters are in Riyadh, the 
capital of Saudi Arabia. These countries are the most productive oil countries in the Middle East Plus, 
articles that make up the laws of most GCC countries are identical. In addition, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and the State of Kuwait have recently introduced new companies laws. For this reason, the 
study sometimes refers to their corporate laws rather than considering all six countries. 
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evaluation. Although the Saudi judiciary (namely commercial courts) has recently begun 
publishing cases and judicial rulings on its website, the system lacks the proper codification 
system⎯which would otherwise ease the search for rulings related to the subject matter. 
Furthermore, given the scarcity of English-written references about the Saudi laws in general 
and the subject matter in particular, a great deal of Arabic-English translation is required. This 
limitation appears to be a chance to take the lead in presenting the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 
to Western readers with the hope that it becomes an essential reference for future research on the 
topic.  
  
13 
Chapter One: The Concept of Minority Shareholders in Close Corporation 
 
 
“There are 51 shares that are worth $250,000. There are 49 shares that are not worth a . . .” 16 
 
John H. Doyle  
 
Motivating Hypothetical 
Saad, a teacher with no business background, is pondering over a business opportunity that his 
father, Fahad, has invited him to join him in launching a new business, which needs a statutory 
minimum of two shareholders to incorporate a joint-stock corporation under the 2015 Saudi 
Companies Law. The offer is to contribute 10% of the company’s capital or 25% if his brother 
wants to join. Saad has no knowledge in business and no background about the law, so in his risk 
assessment phase, he is wondering about the legal risks associated with the proposed ownership in 
this sort of corporation. 
The Scope of Chapter One 
This foundational, expository chapter establishes a primary layer to comprehend the issues that the 
minority shareholder status triggers in close corporations. It is divided into three sections. First, it 
starts with defining the terms “minority shareholder” and “close corporation”. Second, it spotlights 
common issues that arise out of the close corporation’s structure. The third section provides a 
conceptual categorization of strategies that are used to tackle the issues. These strategies are 
divided based on the source from which each strategy flows. 
                                                 
16 See Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 50, 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1956) (quoting John Doyle’s 
address before the 1893 annual meeting of the Ohio State Bar). 
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Part I. Definition 
A. The Definition of Minority Shareholder 
The minority term in a corporate context is commonly understood as the possession of less 
than half of the corporation’s capital. However, there are two common standards to define minority 
shareholders. First, the quantitative measure. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, minority 
shareholder means “[a] shareholder who owns less than half the total shares outstanding and thus 
cannot control the corporation’s management or singlehandedly elect directors.”17 This 
shareholding may belong to one person or a group of shareholders. 
Another measure applied to define minority shareholders is the qualitative standard. This 
measure depends on an evaluation of the control exerted over the corporation. Sometimes a 
shareholder has minority status according to the quantitative standard, yet the shareholder exerts 
control over the corporation and has managerial and directorial powers. These powers often come 
through ax ante contracting and other arrangements. In this sense, a quantitatively-defined 
minority shareholder with veto power over some transactions becomes a qualitatively-defined 
majority. Both standards go hand in hand and are of paramount significance in a court of law to 
prove the entitlement of minority shareholders to the statutory and judicial protection.18 
The minority concept arises following the recognition of separate legal personality for the 
corporation, and then the domination of major shareholders over the corporation in a way that 
results in oppression for other disgruntled shareholders, or later so-called the minority. Given the 
importance of the shareholder’s role in corporations, it is of necessity to intervene and re-balance 
                                                 
17 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1586 (10.ed 2014). 
18 see Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A 
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 620 (2000). 
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the relationships between the minority and the majority for the sake of the entity and its objectives. 
The intervention has taken various styles worldwide. 
In the review of the Saudi Arabian statutes and laws regulating close corporations, however, it 
appears that the Saudi legislature has not adopted a precise definition of the minority, and it has 
not singled out a specific chapter or section of its corporate law for the treatment of corporate 
minorities. This seems similar to other corporate laws of various jurisdictions.19 Nevertheless, this 
does not negate the existence of the statutory protection for minority shareholders under the Saudi 
Companies Law of 2015 as it is illustrated later in this thesis.  
For this study and in avoidance of the perplexity of the terminology, the term “minority 
shareholder” denotes powerless shareholders who are destitute of control over the corporation’s 
decisions and its board of directors, irrespective to their ownership interests in the corporate 
capital. In most circumstances, if not all, these minorities own less than fifty percent of the capital, 
but there are situations where minorities own more than the half, yet they are considered minorities 
due to the fact that their ownerships are widely dispersed, or because of the privileges and 
preferences the dominant shareholder has secured by contract. 
B. The Definition of Close Corporation 
The Saudi Companies Law has neither defined the close corporation status nor has it capped 
the number of shareholders the corporation may have. Instead, an enterprise is considered to have 
the close corporation status as long as its shares are neither listed on nor traded through the capital 
market, irrelevant to the number of its shareholders. 
                                                 
19 See Generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 89–99 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (presenting that minority 
concepts are well articulated by judicial rulings in a number of jurisdictions, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany and France). 
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Comparatively, some U.S. state courts have set several definitions that orbit around the special 
features of the close corporation. Such features are (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) 
the small number of owners, (4) illiquidity of shares due to the absence of a ready market, and (5) 
centralized management.20 Comparably, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines a close corporation 
as “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only a few shareholders (often 
with the same family).”21 
Alternatively, some jurisdictions have statutorily recognized close corporations as separate 
status from the public corporation status and thus have enacted special statutes regulating close 
corporations.22 To elect the close corporation status, the law requires that the number of 
shareholders not to exceed the statutory cap (e.g., ten or fewer shareholders) to be eligible for such 
election. Statutory close corporations differ from regular close corporations whose owners do not 
affirmatively elect at the time of incorporation to be a statutory close corporation, and thus subject 
to the general corporation law.23 
For the purpose of this research, the term “close corporation” is used to indicate incorporated 
enterprises with capitals divided into shares that have no ready market through which holders of 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
21 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 416 (10.ed 2014) (including closely held corporation 
and closed corporation in its definition of the close corporation). 
22 Such states are California, Delaware, and Arizona.  
23 For further discussion about the status of statutory close corporations and its advantages and 
disadvantages, see Don Berger, Statutory Close or Closely Held Corporation, 11 PAC. L. J. 699 (1980). 
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these shares would trade. The terms close corporation, closely held corporation,24 and joint-stock 
company are used interchangeably in this research to mean the same unless otherwise noted.25 
Part II. Minority shareholders’ predicaments in Close Corporations 26 
Minority shareholder’s dilemma may seem to be universal in terms of the nature of the issues 
minorities across jurisdictions confront.27 Such issues are unmarketability of shares, dilution of 
ownership interests, the absence of managerial involvement combined with different expectations 
held by minority shareholders, shareholder oppression, and majority opportunism. It is worth 
noting that these issues may overlap and interlock, which creates difficulty under which issue a 
given scenario should be placed.  
                                                 
24 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (differentiating between closely held 
corporations, whose shares are owned by a few shareholders with important “interpersonal relationships . 
. . to the management of the firm,” and widely held corporations, “whose shares are not freely tradeable 
but that nevertheless have hundreds or thousands of shareholders.”) 
25 Contra the terms of public company, public corporation, quoted companies, and publicly traded 
companies are used interchangeably to represent corporations whose shares are listed on and traded 
through a stock exchange. 
26 Due to the lack of literature about the subject matter in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. literature has been 
selected to provide a broad overview about the minority shareholders’ problems in American close 
corporations that may take place in Saudi close corporations as well. It is worth keeping in mind that this 
article does not excessively cover the development of minority shareholder oppression and other issues in 
the United States, rather it provides the reader with a short-cut background and the gist of the subject 
matter in an effort to create a blueprint upon which the analysis and exploration of the Saudi Companies 
Law is premised. 
27 See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the 
Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 758 (2007) (asserting that the issues of minority 
shareholders in close corporations are non-conclusive to the United States, but rather “they are part of the 
fabric of modern business organization law on a global scale.”) See, e.g., A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES 38–59, 90–118 (2002) (demonstrating the company law governing 
minority shareholders' remedies from historical, theoretical, and comparative perspectives in the United 
Kingdom); Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then & Now, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36–38 (2002) (raising concerns about the severity of minority oppression in 
China); Nigel Furry, The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders in United Kingdom, 22 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 81 (1987) (analyzing the willingness of the U.K courts to shelter minority 
shareholders’ interests). 
  
18 
A. Unmarketability of Shares 
One of the fundamental features of the corporation is that the interests of business partners are 
originally transferable.28 Transferability of shares provides free rein for the corporation to operate 
and accomplish its objectives regardless of the change in its owners, who in principle enjoy 
liquidity of their interests.29 
In close corporations, however, shareholders’ right to transfer their shares does not imply the 
tradability of shares. Unlike public companies,30 close corporations lack the market where 
shareholders would sell their interests and exit the firm for a fair price. The absence of an 
established market entails that displeased shareholders cannot escape from the entity without their 
interests being undervalued as a result of the deduction of risks associated with their interests 
(minority discount).31 32 
As the shares in close corporations lack marketability, they oftentimes undergo a wide range 
of restrictions on their transferability. Given the small number of shareholders in the close 
corporation and the interpersonal relationships between them, shareholders prefer to place 
                                                 
28 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (explaining that transferability of shares 
is “[a] basic characteristic of the business corporation”, which makes it distinguishable from the 
partnership form, another vehicle to carry out businesses).  
29 Id. at 11, footnote 8, (asserting that liquidity of shareholders’ interests gives shareholders an advantage 
to have diversified portfolios as free tradability, on the other hand, boosts the liquidity of investments). 
30 The traditional corporate norm of free transferability is better associated with publicly held corporations 
where a separation between ownership and management exists. “Traditional corporate norms, oriented as 
they are toward publicly held corporations, proved unsuitable for close corporations.” See Robert B. 
Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1992). 
31 See F. Hodge O’Neal & Walter G. Moeling, IV, Problems of Minority shareholders in Michigan Close 
Corporations, 723, 724 14 WAYNE L. REV. 723 (1968); O’KELLEY THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS ch.5 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2010). 
32 See Arthur R. Pinto, Protection of Close Corporation Minority Shareholders in the United States, 62 
AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 361, 370 Footnote 56 (2014) (“A minority discount reflects the fact that minority 
shareholder often lack corporate decision-making power while a lack of marketability discount further 
reduces the value of shares because no ready market exists where the shares could be sold or resold. The 
prospect of obtaining the minority's shares, and doing so at a discount from ”fair” value, may create 
incentives for the majority to squeeze out the minority by one means or another . . . .”) 
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restrictions on their shares in an effort to maintain their interests within the group and avoid any 
entry of a third party they may dislike. Notwithstanding the rationale behind placing these 
restrictions, they are, nevertheless, recognized by corporate laws in most jurisdictions, including 
Saudi Arabia, yet the treatment of these restrictions may differ from one to another.33 
B. Dilution of the Ownership Interests34 
Another issue that minority shareholders in close corporations worry about is the dilution of 
their shareholdings due to share issuance. As the majority rules the corporation and has the ultimate 
say in the corporation’s resolutions, it may at some point issue additional shares and sell them to 
itself, or a third party at a favorable price.35 The problem of share issuance exacerbates when the 
default law of the pre-emptive rights is eliminated by the bylaws of the corporation or its certificate 
of incorporation.36 Otherwise, the majority issues shares at a time when the minority is unable to 
exercise its right due to a lack of money to participate in the capital raising.37 
                                                 
33 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (emphasizing that “all jurisdictions . . . 
provide mechanisms for restricting transferability.”)  
34 The statutory treatment for this issue will be extensively discussed and reviewed in another chapter 
probing the rules and regulations of joint-stock companies in the Saudi Companies Law of 2015. The 
Saudi Companies Law, akin to its counterparts, regulates the issuance of new shares and sets forth rules 
for the exercise of preemptive rights in such situations. 
35 See F. Hodge O’Neal & Walter G. Moeling, IV, Problems of Minority shareholders in Michigan Close 
Corporations, 723, 724 14 WAYNE L. REV. 748 (1968). 
36 “[T]he preemptive right of shareholders means to acquire newly issued shares from the corporation of 
which they are shareholders is considered to refer to their right to purchase a portion of such shares pro 
rata to their existing holdings.” Andrew L. Nichols, Shareholder Preemptive Rights, 39 BOSTON BAR J. 4, 
5 (1995). 
37 In such cases in the United States, minority shareholders may, based on the fiduciary duty, have a claim 
against the majority. See, e.g., Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 135 P.2d 1007 (1943), 
as dominant shareholders wanted to issue shares just to empower themselves. However, if the issuance of 
shares were for a good business reason and at a fair price, it would be likely difficult to challenge such a 
corporate resolution. See generally Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at 367. See, e.g., Hyman v. Velsicol 
Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951). 
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C. Shareholder Expectations 
One of the traditional attributes of the close corporation is the small number of its 
shareholders.38 These shareholders act as co-owners of the business, and most of the time they 
treat each other as partners.39 Despite the delegation of the management to a separate directorial 
body (as a unique facet of the corporation),40 shareholders in close corporations expect to co-run 
the business and have a say in its decision-making process.41 The expectations of these 
shareholders intensify when the relationships between shareholders embody interpersonal ties and 
familial bonds.42 Not only do they advance money for the corporation capital, but they also invest 
skills and devote time, hoping to obtain in return not only dividends but also salaried positions in 
their corporations. 
                                                 
38 See supra § I, 2. 
39 Close corporations are commonly considered as intimate enterprises that lack the separation between 
ownership and management, giving rise to expectations of shareholders far beyond what corporate laws 
aim to protect. See Adam Chernichaw, Oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market 
Oriented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 507 (1994). 
40 Delegated management is an essential stone in the corporation personality, and this is what makes 
corporations stand out from partnerships, limited liability companies, and business trusts as they “cannot 
have a board structure similar to . . . a typical corporation.” See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2nd. ed. 2009) 
41 See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702 
(1992) (“Shareholders in a close corporation usually expect employment and a meaningful role in 
management.as well as a return on the money paid for the shares.”) 
42 O’KELLEY THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 
447 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2010) (describing close corporations as intimate enterprises that may 
conflict with the long-rooted norms of corporate law, such as the lack of separation between the 
management of the corporation and its owners’ investments. the relationships between the owners of the 
corporation commonly “overlap family or other close personal ties, adding another layer of expectations 
and creating various means of interaction beyond that those provided by the structures of entity law.”) 
Close corporations built upon close relationships between their shareholders can be also called 
“archetypical close corporations,” see Chares O’kelley, Jr., Commentary, Filling Gaps in the Close 
Corporations Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 238 (1992).  
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This may sound ideal; however, such expectations by minority shareholders put a burden upon 
them to secure these positions through contracting ex ante.43 Nevertheless, given the deficiency of 
bargaining power and the absence of well-suited corporate law norms to the close corporation’s 
extraordinary nature,44 minority shareholders should accept the reality of the majority primacy.45 
As long as the majority discharges its duties in good faith and pursuant to its fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty (e.g., lawful elimination of returns on investments or lawful removal from a 
directorial or managerial position), the minority does not have much but to be under the majority’s 
mercy, given that the statutory remedies are unlikely triggered.46 
The absence of the management participation⎯not being on the board of directors or serving 
as an officer⎯triggers another issue that the minority shareholders become unaware of the 
corporation’s activities and unable to access the corporation’s books and records.47 The blocking 
of or the limitation on the access to information has adverse impacts on the exercise of 
shareholder’s rights, such as informed voting.48 Also, it leads to an undervaluation of their shares; 
these shares are, and will probably be, underpriced because of the risks of uncertainty and lack of 
power linked to them.49 
                                                 
43 Contractual protection is claimed to offer greater protection for the minority as it will be shortly 
explained. See infra § III, C. 
44 See supra § I, B.  
45 See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and 
the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1461 (1994) (explaining the 
shareholder primacy model as it has the right for the majority to select the corporation’s fate and 
formulate its policies and goals 
46 See Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at 366, (“Unless there is such a showing or some contractual right or 
understanding that dividends should be paid, there is no right to receive a return through a dividend.”) 
47 See Keith Rogers, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Alaska Close Corporations, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 
45, 58 (2007). 
48 The right to access the books and records of a corporation under the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 is 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
49 As shown under the Unmarketability subtitle, closely held corporations lack the liquidity feature that is 
recognized in publicly traded corporations. Shareholders in these corporations cannot easily liquidate 
their investments or at least get fair value for their interests without deduction of the risks involved in 
such ownership interests. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
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Moreover, when the minority shareholders are neither elected nor selected for corporate paid 
positions, the only remaining hope for them is to at least receive dividends in return for their 
investments in the corporate capital. However, the decision to distribute dividends is at the 
majority’s discretion.50 Unless the majority abuses its discretion or acts in bad faith, minority 
shareholders appear to be handcuffed and “in danger of being frozen out”51 as the returns on their 
investments may be eliminated for an indefinite period.52 Of course, the abuse of power and refusal 
to declare dividends are subject to, and a question of fact left to, the judiciary deciding case by 
case and checking whether the majority has breached its fiduciary duties.53 Failure to meet the 
expectations of minority shareholders may, the court finds, constitute oppression as a cause of 
action and thus a justifiable claim for remedy.54  
D. Majority Opportunism and Oppression55 
Due to the minority shareholder’s vulnerable position, the majority may find it tempting to 
take actions that may sound oppressive of minority shareholders. In other words, the fragile 
                                                 
50 However, some corporate laws have quite different treatments for dividend distributions. The rules of 
dividends in the Saudi Companies Law will be explained later in this research. 
51 See Keith Rogers, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Alaska Close Corporations, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 
45, 58 (2007) (asserting that “the two ways…for an investor to receive a return on her investment . . . are 
through employment with the company and through dividends. Unless a minority shareholder is able to 
secure her rights through a shareholders’ agreement or a supermajority voting provision in the charter at 
the inception of a close corporation, . . . the majority can use its voting power to deny her a job and refuse 
to declare dividends.”) See Also F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS §1.09 (3d ed. 1994). 
52 See Michael E. Brown, Missouri Close Corporations: Proposals to Strengthen Protections for Minority 
Shareholders, 68 UMKC L. REV. 145, 146 (1999). 
53 See, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. App. 1977) (stipulating that denying dividend 
to shareholders was a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the directors according to their history); Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the equal opportunity doctrine that offer greater 
protection for shareholders of close corporations). 
54 See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 708 
(1992) (“Oppressive conduct by the majority …is listed widely in most state dissolution statutes, and… 
the principal vehicle used by legislatures, courts, and litigants to address the particular needs of close 
corporations.”)  
55 Sometimes statues and corporate laws refer to oppression as “unfairly prejudicial.” See e.g., Alaska, 
California, and Minnesota. 
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standing of minority shareholders may adversely incentivize the majority to perform 
opportunistically. The majority opportunism⎯along with the subsequent conflict of interests 
between the majority and the minority⎯ is also considered one of the agency problems,56 as 
Kraakman and his co-authors refer to it as “the second agency problem.”57 
Oppression of minority shareholders transpires when an individual or a group of owners 
decides to ostracize or minimize the influence of their partners, whose expectations then become 
defeated and frustrated. The rationale behind these oppressive activities varies from one case to 
another, ranging from hunger for power, the dream of avarice, and personality clashes to the death 
of the founder.58  
In general, the concept of minority shareholder oppression has been the subject of both 
legislative and judicial interventions. In terms of the legislative response, several corporate laws 
and statutes have warranted a finding of oppression of minority shareholders in close corporations 
a cause of action for the termination of the business and the dissolution of the corporation.59 
Nevertheless, the legislatures have left the door open for the judiciary to interpret and define 
oppression and then filter, via case-by-case analysis, what actions could establish it.  
                                                 
56 An agency problem is an economic term used whenever the welfare of one party (the principal) 
depends upon the actions taken by another party (the agent). It is also known as the principal-agent 
problem. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 35 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009). 
57 In the corporate context, the second agency problem occurs as a result of a conflict of interest between 
the majority shareholder (the principal) and the minority shareholders (the agent). However, it is worth 
noting that this problem raises to the surface whenever a group of the business’s owners has power over 
the resolutions impacting the remainder of owners. For example, minority shareholders with veto rights 
See Id. at 36.  
58 The death of the founder of the business seems to be a common motive for oppression in Saudi Arabia, 
given the special nature of Sharia inheritance rules. See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
59 See, e.g., Missouri Revised Statutes, MO. Rev. Stat § 351.494 (2012) (citing grounds for judicial 
dissolution). 
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Unlike fraudulent and illegal acts,60 the definition of oppression has been judicially-developed 
to be different from fraud and illegality.61 Many states in the United States, have found that 
oppression should be construed to encompass an array of circumstances dealing with abusive 
conduct, such as a lack of shareholder’s integrity, harsh treatment toward the minority, and 
prejudice against it.62 Without the oppression concept and its judicially-widened definition, 
minority shareholders would otherwise have no cause of action and no ground to bring a lawsuit 
since these actions are beyond the illegality and fraud theories.63  
The issues of minority shareholders⎯the absence of the ready market, the owners’ 
expectations, and the dilution of ownership interests⎯ have all together paved the way for the 
                                                 
60 See J. A. C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 
22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 40 (1987) (drawing a distinction among the terms fraud, illegality, and 
oppression. On the one hand “illegality and fraud are terms with relatively clear legal meanings and 
include violations of statutory requirements and misappropriations of corporate assets.” On the other 
hand, “[oppression] must refer to conduct not embraced by either of these terms.”) 
61 Another distinction between fraud and illegality on the one hand and oppression of the other is that the 
former appears to be directed at only “the shareholder’s investment in the corporation,” while oppression 
is directed at the shareholder himself. See Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at footnote 79. 
62 In the famous case Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984), the court sets 
a test for what may constitutes oppression, stating that “[defining oppressive conduct] has been resolved 
by considering oppressive actions to refer to conduct that substantially defeats the "reasonable 
expectations" held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise . . . A 
shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, 
a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would be 
oppressed in an authentic sisense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations.” See 
also McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009), which ruled that the shareholder majority 
owes a duty of “utmost faith” to the minority counterpart. 
63 Some scholars who have been influenced by law and economics, “dominant mode of corporate 
scholarships,” have criticized the common use of “reasonable expectations” criterion by courts of almost 
all states across the United States, except Delaware, Kansas, and Oklahoma, which have turned down the 
exceptional protection for minority shareholders in close corporations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
273 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804(d) (1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1094 (West 1987). 
Generally See, Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2010); Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is 
the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2001) (spotting the increase 
use of reasonable expectations standard); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to 
the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
129, 142 (2003) (Defending the longstanding employment of law and economics as a “ dominant 
theoretical paradigm” to perceive and evaluate law and policy). See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
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majority to engage in oppressive conduct. The oppression of minority shareholders may strike by 
limitless devices that can be cataloged into two categories in conjunction with the on-ground 
consequence each technique generates: squeeze-out and freeze-out devices. The squeeze-out 
devices are actions that are taken by the majority to remove the unwelcome minority. Such actions 
include merger consolidation,64 dissolution, and compulsory share exchange.65 
The second category includes devices that deprive the minority of any return on their 
investments or exit the company for a fair price for their interests. These devices lock the minority 
in the company, divest them of their voice in the corporation management, and freeze their 
interests. Such actions include withholding of dividends, paying high compensations to the 
managers and officers of the majority shareholders,66 siphoning off corporate assets,67 abusing 
share issuance rights, and the misappropriating corporate opportunity.68 
                                                 
64 The merger is an effective procedure that is deemed to be useful to get rid of the minority shareholders. 
See, e.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952). 
65 Accord F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS ch.1, § 1.01, at 1 (2d ed. 1997) (defining oppressive conduct as “the use by some of the 
owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside information, or powers of 
control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more 
of its owners or participants.” The authors go further to subcategorize squeeze-outs to “partial squeeze-
outs” and define them as mechanisms that “reduces the participation or powers of a group of participants 
in the enterprise, diminishes their claims or earnings or assets, or otherwise deprives them of business 
income or advantages to which they are entitled." See Id. at 1–2, (discussing a partial squeeze-out). 
66 Large remunerations for directors and officers coupled with the refusal to declare dividends establish a 
cause of action and claim for relief. See O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close Corporations, footnote 42. 
67 In many cases, majority shareholders execute a contract between the corporation and another 
corporation they own to drain the corporation’s assets; see O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close 
Corporations at 734. another way to deploy the corporation’s monetary resources is “[by] form of high 
salaries or rents, insulated from judicial review by the business judgment rule.” See Thompson, Cause of 
Action at 703. 
68 For detailed freeze-outs devices such as management buyouts, short-form mergers, and reverse stock 
splits, see Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A 
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 622–625 (2000); 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS ch.8, § 8.13, at 67–68 (3d ed. 1998); JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS § 23.2, at 611 (1997). 
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Along with the negative impacts on the business generated by the oppressive conduct, disputes 
and dissension among the owners also produce negative publicity that makes potential investors 
hearing about the oppressive conduct inside the corporation shun investing in it.69  
Part III. Strategies to Protect the Minority Shareholders 
Overview 
The issues of minority shareholders in close corporations are addressed differently by each 
state and country. However, the approaches to solving the minority conundrum can be narrowed 
down into three strategies: the legislative strategy, the judicial strategy, and the contractual 
strategy.  
Moreover, the timing of these strategies plays a pivotal role in the investment decisions as 
individuals advance and risk some of their fortunes in expectation of a job or role in the corporate 
management along with returns on their investments in the business.70 
For instance, the contractual strategy or the contractual protection of minority shareholders is 
an ex ante approach, as shareholders together decide (in advance and before committing their 
money for the sake of the business) on the provisions that redesign the corporation’s default 
features in order to make it more suitable to meet their own needs. 
On the contrary, the judicial strategy serves as ex post protection for minority shareholders. 
Grieved shareholders afflicted by oppressive conduct by opportunistic majority shareholders 
demand justice and ask for oppression to be lifted. Flip thinking of the judicial protection shows 
that even if the role of the judiciary appears after the occurrence of the dispute, lawyers and 
                                                 
69 See O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close Corporations at 731. 
70 See Thompson, Cause of Action at 702, (arguing that close corporations as described intimate 
enterprises are not only channels for investments of monetary contributions in the capital, but also an 
opportunity for the investment of human capital). 
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counselors drafting bylaws, shareholder agreements, or other organizational documents may 
benefit from the existing rules to anticipate potential issues their clients may encounter down the 
road.71 
The legislative strategy, or so-called statutory protection, embraces the protection for the 
minority shareholders both ex ante and ex post. Note that both ex ante and ex post forms of 
protection predate the incorporation of an entity; the statutory protection is already out there in the 
form of corporate law, regulation, supplement, or statute. However, these statutory protective 
provisions may be classified based on the nature of the subject matter to which each rule or article 
is applicable. For example, articles concerning the operation of the board of directors, the 
regulations of shareholder assemblies and share issuance are thought to be ex ante, as they aim at 
ensuring the minimum requirements for healthy operation of the company. The ex post protection 
for the minority shareholders is a mixture of rules and articles that take place after the occurrence 
of disputed conduct, such as oppression or the criminal accountability of corporate officers in 
intentional mismanagement. Such misconduct triggers the related rules and thus bring into the 
arena the ex post role of the judiciary. 
In sum, the protection of minority shareholders can be divided into three sorts based on what 
each strategy yields: statutory protection, judicial protection, and contractual protection. 
                                                 
71 The researcher is of the opinion that lawyers in the United States, for example, have a crystal image of 
the judicial treatment for minority shareholder’s oppression due to the massive literature and legal 
scholarships of the subject matter, as well as the large body of case precedent to rely upon. In contrast, it 
seems to be challenging for lawyers practicing in Saudi Arabia to have a clear perception about the 
treatment of the Saudi Judiciary due to many factors, such as the shortage publications of courts’ rulings 
in the subject matter and the novelty of the statute concerning it. Therefore, it still seems that the judicial 
approach in Saudi Arabia lacks the ex ante protection that may be found in the United States or other 
jurisdictions. 
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A. The Statutory Protection  
In reviewing the statutory protection of minority shareholders across several jurisdictions, one 
can conclude that corporate laws along with other related regulations vary in their degrees of 
protecting minority shareholders.72 Some jurisdictions offer a greater protective system for the 
minority, as opposed to the ones with limited legislative resources for minority shareholder 
protection. The forms of legislative protection may be signified in the adoption of strong corporate 
governance practices, the special statutory treatment for close corporations, the approval of the 
heightened duties upon majority shareholders, statutory remedies, the mandatory buyouts, and the 
statutory criminalization of the abuse of power and mismanagement by directors and officers. All 
of which are indicators that are utilized to determine whether an X jurisdiction is more or less 
favorable to protect its minority shareholders.73 
1. Strengthening Corporate Governance and Boosting Shareholder’s Rights 
The Statutory adoption of good corporate governance rules confidently enhances the protection 
for minority shareholders in close corporations.74 Such an adoption should be followed by vigorous 
enforcement of the statutory shareholder rights stipulated in corporate laws. However, these rights 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, Simple Solution at 700, (conducting a comprehensive state-by-state 
analysis of the minority shareholder protection premised upon both cases ruled by courts and statutes and 
laws enacted by legislatures regarding oppression in fifty states). 
73 This statutory approach has, nevertheless, received some criticism. According to the opposite side, 
statutory protection is overreaching and extends its protection for the minority shareholders who did not 
contract for such protection. See Arthur R. Pinto, Protection of Close Corporation Minority Shareholders 
in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 361, 370, 376 (2014) (criticizing the statutory approach as 
it “could undermine private ordering, the freedom to bargain, and the important role of contracting ex 
ante for protection and the most efficient results). 
74 See Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A 
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 613, 696 (2000) (“Minority shareholders may not control the 
company, but their role in a corporation through minority rights, fiduciary duties, requirements of fair 
dealing and good faith, private agreements, and derivative suits influences corporate governance and 
makes minority shareholders significant players in the corporate world.”) 
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vary in conjunction with the legislatures’ desires and how far they are willing to go to protect the 
minority shareholders and improve their positions. 
Several rights and rules enshrined in the corporate law can mirror the robustness of its 
corporate governance and its stand for minority shareholders. Some of these rules, for instance, 
are the adoption of the cumulative voting system, the statutory shareholder meeting, the separation 
between the chairperson and the C.E.O, and the constraints on the number and duration of the 
members of the board. 
2. Special Statutory Treatment for Close Corporations 
Another indicator of strong statutory protection for minority shareholders comes from the 
special treatment that close corporations enjoy in some jurisdictions. For a long time, legislative 
bodies in most jurisdictions have deviated the fact that close corporations are of special nature and 
thus should not be dealt with as public corporations. 
In response, a number of jurisdictions have enacted some special rules and regulations that are 
well-designed to satisfy the increasing needs of close corporations. These regulations and 
supplements often provide tailored corporate governance rules that suit the nature of the close 
corporations.  
3. Statutory Remedies 
a. Dissolution 
Dissolution is widely listed in most states’ dissolution laws as “the principal vehicle used by 
legislatures, courts, and litigants to address the particular needs of close corporations.”75 Most 
states offer the minority statutory grounds based upon which it may seek dissolution of the 
                                                 
75 See Thompson, Cause of Action at 709. 
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corporation.76 Nevertheless, courts have differed in the circumstances under which they grant this 
harsh remedy as corporate statutes lay various grounds for judicial dissolution.77 
b. Alternative Remedies 
With respect to the severity of involuntary dissolution and in avoidance of such an extreme 
remedy,78 legislatures have provided courts with greater flexibility to impose less drastic remedies 
in oppression cases for on-going businesses (instead of these viable businesses’ being wrecked by 
dissolution). The courts, in turn, are more inclined to grant alternative reliefs short of dissolution.79 
Some alternative reliefs that corporate statutes make available to the courts are the appointment of 
the custodian, reorganization of the corporation’s charter and bylaws, or a forced buy-out.  
One of the judicially-applied alternative remedies is mandatory buyouts.80 The buy-out 
provision forces corporations to buy the shareholding of the complaining shareholder at a fair 
market price. Some courts may order a buy-out even in the absence of statutory or judicial 
                                                 
76 Except in Delaware, Kansans, and Oklahoma states, these states deny the involuntary dissolution of a 
close corporation unless it has two shareholders with equally divided ownership interests. See supra note 
63. Note that these three states have adopted alternative remedies to solve the dilemma of minority 
shareholder oppression. Such an alternative is the appointment of custodians. Also, Delaware and Kansan 
have special statutes for close corporations that offer additional remedies, if the corporation elects the 
close corporation status. See Thompson, Cause of Action at 709. 
77 See, e.g., Rogers, Alaska Close Corporations at 58, (A minority shareholder may sue based on the 
available grounds for dissolution, which “[includes]: (1) that the majority has engaged in the gross 
misconduct []; (2) that there is deadlock; and, (3) in the case of corporations with fewer than thirty-five 
shareholders.” Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the 
complaining shareholders.) 
78 See Matthew C. Lucas, Revoking the Irrevocable Buyout: Aligning Equity with Due Diligence in 
Corporate Dissolution, 75 ALB. L. REV. 15, 15 (2011) (referring dissolution of the business as “one of the 
most acrimonious, expensive, and, by almost all accounts, unpopular of legal remedies available in 
business litigation.”) 
79 Some of the alternative remedies include changes or cancelation of any provision of the incorporation’s 
articles, the bylaws, corporate decisions, the sale of the corporate property and franchises of the 
corporation to a specific purchaser, removing officers or directors, requiring an accounting ,or ordering 
payment of dividends or damages. See, e.g., The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, 
embraced by several states, has nine examples of remedies. 
80 See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, Simple Solution, at 665, (asserting that a “buyout of the complaining 
shareholder's shares is also the rule in eighty percent of the states: about forty states provide this remedy, 
either through statute or through common law.”) 
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authorization, or even in the absence of a request to the court by the corporation or a majority 
shareholder. 
4. The Statutory Criminalization 
Another statutory approach to protect the corporation and the interests of its shareholders is 
the statutory criminalization of some malfeasance by corporate officers and directors. 
Criminalizing misconduct acts as a deterrence, especially when it entails severe penalties, such as 
fines, incarceration or both.81  
B. The Judicial Protection 
Courtrooms are the battlefields for the oppressed to restore justice and have some sense of 
fairness as the management of their corporations along with their business partners deprives them 
of their rights. This puts a burden upon the courts to re-balance the relationships between the 
owners in light of the special nature of the close corporations on the one hand, and the fairness and 
equity principles on the other.  
The courts play an indispensable role in promoting justice and fashioning doctrines and rules 
that are applicable to close corporations, while legislatures might have overlooked the differences 
between public corporations and close corporations in drafting corporate statutes and codes. In the 
United States, for instance, courts across the country have given birth to several judicially-created 
doctrines and principles that fill the gaps the legislative left in the handling of the close 
corporations.82 They have always intermeshed laws with the altering business atmosphere. 
                                                 
81 It will be thoroughly analyzed later in this research. 
82 This claim, however, is not without controversy; the Delaware Supreme Court in Nixon v. Blackwell 
ruled against the creation of judicial doctrine to shelter minority shareholders from oppression, and 
asserted that it is within the legislative branch to formulate such a doctrine or rule. See Matheson & 
Maler, Simple Solution at 663. 
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Along with Common law, some state legislatures have empowered courts with an array of 
delegations over the close corporation matters. For example, defining oppression as a cause of 
action,83 and imposing statutory remedies such as dissolution, buyouts, and the assignment of a 
receiver or custodian. Some courts have even gone beyond the statutory functions (and sometimes 
authorization)84 assigned to them in the protection of minority shareholders, so they manufactured 
the heightened partnership duty on majority shareholders, in addition to the conventional corporate 
duties of care and loyalty owed by majority shareholders, as directors and officers, to the 
corporation. 
The Heightened Partnership Duty upon Majority Shareholders  
A number of U.S. courts have adopted an enhanced duty that a close corporation majority, in 
its shareholder’s capacity, owes the minority shareholders a heightened duty of care akin to the 
duty upon partners in the partnership, where the relationship between partners is of “utmost good 
faith”85 and trust and confidence.86 Judges have become more inclined to broaden the minority 
shareholders’ ability to file a direct cause of action against the majority’s breach of duty.87  
The birth of the partner-like fiduciary duty offers a greater extent of protection for the minority 
shareholders because this sort of protection is assumed to be tailored to any given circumstances, 
in aid for the trapped and oppressed minority shareholders.88 To find a breach of this duty is a 
                                                 
83 See the discussion about oppression and the U.S. judicial definition in § II, D.  
84 See Thompson, Cause of Action, footnote 70, (emphasizing that courts lean to grant alternative 
remedies even in the absence of legislative ground or statutory authorization to grant a remedy). 
85 James M. Jr. Van Vliet & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders 
Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 252 (1998) (referring to the 
heightened duty of shareholders as a “golden rule” in a corporate setting). 
86 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009) (confirming that minority 
shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty of “utmost good faith”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 
N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975) (“Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders must be 
one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed.”) 
87 supra note 84. 
88 Id. 
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question of facts, yet the breach of the duty in close corporations oftentimes arises out of the 
disproportionate treatment against the minority, the frustration of its reasonable expectations, or 
the freeze-out or squeeze-out action.89 Without a heightened duty, some conduct may be 
considered oppressive, unfair to the minority, yet their legality would be undoubted if courts 
examined the action under the ordinary duties of care and loyalty.90 
However, the degree of the protection afforded to the minority shareholders by the judiciary 
(by its broadened definition of oppression or the creation of the enhanced duty) has received a 
great deal of criticism, namely by the advocates of the contractarian view and the scholars of law 
and economics. An optimal level of protection for minority shareholders, they contend, is reached 
by shareholder’s contracting ex ante. 
C. Contractual Protection 
In the view of contractarians,91 the corporation is a nexus of contracts into which individuals 
out of their own free will enter.92 In this context, shareholders should contract for their protection. 
                                                 
89 For further thorough illustration of the three categories and U.S authorities on the subject matter, See 
Id. 525–561. 
90 In opposition to this claim, another competing viewpoint, in accordance to standard law and economics, 
argues that imposing an additional duty upon the majority shareholders factually wrongly empowers the 
minority with an additional weapon, and the understanding of close corporations in Delaware will 
eventually dominate in the corporate law. Instead, shareholders are better protected by contracting ex 
ante. For an insightful look at this counterargument, see Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close 
Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 490 (2004). 
91 See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1161 (2011) (citing contractarians as those who “view corporate law as simply a modest extension of 
contract law.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on 
the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989). 
92 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (asserting that a 
corporation is a “web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations . . . ”); Michael 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–80 
(2006). 
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Contracting before investing is often believed to be the best approach for the minority shareholders 
to guarantee their rights, safeguard their expectations, and preclude the shareholder opportunism.93 
The contractual protection for minority shareholders comes in a variety of devices that are 
tailored to meet the expectations of shareholders and affirmatively shield them from opportunistic 
or oppressive conduct. Some predominant devices commonly used in the protection of the 
shareholder expectations are shareholder agreement, long-term employment contract, and the 
incorporation of protective provisions in the corporation bylaws and charter.94 
1. Shareholder Agreement 
The shareholder agreement is a prominent device to protect the interests of not only the 
minority shareholders but also the majority ones.95 It is a contract frequently utilized in support of 
the efficient and sustainable operation of the firm. Moreover, it serves as a gap-filling device for 
the loopholes that are left unfilled by the legislation.96 To keep up with the rapidity norm of the 
business, contracts are undoubtedly faster to respond to corporate contingencies than enacting new 
laws or amending current ones.97 
                                                 
93 For insightful discussion about the contractual approach to shareholder protection, see Paula J. Dalley, 
The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 221 (2004) 
(opposing the courts’ intervention as it may “rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority”); 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 229 
(1991) (emphasizing the importance of contractual devices to ensure the flow of returns on investments); 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (stating that shareholders 
who desire more freedom to dissolve the corporations should bargain for such a right before investing).  
94 F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS – EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1975) 
95 A consensual shareholders’ agreement represents a comprehensive understanding among all 
shareholders about the expectations of each one of them before they embark upon a business. 
96 See Charles R. Jr. O’Kelley, Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 253 (1992) (“The close corporation contract assigns primary gap-filling 
authority to majority shareholders, and gives secondary, discretionary gap-filling authority to courts.”) 
97 See F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 121, 143–146 (1987). 
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Drafting such a contract requires in-depth knowledge of the existing corporate-related laws 
and case laws, as well as skills to extrapolate the future from the status quo of the would-be 
business partners.98 Many of the business partners’ clashes and conflicts are negative outcomes 
following shareholders’ oblivion to what awaits them down the road.99 At the outset of the 
business, shareholders are often short-sighted as they fail to apprehend the potential struggles and 
oppression in the absence of the protective provisions beforehand.100  
For a robust protective shareholder agreement, attorneys and legal practitioners are well-suited 
to perform such work. It is exceedingly advised that soon-to-be shareholders should have their 
legal representatives draft and review this agreement before they are bound to it. Such 
representatives are widely acquainted with the regulatory framework of the corporations, and more 
familiar with the judicial decisions involving a close corporation’s wrangle. They shoulder the 
burden to examine shareholders and figure out any potential dissension that may occur during the 
lifetime of the corporation.101  
The protection of minority shareholders through the shareholder agreement comes in forms of 
a non-exhaustive list of protective and preventive provisions and clauses that can be fashioned to 
meet the shareholders’ needs case-by-case. Such clauses are, for instance, veto power, restriction 
on the transfer of shares, and a choice of law clause.102 It is of the attorneys’ duty to point out to 
shareholders the consequences of each provision, such as the advantages and disadvantages of the 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 See infra note 107. 
100 See infra note 107. 
101 Molano Leon, Ricardo, Shareholders' Agreements in Close Corporations and Their Enforcement, the 
Student Works and Orgs. at Digital Commons, Georgia Law, paper. 89 (2006). 
102 Supra note 97. 
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provision and any substitutional course of action as well as the problems it entails in a court of 
law.103 
2. Long-Term Employment Contract 
In return on their capital investments, shareholders expect to occupy salaried positions in their 
corporations. A well-fashioned employment contract can fence such an expectation in a precaution 
against exclusion or deprivation of working for the corporation.104 To have a protective 
employment contract, shareholders are advised to tie part of their remunerations with the 
prosperity of the corporation in the form of, for example, bounces or percentages of profits. 
Another protective clause is one that guards the shareholder-employee against any oppressive 
termination of employment, failure to renew the contract or breach of it. Examples of this sort of 
clause are liquidated damages, severance package, mandatory offer to purchase the shareholder’s 
shares or a lifetime pension.105  
3. Protective Provisions in Corporate Charters and Bylaws 
Another contractual approach to effective protection for the minority shareholders is to include 
the corporate charters and bylaws some provisions that ensure the minority shareholder’s 
participation in the management and decision-making.106 Such a provision is the unanimity or 
super-majority vote requirement for appointing the members of the board or deciding on 
fundamental corporate actions (e.g., mergers and share issuance). These provisions implicitly 
embolden shareholders to veto opportunistic transactions. To back up these provisions, minority 
shareholders should be continuously represented in the board of directors to exercise their 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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bargained-for rights, which can be attained by, for example, the share classification and the 
staggered board provision. 
Tackling close corporation issues beforehand through contracting may sound ideal on the book, 
yet this is not always the case in the world of close corporations, which are dominantly owned by 
family or people sharing interpersonal bonds.107 In reality, the enthusiasm to commence the 
business with blind trust among shareholders hypnotizes them so that they cannot foresee anything 
but success and a lucrative business ahead.108 Furthermore, minority shareholders at the kickoff of 
a business often lack the bargaining power to contract for their rights. Also, this approach requires 
minority shareholders to squander much time and bear high costs.109 In addition, contracts demand 
reliability upon the judiciary to construe and enforce them, yet the judicial bodies of developing 
countries at large still run behind the rapidly-developed business sector, including corporations.110 
Therefore, this infers that vigorous interventions by the statutory and judicial branches to monitor 
and keep corporations in check are of great necessity.111 
                                                 
107 See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 108 (2010) (stating that 
shareholders of close corporation oftentimes “lack either the foresight to plan for the breakdown of their 
relationship, or could not easily figure out how to balance the dangers of freeze-in against the risk that a 
member would use a power to dissolve the corporation to oust a comember.”); Benjamin Means, A 
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1163 (2011) (“[F]ellow 
investors are often family members or friends. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that investors 
often fail to anticipate and bargain against future oppression, especially regarding problems that may not 
surface until later generations assume control of the business.”) 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1164, (claiming that “if an investor has plenty of both, and thinks added clarity is worth the 
bother, there is a limit to what can be effectively dealt with ahead of time”). 
110 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,109 
HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) ([A] company law that depends on fast and reliable judicial decisions is 
simply out of the question in many emerging markets.); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989) 
(contending that long-term contract requires “judicial involvement[that] is not an aberration but an 
integral part of such contracting”). Coffee characterizes the judicial monitoring as a “key tradeoff” in that 
“we counterbalance contractual freedom with ex post judicial review.” Id. at 1621. 
111 See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1163 (2011) (“In a long-term contract rife with gaps that a party can exploit to further its own interests at 
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In sum, if the minority shareholders fail to defend their expectations and protect their own 
interests through bargaining for their rights,112 they still should be sheltered by a protective 
legislature and judiciary. Even if each approach has its role, they all work hand in hand to serve 
the trapped minority shareholders and their interests in close corporations in conjunction with the 
corporate norms. 
Conclusion 
Although the terminology of minority shareholders and close corporations breed confusion, it 
is of importance to settle upon the meaning of these terms throughout the research as they describe 
shareholders with no power over the management of the corporation that is unlisted on a securities 
market. This definition of minority shareholders and close corporations offers a broader meaning 
since it is not only limited to who owns less than a half of the capital but also it embraces 
shareholders who have majority ownership interests but lack the power over the corporation’s 
administration. In addition, it encompasses close corporations that would not have the close status 
under the numerical limit on shareholders. 
Worldwide, the close corporation’s structure has often caused inherent difficulties for some 
shareholders. The minority shareholders often fear being trapped in a corporation whose shares 
are not freely alienable. Furthermore, these shareholders commonly expect to occupy a managerial 
capacity as it is the primary source of return on their investments. Such expectations, however, are 
often frustrated unless they are bargained-for. Also, the special feature of centralized management 
                                                 
the expense of the other parties to the agreement, the possibility of bad-faith opportunism12 is ever-
present and robust judicial monitoring seems not only helpful, but necessary.”) 
112 See Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 394 
(1990) (highlighting the significance of the judicial branch in shareholders’ arrangements as “a close 
corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for all parties necessarily depend on 
unstated assumptions. A fully contingent contract cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts 
is used to support these assumptions”). 
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may lure majority shareholders into engaging in oppressive or opportunistic conduct against 
others. These widespread issues of minority shareholders in closely held company call for the 
intervention to rectify the minority’s situation. 
In response to the those above and in protection of the vulnerable standing of the minority 
shareholders, the legislative and judicial branches have intervened to recognize the distinctive 
needs of the close corporations and the knotty problems they pose. This recognition comes in a 
variety of forms (such as the judicially-developed “reasonable expectation” standard in the U.S. 
or the special statutory supplement designed for close corporations) to ultimately protect the 
minority and curb any abusive conduct by the majority. These curative interventions come as some 
minorities fail to protect their expectations and prevent any potential misconduct and oppression 
against the minority through ex ante contracting. The contractual approach is another device to 
address minority shareholder problems, yet such an approach is less effective in the absence of 
equal bargaining power among parties.  
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Chapter Two: Corporate Laws and Regulations of Business Organizations 
in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
“Laws should be like clothes. They should be made to fit the people they are meant to serve.” 
 
        Clarence Darrow 
 
 
Motivating Hypothetical 
After Saad realizes the issues associated with his father’s offer and the complexity of the 
corporation structure, he is now wondering how corporations operate in Saudi Arabia, and by what 
laws and regulations his father and he will be bound. Before jumping into the internal legal system 
of the corporation, he wants to learn about the regulatory framework governing the corporation 
and be educated about how public companies differ from close ones.  
The Scope of Chapter Two 
This chapter aims at delineating the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia and sets up the legal ground 
upon which the corporation is incorporated and regulated. It is divided into two sections. The first 
section offers a comprehensive overview of the legal structure governing Saudi corporations. This 
includes a historical snapshot of the inception and the developments of the Saudi corporate laws 
and regulations. The second section maps out the unique structure of the ownership in the region. 
This encapsulates, on the one hand, the ownership structure of publicly-traded corporations 
(including state-controlled corporations, and family-controlled corporations) and the ownership 
structure of closely held corporations by state and family, on the other hand. 
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Part I. Laws and Regulations of Saudi Corporations 
A. Principal Laws 
1. The Commercial Court Law (CCL) 
In 1931 and before the unification of the Kingdom, the Commercial Court Law launched the 
advent of regulating commerce in the region.113 It consists of 633 articles that govern a range of 
commercial activities, such as the bills of exchange, maritime commerce, and the corporation.114 
Only seven out of 633 articles were cut to regulate corporations. These articles provided no 
elaborate guidelines but the types of business organizations it considered lawful at that time.115 
The deficiency of the CCL to regulate broad aspects of corporate activities (e.g., the incorporation, 
the governance, the dissolution, and the liquidation) alongside the growing number of the 
companies necessitated the enactment of a new and separate law recognizing the recent 
socioeconomic developments.116 
2. The Companies Law of 1965  
In response to the call of modernization following the oil discovery in the region and the 
absence of governing rules for corporations, the state issued its first-ever corporate law to regulate 
                                                 
113 The founder of the Third Kingdom, King Abdulaziz, promulgated the Commercial Court Law on the 
second of June of 1931 by royal decree No. 32. This Law was mainly drawn on it French counterpart, and 
“ . . . was among other civil, maritime, criminal and civil and criminal [sic] procedural legal changes 
brought about in the [nineteenth].” See AlMajid at 174. See Also George N. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to 
Law Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 730 (1988). 
114 AlMajid, at 174. 
115 These organizations included general partnership, limited liability partnership and joint-stock 
corporation. See Almajid, at 176 (attributing the adoption of these organizations to their origin in the 
Islamic literature).  
116 Id. (asserting that even though the Law is still “valid in principle”, a bunch of its articles and rules 
were superseded by more specialized statues and laws in different areas. For example, companies law, 
negotiable instruments, and “other single-purpose regulations with limited competence and scope”). 
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all sorts of organizations existing at that time.117 It raised the number of forms of organizations 
allowed to operate to seven.118 Like other Saudi laws and regulations at that phase, the Law copied 
virtually the Egyptian Companies Act, which was fashioned after the French Companies Code.119 
Emphasis should be added that the Law affirmed strict conformity with Sharia in implementing 
the Law.120 
In a nutshell, the law comprised of 233 articles formulating the regulatory framework for all 
organizations in the region, including the close corporations—principal to the present thesis. 
Chapter five of the Law regulated all aspects of joint-stock corporations (close and public) in 100 
articles.121 Such aspects were the incorporation, shareholder meetings, shareholder rights, merger 
rules, and public offerings. It also embraced a modest level of corporate governance principles in 
terms of the corporation’s internal institutions, involving the board of directors’ responsibilities 
and duties.122 Overall, the Law was argued to have complied with half of the corporate governance 
guidelines recommended by the Institution of International Finance.123 
                                                 
117 Id. n. 618, (questioning the lengthy period (around 34 years) the Saudi legislator took to realize the 
insufficiency of the Commercial Court Law to regulate companies in the region, and claiming that 
discovery of oil laid the foundation for a new era for economic, financial, and social changes). 
118 In addition to the business organizations listed in note 115, the Law included in mutual partnership, 
limited liability company, syndicate company, and company limited by shares. See Article two of the 
Companies Law of 1965.  
119 Compare AlMajid, at 177 with Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian 
Publicly Traded Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, p.64 (2014) (Unpublished 
SJD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) [hereinafter Alrasheed] (on file with the author) (claiming that 
the business culture in the region is American-oriented, and attributing that to “the pioneer oil prospecting 
concession granted to [an] American oil company and the unique political alliance and economic 
partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”).  
120 E.g., Article two of the 1965 Companies Law declared that “[w]ithout prejudice to such companies 
known in Islamic jurisprudence, any company that does not assume one of the mentioned forms shall be 
considered null and void, and the persons who have made contracts in its name shall be personally and 
jointly liable for the obligations arising from such a contract.” Notice that the article exempted companies 
recognized by Sharia from assuming a form of the seven enumerated in the Law without being nulled. 
121 Articles 48–148. 
122 For further insight, see Youseif A. Alzahrani, Rights of Shareholders under Saudi Company Law 1965 
(2013) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brunel University) (on file with the author). 
123 Alrasheed, n. 11 at 3. 
  
43 
The Law underwent several amendments during its lifespan. However, the forty-four-year-old 
could not withhold the bitter criticism about its deficiency and its failure to meet the demands of 
the modern market. What served the country in 1965 and during the transition period became 
incompetent to stand in an ear of largescale financial connectivity and volatility. That resulted in 
the fact that many corporate matters were regulated by scattered ministerial ordinances and 
circulars.124 In addition, the introduction of the Capital Market Law125 and the formation of the 
Capital Market Authority abridged the Companies Law’s jurisdiction over public corporations.126 
3. The Capital Market Law of 2003 and the Accompanying Rules 
Earlier before the passing of the Capital Market Law, the securities market127 had been 
regulated in an ad hoc approach that did not correspond with the increase in the economy and the 
governmental trend to enhance the private sector.128 The market was subject to various regulations, 
every one of which was intended to attain different ends, but holistically they aimed at regulating 
the market in principle. Not to mention the overlap among ill-defined authorities in charge of 
                                                 
124 AlMajid, at 177, 180. 
125 See infra Chapter 2. Part I. A. 3.  
126 AlMajid, at 179. 
127 It is claimed that the beginning of the modern trading system for shares is traced back to two 
occasions: first, the establishment of a ministerial committee, comprised the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Commerce and the Governor of Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, and responsible for almost 
all security-related activities, such as establishing a share-trading system and supervising it, by Royal 
decree No1230/8, on April 24th, 1983. The second was the establishment of the Saudi Share Registration 
Company, in charge of administering shareholders’ records, share certificates, and facilitating the 
transferring of share ownership. For further history about the inception of Saudi securities market, See 
FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, p. 180–184, Lambert Academic Publishing (2014); Sultan 
Alabdulkarim, An Evaluation of Investors Protection in Secondary Securities Market: A Comparative 
Study of Regulatory Regimes in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, p.248–254 (2012) (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Newcastle University) (on file with the author); Mohammed T. Alsanosi, Corporate 
Governance: The Saudi Arabian Capital Market and International Standards, Ch.4 (2010) (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leicester) (on file with the author). 
128 Sultan Alabdulkarim, An Evaluation of Investors Protection in Secondary Securities Market: A 
Comparative Study of Regulatory Regimes in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, p. 248–254 (2012) 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Newcastle University) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Alabdulkarim]. 
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fulfilling their creation’s purposes made it difficult for foreign investors to risk their capitals in 
such a market. 
As the economy was growing, and the necessity to attract direct foreign investments was 
escalating, the country sensed the need for a more explicit, yet comprehensive legal framework 
that would gain the trust and confidence of investors, mainly foreign ones.129 Evidently, economic 
changes, as argued, precede legal developments.130 While the economic and financial sources 
abounded in the region, the country suffered from a scarcity of regulatory foundations.  
Therefore, in 2003 the country introduced a significant piece of legislation that crafted the 
foundation for a new world for investments in the Saudi securities market.131 The Capital Market 
Law passage marked the end of chaotic sittings deterring the entry of foreign capitals and blocking 
the prosperity of the Saudi economy.  
The sixty-seven-article Law guarantees flexibility and efficiency of the market. To do so, a 
governmental authority with financial, administrative autonomy was created as enshrined in article 
four of the Law.132 Moreover, to promote the protection for investors and shareholders, the Law 
ordered the establishment of the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes.133 
In exercise of its power, the board of the Capital Market Authority, since its establishment, has 
issued a cluster of rules and implementing regulations controlling the market, listed corporations, 
and would-be ones. Such regulations include the Listing Rules of 2004, the Corporate Governance 
                                                 
129 Id. at 225. 
130 George N. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 750 (1988). 
131 It was issued by Royal Decree No. M/30, on July 31, 2003. 
132 Article 4.A stipulates that “[a]n Authority to be named the ‘Capital Market Authority’ shall be 
established in the Kingdom and shall report directly to the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall 
have a corporate personality as well as financial and administrative independence. It shall be vested with 
all powers necessary to discharge its duties and functions under this Law. The Authority shall enjoy 
exemptions and facilities enjoyed by public corporations. Its staff shall be subject to the Labor Law.” 
133 Article 25.G.  
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Regulations of 2006, Prudential Rules, Merger and Acquisition Regulations, Market Conduct 
Regulations, Authorized Persons Regulations and the Corporate Governance of 2017.134 
In sum, with a deficient corporate law at that time, the Capital Market Authority played an 
essential role in supervising and monitoring not only the stock market but also the public 
corporations. The Capital Market Law empowers the Authority, with well-defined capacity, to 
build investors’ confidence and preserve the integrity of the market’s framework and institutions 
by all means.  
4.The Companies Law of 2015 (CL) 
Since the enthronement of King Salman (January 23rd, 2015), after the death of his 
predecessor, King Abdullah, the country has been experiencing far-reaching changes in its policies 
across the board.135 One of the noteworthy changes was the passage of the most long-awaited piece 
of legislation, the Companies Law of 2015.136 The Law has been enthusiastically welcomed by the 
                                                 
134 For additional regulations and rules, see the Capital Market Authority’s website, https://cma.org.sa.  
135 One of the significant changes the country has ever experienced, on political level, were the rewriting 
of the royal succession and the advancing of assertive foreign policy. See David Blair, Saudi Arabia’s 
Quiet Revolution as King Salman changes Royal Succession, Tel.: World News (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/11571482/Saudi-Arabias-quiet-
revolution-as-King-Salman-changes-royal-succession.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017), and Ben Hubbard, 
Saudi King Rewrites Succession, Replacing Heir With Son, 31,( June 21, 2017), N.Y. Times: Middle East, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-
salman.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017). 
136 There is no exaggeration in describing this law as “the most long-awaited piece of legislation.” 
Almajid in his book, which was his Ph.D. thesis, notes that “[a]ccording to the Minister of Commerce, 
Abdullah Yamani, the bill of the new Companies Law has been passed to the Prime Minister, King 
Abdullah, waiting for the issuance of the new law by a royal decree . . . ” The Minister’s press 
announcement was on January 24th, 2007. See Alsharq Alawsat Newspaper, ed. 10284, Jan 24, 2007, 
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=10284&article=403215#.WbwrxMbMyCQ. 
More than 20 months later, Almajid questioned why the Law was not officially promulgated, and he 
expected to be announced within months. See Almajid, n. 632 at 180. Five years after the long waiting, 
the Law finally came into light and was promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/3 on November 9th, 2015, 
published in the Saudi Gazette (Um Al-Qura) on December 4th, 2015, and went into effect on May 2nd, 
2016. 
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corporate public, including shareholders, stakeholders, directors, executive officers, and 
academics. 
With an optimistic tone, the CL has been regarded as a revolution and one of the most 
significant laws the country has legislated recently. As one commentator states, the goals of the 
Law are to reinforce the developmental role of corporations to serve the national economy, to 
attract foreign capitals, to boost the role of the private sector, and ease the entry of Saudi 
entrepreneurs into the market.137 Moreover, the CL is of paramount importance to carry out the 
Saudi 2030Vision as it promotes the bases for an institutional work environment and ensures a 
high level of corporate governance practices in the Saudi corporate world, which will foster the 
transparency and the protection of shareholder’s rights.138 
Speaking of form, the CL, in a nutshell, consists of twelve chapters embracing a total of 227 
articles. The first chapter of the Law contains general rules applicable to all forms of enterprises 
recognized by the Law, such as the glossary. The other next five chapters are well-organized as 
each legally-recognized enterprise form is singled out in a separate chapter. The Law abandons 
three types of corporations that were recognized under the old Law, cooperative corporation, 
partnership limited by shares and variable capital company.139 The canonical forms of enterprises 
in Saudi Arabia today are the partnership, limited partnership, unincorporated joint venture, joint-
stock corporation, and limited liability company. 
                                                 
137 FAISAL M. ALFADEL & SALEH A. ALBALWI,  ديدجلا تاكرشلا ماظنل ةسارد :ةيدوعسلا تاكرشلا نوناق يف طيسولا
 ماع رداصلا١٤٣٧ رداصلا ةينهملا تاكرشلا ماظنو ـه ماع١٤١٢ـه  [ THE ANATOMY OF THE SAUDI COMPANIES 
LAW: A STUDY OF THE NEW COMPANIES LAW OF 1437H AND THE PROFESSIONAL 
COMPANIES OF 1412H] 7-8 (L. & ECON LIBR. 2017) [hereinafter the Anatomy of Saudi CL]. 
138 Id. 
139 There is no officially announced justification for why these three types were abolished, yet it may be 
logically attributed to the rare use of these corporate entity forms during the lifetime of the old Law. Cf. 
Francis Patalong, New Saudi Arabia Companies Law: Effective 2016, AL TIMIMI & CO. (Dec. 2016), 
http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-14/december-january-3/new-saudi-arabia-
companies-law-effective-2016.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017). 
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In terms of substance, the Law has many salient features, as opposed to the superseded one. 
One of the most significant features is the official recognition of the one-owner enterprise, in the 
form of single-shareholder joint-stock corporation and one-member limited liability company.140 
In the past, multiple one-person corporations were incorporated in exception to the Law, namely 
stated-owned corporations, where the government was the sole shareholder.141 Another feature is 
the clear-cut definition of the authorities controlling and supervising the enterprises.142 The role 
played by the Capital Market Authority following its foundation brought about sort of perplexity 
in terms of which controlled which.143 The old Law assigned the regulating authority to the 
Department of Companies at the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, yet the Capital Market 
Authority was exerting power over listed joint-stock corporations without regulative frontiers. 
Now, the Law commissions the Ministry of Commerce and Investment with the regulatory 
authority over all types of enterprises, excluding listed joint-stock corporations, which is statutorily 
subject to the control and supervision of the Capital Market Authority.144 The recognition of the 
holding company is also a remarkable feature of the Law. Even though there were a number of 
companies that claimed the holding status for their businesses, there were no rules or guiding 
principles to govern them.145 In practice, if the enterprise wanted to operate as a holding one, it 
would be formed as a joint-stock corporation or limited liability company, and then the title 
                                                 
140 See infra Chapter 3. Part I. E. 
141 E.g., the Saudi Railways Company (SAR), http://www.sar.com.sa/About-SAR/SAR-History.aspx, and 
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO), http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home.html. See also 
MOHAMMED H. ALJABER, يدوعسلا يراجتلا نوناقلا [ THE SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW], 179 ( 4.ed. 1996) 
[hereinafter Aljaber]. 
142 Article 1 defines the Competent Authority in charge of the Law as the Ministry of Commerce and 
Investment, and “ . . . as for joint-stock companies listed in the Capital Market, the Competent Authority 
shall be CMA.” 
143 See supra ch.2, I, A, 2&3. 
144 See supra n. 142. 
145 E.g., The Kingdom Holding Co. 
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“holding” would be added to its name without entailing any legal ramifications or being bound by 
any governing rules. However, the new Law singles out the seventh chapter for the regulatory 
framework for the holding corporations.146 After all, the Law features an enhanced corporate 
governance framework that embraces global measures and principles alongside a range of 
sanctions, which are explored and analyzed later in the thesis. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the fact that much ink has spilled over the distinct aspects of 
the Law (with optimism and enthusiasm) should not overlook the challenges and implications the 
Law may fetch. Its ink is barely dry. Since its issuance, the implementing regulations have not 
been announced yet. Amendments to the Foreign Investment Law in accordance with the new Law 
has not been addressed, which should be done in the very soon future, as the custom and practice 
take time to adapt. Also, subordinate regulations may be of necessity to provide details about the 
Law in a way that renders the Saudi corporate legal framework more responsive to broader global 
trends.147  
                                                 
146 The seventh chapter of the Law contains five articles. Article 182 defines the holding company as “a 
joint-stock or a limited liability company that aims at controlling other joint-stock or limited liability 
companies, called subsidiaries, by owning more than half of the capital of such companies or by 
controlling the formation of their boards of directors . . . .” Article 183 enumerates six legitimate purposes 
of holding companies, including managing its subsidiaries or participating in the management of other 
companies in which it owns shares and providing support thereto, investing its funds in shares and other 
securities, and owning real property and movable assets necessary for its operations. Article 184 
emphasizes that “[a] subsidiary may not acquire shares in a holding company. Any action to transfer the 
ownership of shares from a holding company to a subsidiary shall be deemed null and void.” Article 185 
require holding companies at the end of each year to prepare consolidated financial statements that 
include its subsidiaries, in accordance with recognized accounting standards. Article 186 mandates 
holding companies to abide by the provisions set forth in this chapter and other provisions of the Law not 
conflicting therewith, depending on the type of company adopted. 
147 Since the passage of the new Law, several articles and reports have done interesting comparisons 
between the two Laws. The authors of these comparisons have utilized a variety of novel formats, such as 
matrixes and graphs, to make the comparisons look alluring and easy to grasp. E.g., Alain Sfeir & Nouf 
Aljoaid, The New KSA Companies Law in Focus, CLYDE & CO. LLP, CORP. News (Apr. 2016) (on file 
with the author), and 
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B. Supplementary Rules and Regulations 
1. The Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating to Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations 
(RRPUC) 
 In acknowledgment of the special nature of close corporations, the Minister of Commerce and 
Investment, by the power vested in him,148 announced by a ministerial resolution the Regulatory 
Rules and Procedures Relating to Unlisted Joint-stock Corporations (RRPUC).149 In principle, 
these rules signify an unprecedented step forward for the world of close corporations in the 
region.150 
In a few words,151 this resolution includes eleven chapters and forty-eight articles covering a 
range of corporate matters that correspond to the unique structure of close corporations. Such 
matters are the remunerations of the board of directors, the use of technology to conduct general 
shareholder assembly, share buybacks, share sales, mortgaging of shares, issuance of preferred 
shares, share conversion, distribution of dividends, issuance and sales of preemption rights. 
Furthermore, the resolution includes official four appendixes, three of which are concerning 
mortgaging of stocks, and the fourth is an authorization form.152 
Given that most Saudi business establishments are non-listed encourages the Competent 
Authority to appreciate these businesses and acknowledge their pressing, structural issues in their 
corporate governance. The inconsistency of the corporate governance framework with the social 
and economic basis of close corporations gives rise to deficiencies and may not realize the goals 
                                                 
148 It is prescribed in Article 225 that “ . . . 2- the Minister and CMA’s Board shall, each within their 
jurisdiction, issue necessary decisions for the implementation of the provisions of the Law.” 
149 See supra Ch.1, IV, A (https://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1480082743260579300/). 
150 This Ministerial Resolution is written in Arabic and has not been officially translated into other 
languages, namely English. Therefore, the author strives to translate these rules in a way that closely 
mirrors the exact meanings in Arabic context. 
151 An extensive reading and analysis of these rules are situated in the fourth chapter later in this thesis. 
152 See supra n. 150. 
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of the corporate governance, such as the reduction of agency problems and transaction expenses.153 
This calls for effective legal governance mechanisms that offer protection for shareholders from 
the misconduct of others.154 Whether these rules afford an adequate degree of protection for 
minority shareholders against the misconduct of controlling shareholder or the opportunism of the 
board of directors is of the research questions. The research answers it through an in-depth analysis 
of these rules and the rules of the Companies Law to come up with a good understanding of what 
would optimize the Saudi legal framework of corporate governance for close corporations.155 
2. The Guide of Corporate Governance of Family Companies and its Directive Charter 
The influence of a family over its business in the form of non-listed corporations oftentimes 
generates conflicts and tensions among members of the family and its generations or between 
minority shareholders and controlling ones (in the long run), which weakens the business or 
sometimes leads to bankruptcy or dissolution of the corporation. Therefore, it is highly 
recommended that family companies adopt a charter or guidelines that adopts special corporate 
governance rules tailored to suit the needs of the family business. Unlike the “thorny governance” 
faced by family corporations,156 family businesses with straightforward corporate governance 
rules tend to maintain the sustainability of their corporations, realize their ends, and stay 
competitive and efficacious.157 
                                                 
153 See JOSEPH A. McCAHERY & ERIK P. M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
NON-LISTED COMPANIES 2,3 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter McChathery, Corporate 
Governance of Non-Listed Companies]. 
154 Id. 
155 See supra note 151. 
156 McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 4, (criticizing the informal 
governance of family-owned corporations as it is the main cause these corporations fail to resist “the 
dynamic changes in both the family and business cycle.” Such changes are entry of new generation and 
alteration in the business’s strategy, which renders the business prone to failure). 
157 Id. (arguing that legislators bear the burden to make family businesses implement a good level of 
corporate governance that leads to the success and continuity of the business, and stating an example of 
empirical study that concludes poor governance has led to large declines and significant long-term 
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 In an effort to raise the awareness of family-business owners, the Minister of Commerce and 
Investment announced (July 2014) “the Guide of Corporate Governance of Family Companies and 
its Directive Charter.” The Guide consists of seven chapters with forty articles. It establishes the 
primary foundations for institutional entities and necessitates the significance of adopting 
corporate governance, and the separation of management and ownership. In addition, it calls for 
the adoption of the efficiency and competency standards in electing the management team along 
with finding a precise mechanism for a dispute resolution that protects the business’s reputation. 
This guide also advances selective rules and principles that the family charter should contain, and 
it draws the systematic framework for family businesses to promote transparency and achieve a 
high level of sustainability and stability.158 
As it may be obvious, this ministerial endeavor was before the passage of the CL of 2015. That 
reflects on the Competent Authority’s awareness of the fact that the one-size-fits-all corporate law 
and governance may lead to unwanted results.159 Also, it may not promote the efficiency and 
improve the sustainability and transparency for close corporations—as corporate governance is 
supposed to produce. Nonetheless, the guidelines arguably suffer from a structural defect that they 
are noncompulsory. The family-business owners have the absolute discretion to opt for these rules. 
The good news is that several sophisticated family-owned businesses realized the importance of 
adopting these rules and voluntarily turned them into an inseparable part of their articles of 
                                                 
underperformance. Another advantage of strong corporate governance –besides the fact that it promotes 
effective tools to deal with and settle familial conflicts- is the correlation between effective corporate 
governance of family businesses and the growth in innovations they create because the priority given to 
long-term development over short-term profitability). E.g., Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, Inside the 
Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decision and Performance, 122 Q. J. ECON. 647 (2007). 
158 These guidelines are in Arabic and have not been officially translated into other languages, namely 
English. 
159 McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 3, (claiming that one-size-fits-all 
model does not benefit close corporations due to the disproportionate application of the corporate 
governance principles. Plus, this model results in high compliance costs borne by close corporations). 
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incorporations, after knowing the economic gain and social benefits the adoption of these 
guidelines generate.160  
3. Templates for the Articles of Incorporation and Articles of Associations 
In compliance with the Law,161 the Minister of Commerce and Investment issued templates for 
the articles of incorporation—for each sort of enterprise the Law comprehends. These templates 
aim at easing the incorporation of enterprises (as they include the requirements of the Law) as well 
as certify the CL implementation. It was the first implementation of the Law as Article 225 
instructs the Minister of Commerce and Investment to release these guiding forms within 120 days 
from the issuance date of the Law.162 As far as close corporations concern, they have two templates 
representing the constitutional documents of any joint-stock corporation: a template for the articles 
of incorporation163 and a template for the articles of association (the establishing contract).164 
These embody comprehensive documents for every detail and element of the corporation. In 
addition, they seem to be self-explanatory; however, this does not negate the importance that these 
documents should be filled out by specialists (e.g., lawyers) who can understand the ramifications 
each element produces and inform the owners of the business about them. Another 
recommendation is that these templates should be officially translated into other languages (e.g., 
English and Chinese) to facilitate the entry of foreign investors. 
                                                 
160 E.g., AlZamil Group Holding Company. 
161 Article 225 reads that “1- [g]uiding forms for the articles of incorporation and articles of association 
for each type of company shall be issued pursuant to a decision by the Minister within 120 days from the 
issuance date of the Law, and shall be published on the Ministry’s website. Such forms shall be valid 
from the effective date of the Law.” 
162 See supra Ch.2, I, A, 4. 
163 See template No.3, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, 
https://mci.gov.sa/cl2015/Documents/05.pdf, (last visited: Sep. 18, 2017). 
164 See template No. 4, The Ministry of Commerce and Investment, 
https://mci.gov.sa/cl2015/Documents/06.pdf, (last visited: Sep. 18, 2017). 
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4. The Corporate Governance Regulation of Unlisted Corporations (CGUC) 
In the fifth of October 2018, the official gazette published the Corporate Governance 
Regulations of Unlisted Corporations,165 mirroring the steadfast commitment of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Investment to the continuous improvement of the Saudi market. The Regulation 
consists of a set of rules and principles that ensure the best practices of corporate governance. 
Unlike the Corporate Governance Regulations of listed Corporation, the observance of this 
Regulation by close corporations is voluntary. At the onset, Article two makes it crystal-clear that 
unless it is obligated by the Companies Law or another legal instrument (e.g., resolution, law or 
regulation), the Regulation is mere, non-binding guidance that aims at formulating an effective, 
legal framework for the governance of the corporation.  
The Regulation underscores the importance of an effective framework of corporate governance 
as it reinforces shareholder rights and fosters his role in overseeing the corporation. Furthermore, 
effective corporate governance ensures transparency, integrity, and fairness of corporate 
transactions as well as it offers effective tools to handle related-party transactions. It also provides 
a healthy environment where corporate officers are held accountable for their actions. The 
Regulations comes to transform these broad goals into applicable rules the corporation may adopt 
to form its governing structure. 
As a critical observer of the regulatory framework of close corporations, it appears to be 
justifiable not to compel all close corporations to follow the CGUC for two reasons. First, close 
corporations vary in their sizes and the number of their shareholders. Therefore, from a cost-benefit 
analysis, it may be unwise to subject all corporations to unnecessary rules and other aspects of 
governance as they may be costly and may render few or no direct benefits to the corporation. The 
                                                 
165 See Um Al-Qura Gazette, https://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1538687463811469400/ .  
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adoption of best corporate governance practices should be decided by the corporation itself based 
on a wide range of variables, including the size of the business and the sophistication of its 
shareholders. A corporation with the statutory minimum of share capital and shareholders may 
realize no benefits from complying with the CGUC but uncalled-for costs. 
Second, as it is exposed later in this research, the Companies Law has already regulated the 
governance of close corporations by a host of obligatory rules that, from a comparative point of 
view, constitute unprecedented intervention by the legislative body in regulating corporations and 
their governance structure. Therefore, mandating more governing rules⎯and thus shrinking the 
contractual freedom of shareholders⎯ would be counterproductive as it overregulates the 
corporation and thus makes it a less attractive form of business. 
Part II. The Ownership Structure of Joint-Stock Corporations in the Saudi 
Market 
Overview  
Most of the comparative and empirical studies of corporate governance establish a solid 
connection between the system of corporate governance the country adopts, and the structure of 
ownership dominating its corporations. It is regarded as one of the essential elements in shaping 
the country’s pattern of corporate governance, bearing in mind the differences among corporate 
governance systems.166 
                                                 
166 E.g., the German corporate governance requires a representation of the labor in its corporation, while 
such a requirement does not exist neither in the United States nor the United Kingdom. 
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To elucidate, public corporations in common law countries (e.g., the United States) enjoy 
dispersed ownership structure,167 which involves a corporate governance system that addresses the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders.168 On the other hand, in Civil law 
countries—and arguably developing countries— concentrated ownership is the prevailing 
structure of corporations, and hence a different system of corporate governance is undoubtedly 
required to handle the agency problem between majority shareholder and minority ones this 
time.169  
In Saudi Arabia, it is argued that concentrated ownership structure prevails in its corporate 
arena.170 Studies attribute the phenomena (the concentrated ownership structure) to a couple of 
reasons.171 First, the legally driven reason. The fact that the Saudi Companies Law of 1965 was 
vastly affected by the French Companies Code makes it fair to characterize the country as a civil 
law country, so a concentrated ownership pattern is expected to dominate.172 Another reason that 
justifies the domination of concentrated-ownership structure is a politically driven one. It is 
contended that countries with monarchies or a lack of democratic systems tend to have highly 
concentrated ownership structure, and thus a fragile protection system for minority shareholders, 
resulting in substantial shareholdings in the hand of few moneyed families together with the 
                                                 
167 In fact, 94% of listed corporations in the United States do not have a single shareholder with more than 
25% ownership of their capitals. See S&P Global Market Intelligence, 
https://marketintelligence.spglobal.com.  
168 Which is also known as the first agency problem that involves conflicts between the owners of the 
corporation (principals) and its managers (agents). The problem resulting out of such a relationship is how 
to ensure that managers advance the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and put them ahead of 
theirs. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 30 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) 
169 See supra n. 56, 57.  
170 See Almajid, at 207–211. 
171 One of the most cited studies that undertakes the analysis of ownership structure is the study conducted 
by La Porta and his colleagues. According to their “laws matter” theory, legal institutions widely 
influence the structure of ownership in corporations. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999). 
172 Id. 
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government.173 For an observer of the Saudi market, it is evident that both reasons are valid to 
explain the presence of concentrated ownership structure in the market.  
Another explanation that has debated the validity of the former reasons (legally driven and 
politically driven) to substantiate the divergence of the ownership structure and thus the existence 
of various corporate governance schemes is a financially motivated reason. Advocates of this 
thought suggest that the development of financial markets better expounds differences in corporate 
governance systems.174 Financial markets with a strong presence of all internal institutions and 
easy access to capital tend to have diffused ownership structure, whereas underdeveloped financial 
markets with difficult, if not impossible, and prohibitive access to the capital tend to subsist 
concentrated ownership patterns because of the lack of public participation in the market.175 Such 
a reason may be logical and tenable to explain the concentration of ownership in Saudi public 
corporations, knowing the slow growth of the Saudi market.176  
As far as close corporations are concerned, it may be misapprehended that there is not much 
to say about the ownership structure of close corporations since these enjoy an omnipresent 
                                                 
173 See PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 80,81 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 2005); Almajid, at 208, (adding also the political transparency side by side with firm-level 
one because of the confidence and trust it brings about for investors). 
174 One of these advocates is John Coffee, who contends that neither the politically driven reason nor the 
legally driven one suffices to explain the divergence in corporate governance systems and corporate 
ownership structure. See John C. Jr. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the 
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 82 (2001). 
175 See Maren Hanson, The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB 
L.Q. 272, 291 (1987) (claiming that concentrated ownership exists not only in Saudi Arabia but also other 
developing countries due to the role played by the governments in managing and supervising business 
behaviors). 
176 See Almajid, at 209 (asserting the plausibility of such reason given the history of Saudi market 
development. Since the establishment of Saudi market in 1948, the Saudi market stayed underdeveloped 
until the introduction of technology in stock-trading in the 1990s. Plus, the public, namely small 
investors, refrained from trading in the market because of the high cost of share trading at that time. In 
addition, the Saudi market suffered from unpopularity at that time because the scarcity of initial public 
offerings aimed at the public). 
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ownership structure where there are a few shareholders who are quite often family members and 
friends. Nevertheless, it is of importance to zoom out for a bit and examine the ownership structure 
of the joint-stock corporations, listed and unlisted. This helps to accurately evaluate the corporate 
governance principles and its development in the region. 
A. Public Corporations 
1. State-Controlled Corporations 
The existence of the Saudi government in the Saudi market is of a unique nature. Through 
three major governmental agencies, the Saudi government exerts a great deal of clout over the 
Saudi public corporations.177 Governmental investments in listed corporations come through the 
considerable ownership held by its agencies: The Public Investment Fund, the Public Pension 
Fund, and the General Organization for Social Insurance, alongside its direct ownership in some 
major corporations in the market.178 Given that the value of Saudi stock market is about 1739.3 
billion riyals,179 while the value of government shareholdings is collectively 706 billion riyals 
                                                 
177 Almajid, at 212, (considering that the Saudi government’s involvement in stock-trading has always 
remained paramount since the establishment of the market). 
178 However, the government has lately transferred many of its direct shareholdings to the Public 
Investment Fund, making the Fund alongside the other two agencies the sole investment vehicles by 
which the Saudi government participates in the market. E.g., the Saudi Electricity Company announced 
that the three billion government-owned shares representing circa 74% of the total capital of the company 
were registered for and transferred to the portfolio of the Public Investment Fund. See Alarabiya.net, 
Three Billion Shares: The Government’s Stake in Saudi Arabia Electricity (Sep. 17, 2017) 
ALARABIYA.NET, Arabian Markets, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/companies/2017/09/17/ ليجست-3-
تارايلم-  امهس-ةيموكح-ةيدوعسلاب-ءابرهكلل .html, (last visited Sep. 22, 2017). 
179 As of September 17, 2107, Argaam reported an increase of the market value of shares and enclosed to 
the report a detailed table with the shareholdings’ percentages and values of all types of investors, 
including government agencies and foreign investors. See Argaam, Saudi Market: The Market Value of 
Shares Slightly Higher to 1739.3 Billion [Saudi] Riyals by the End of Las Week and Ownership of 
Foreign Investors Constitute 4.62% of them (Sep. 17, 2017), Argaam, Special, 
http://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/505129, (last visited: Sep. 22, 2017). 
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(161.84 billion U.S. dollar),180 it becomes unmistakable that the government is the largest 
shareholder with ownership of circa 40%.181 
To perceive the controlling role of the largest shareholder, contemplate that all CEOs and 
boards’ members of listed corporations the government invests in are appointed, hired and fired 
by the government. This shows the financial and directorial influences of the government over 
listed corporations, which leaves no room for other shareholders, irrespective to the size of their 
shareholdings, to have a say or active role in the management of a corporation the government 
dominates its ownership.182 
In a brief assessment of this ownership structure, a set of benefits have flown from this structure 
into the region. For example, corporations with substantial government shareholdings tend to be 
better managed, financed, and more lucrative than other listed corporations.183 Shareholders show 
a tendency to invest more in corporations with an influential state standing, rather than other 
corporations with no such thing. Another advantage is that government-controlled corporations184 
showed earlier strong signs and genuine intention to adopt the best practices of corporate 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 This percentage represents the market value of the shareholdings of government agencies alone, so it 
must be higher than 40% if the government investments in other funds are counted, such as the Central 
Bank of the Kingdom. See Almajid, n.731.  
182 See Almajid, at 213 (adding another layer of complexity as members of the board elected by other 
party than the government may not challenge the government representatives’ managerial decisions, 
specially decisions involved major consequences for the corporation. Therefore, “politics [Alamjid 
thinks] interact with economics in a way which seems to let the former impose its wishes on the latter.”)  
183 This may stem from the fact that these corporations enjoy a noncompetitive market in terms of the 
services and the nature of their business activities, such as utilities service corporations and corporations 
in the petrochemical industry. See Almajid, at 214. 
184 Such corporations were Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (the world largest petrochemicals 
manufacturers) and Saudi Telecom Company (STC). It is worth noting that the 70% of SABIC’s shares 
are government-owned, and the remaining of 30% are publicly traded on the Saudi market. See SABIC’s 
website, https://www.sabic.com/en/about, (last visited: Sep. 22, 2107). 
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governance, which made them positive models of efficiency other corporations began to copy.185 
Another benefit derived from such structure is that investments in state-controlled corporations are 
of the lowest risk investments because of the protective role played by the government. Such a 
benefit leads to shareholders feeling safe, more reassured when they invest in these corporations, 
and fearless of these corporations going bankrupt.186 
As this ownership structure has yielded some benefits in the region, it nevertheless suffers 
several disadvantages. The major downsides of the structure are the lack of liquidity and diversity 
in the market. The government seems to play a passive role in terms of trading volumes. Indeed, 
it tends to hold its shareholdings to preserve a long-established position, which has resulted in 
insignificant numbers of stocks available for the public and thus has made the market illiquid. The 
illiquid market finds it challenging to entice investors, especially foreign ones, which makes the 
market less diverse and limited to certain players: government agencies, institutional investors and 
affluent families.187 
2. Family-Controlled Corporations 
One of the main traits of developing markets is considerable familial ownership of its 
corporations. Oftentimes government ownership and family ownership are in parallel, so are they 
in Saudi Arabia.188 Family-controlled corporations undeniably are of the leading actors in the 
                                                 
185 One of these corporation was Savola, a family-controlled corporation. Savola had a head start in 
setting up its corporate governance code. See Almajid, n. 736, (talking in detail about the Savola’s 
corporate governance experience). 
186 Id. at 214. 
187 Id. at 216, (arguing that active trading by governmental agencies may result in massive price swings 
because of the illiquidity of the market and its incapability to ingest a voluminous bowl of shares). Also, 
this serves as evidence for the financially driven reason for the concentration of ownership in the 
Kingdom.  
188 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999) (stating that family ownership dominates developing countries and 
those whose laws flow from the Civil law system, so rich families are eager to hold large shareholdings in 
the listed corporations on the market). 
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corporate arena in the region,189 given the economic role of these corporations and their substantial 
contributions into the national gross demotic product (GDP).190 
The foremost aspect of these corporations is that their shares are traded on the market 
exchange, while they were originated as family businesses in the form of sole proprietorship until 
close corporation, whose owners continue to manage the business and exert control thereupon even 
after the business’s going public.191 Surely, such an option (conducting initial public offering) 
depends exceedingly upon several factors, and not practically available to all close corporations.192 
Such factors are the size of the corporation, its readiness to go public and the sophistication of its 
departments to the financial market. These listed corporations ordinarily bear titles of the families 
owning controlling shareholdings in the corporations.193 The controlling shareholdings of 
                                                 
189 These corporations operate across all sectors, such as cement, transport, agricultural, petrochemicals 
and so on. 
190 See supra ch.2, I, B, 2. (referring to the guide of corporate governance of family businesses).  
191 Almajid, 217, (asserting that positions of wealthy families are further heightened due to their bonds 
with members of the royal family). See also Michael Field, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, (1985). 
192 A noteworthy advance—as part of the ongoing development of the Saudi stock market and in an effort 
to accomplish the goals of 2030Vision– is the introduction of Souk Nomu in late February 2017. This is a 
parallel share market that serves an alternative platform for small-sized and medium-sized corporations 
with the intention to go public. This option affords less stringent listing rules, yet trading on this market is 
restricted to qualified investors. It is an optimal option for close corporations that are not ready yet to 
conduct IPO but desire to finance their businesses through the sales of shares, so Souk Nomu represent a 
preparatory stage for these corporations to make them ready to be listed on the main market. To learn 
more about Souk Nomu, see generally Tadawul, Nomu - Parallel Market (2017) Tadawul, Knowledge 
Center, https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/knowledge-center/about/parallel-market, (last 
visited: Sep. 26, 2017). 
193 E.g., AlDrees, AlOthaim, AlZamil, AlRajhi, AlHokair and AlTaiar corporations. The family’s 
ownership in each of them exceeds 40% of total capital. For details about capital allocations, see Tadawul 
website, 
https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/home/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zij
YycLQwtTQx83D39zA0cAx09wtzCQowNDEz1w_Wj9KPwKTGBKjDAARwN9AuyswMBEuKIug!!/d
z/d5/L0lDUmlTUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBLzROV3FpQSEhL2Vu/.  
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corporations held by Saudi families may also result from the direct possession of the corporation’s 
shares through the market by a single family.194  
The extreme concentration of corporate ownership in the hand of few families has resulted in 
immense fortunes for the latter. In addition, members of the families enjoy a great deal of latitude 
over the corporation as they occupy high-ranking positions and senior offices (e.g., corporate 
officers and managers). This may produce some concerns and raise questions about the integrity 
of their decisions and whether they advance their interests, rather than the interests of the 
corporations and all its shareholders as owners of the business.195 
3. Publicly-Owned Corporations 
The last category of listed corporations are the ones with fragmented ownership structure, 
where neither the government (through its agencies and funds) nor well-heeled families hold a 
controlling proportion of the corporation’s capital.196 This type of corporations includes small-
sized and medium-sized businesses and has a little impact on the stock market.197  
The emergence of this sort of corporations and thus the entry of the public into the market are 
attributed to the creation of the Capital Market Authority and its following efforts to build the trust 
and confidence in the market.198 Its creation was a milestone in the history of stock-trading in 
Saudi Arabia as it was put in charge of regulating and supervising the market. In exercise of its 
                                                 
194 Almajid, at 217, (giving examples of AlZamil family [owning circa 10% of stocks in 4 huge 
corporations] and AlRajihi family [possessing around 20% of share capital of three quoted corporations]). 
195 In principle, capital markets of both developed countries (e.g., Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea) 
and developing countries (e.g., markets of GCC countries) are alike in terms of the ownership pattern 
though there may vary slightly in the level of concertation. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999). 
196 E.g., the IPO of Alinma Bank is a good example of such corporation, when the government offered 
around 70% of its common shares to the public on an equal basis, which widened the base for investors. 
See Almajid, 221.  
197 Id. 
198 The number of IPOs following the establishment of the Capital Market Authority is an obvious sign of 
the active role played by the Competent Authority.  
  
62 
power, the Authority, since its establishment, has thrived in facilitating the market and making it 
more appealing, not only for local investors but also for foreign ones.199 Furthermore, the lack of 
investments channels in the region left the Saudi people with no choice but to invest in the market, 
specifically from 2004 to 2005, 200 when the market was a feasible source of income.201 Moreover, 
since the oil has always been the rationale behind any economic growth in the region and in an 
effort to diversify the national incomes, the government has taken several septs to spur individuals 
to invest in the market as part of economic development.202 
C. Close Corporations 
1. Stated-Owned Corporations 
Corporations are of the foremost inventions of modern history as vehicles to carry out business, 
industrial, and infrastructural purposes by not only individuals but also governments. The Saudi 
government has incorporated a large number of corporations to embark upon a variety of activities 
across the board.203 For instance, the Saudi Railways Company, and the Saudi Arabian Military 
                                                 
199 All fundamental changes by the Capital Market Authority have succeeded in bringing about 
development and investments into the market. Such Changes was the issuance of listing rules and the 
flow of IPOs afterwards. As evidence, see supra note 179 (reporting an increase in the ownership of 
foreign investors to circa 5%). 
200 See Almajid, at 219 (during that time, the share index recorded a dramatic jump of 120% of annual 
growth). 
201 In comparison, people of other countries (e.g., the United Arab Emirates) with similar condition and 
economic resources to Saudi Arabia’s had better investment opportunities and alternatives to select 
therefrom. However, Saudis did not. Therefore, some argue that the investment compass of Saudis 
signaled to the stock market a as a response to the several social and economic changes following the 
increase of oil prices and in repatriation of Saudi capitals overseas following September 11 attacks. See 
Almajid, at 219 (explaining that the Saudi government immobilism led to the failure to accommodate 
Saudi entrepreneurs in the market that suffered shortage of investment opportunities). 
202 Another reason worth bearing in mind is that investors themselves have the right to freely trade on the 
market., unlike other jurisdictions where trading is confined to licensed investors (brokers and 
intermediaries). See also Almajid, at 220 (finding the ability of investors to trade themselves on the 
market a major factor for the massive volume of share-trading on the Saudi market in terms of the 
transactions by individuals, as opposed to those executed by mutual funds and other financial 
institutions).  
203 In fact, all state-controlled corporations (e.g., STC and SABIC) were offered to the public and listed on 
the market and that all backdated the Vision. However, the Vision makes it clear that it is of its mission to 
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Industries Company.204 Most importantly, state-owned corporations undertake huge projects that 
require massive capitals and preexistent infrastructure (e.g., public transportations and airlines), or 
projects with high level of sensitivity (e.g., military industries, oil extraction, and petrochemicals), 
which makes the state-owned corporations oftentimes are the leading corporations across all 
sectors. Private investors may be reluctant to conduct the former category of businesses because 
of the less lucrative appearance of these businesses, at least on the short term, or may not obtain 
the license to conduct the latter.  
Prior to 2015, such corporations would have to be incorporated by a royal decree since they 
were established in exception to the Companies Law of 1956,205 and such an exception had to be 
obtained from the top of the regulatory pyramid, the King. The Law of 2015 rectified the situation 
and filled the gap in the regulatory framework of the corporation as it officially recognizes the 
incorporation of one-person enterprises (joint-stock corporation and Limited Liability Company), 
and they are incorporated—like other forms of enterprises— by a ministerial resolution.206 
Nowadays, most of the state-owned corporations have been offered to the public, and their 
shares are traded on the Saudi stock exchange—even though the government still owns an 
overwhelming majority of these corporations’ shares207— as part of the 2030 Vision to privatize 
                                                 
privatize government services. See 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited: 
Sep. 26, 2017). 
204 This company was incorporated in pursuit of one of the commitments by the 2030 Vision that aims at 
localizing defense industries and repatriate more than 50% of military equipment expenses by 2030. See 
generally 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited: Sep. 26, 2017). 
205 The 1965 Companies Law required in Article 52 a royal decree be issued in approval for incorporation 
of five kinds of joint corporations: concessionaire corporations, corporations managing a public utility, 
corporations receiving governmental subsidy, corporations with the government or a public legal entity as 
shareholder, corporations with banking activities. 
206 See infra Chapter 3. Part I. E. 
207 Supra ch.2. II. A.  
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all state-owned corporations. Nevertheless, the privatization and listing of state-owned 
corporations took place several times before the announcement of the 2030 Vision.208 
This forward movement toward privatizing of government-owned corporations and offering 
their shares to the public is expected to contribute around 65% of the general domestic production, 
instead of 40%.209 Furthermore, it will improve the quality of services and products these 
corporations make, given the entry of new investors into the market and the creation of a 
competitive environment. 
2. Family-Owned Corporations 
Family-owned corporations are the dominant, widespread pattern of ownership in the corporate 
arena in almost every country. These corporations are usually the natural development of the sole 
proprietorships; the growth and expansion of a business over time necessitate the transformation 
of the business into a joint-stock corporation or LLC.  
The nature of management of these businesses varies in its levels of sophistication. In general, 
most of these corporations are founded out of a purely helpful act by owners of a single family, or 
sometimes by owners with personal relationships in common (e.g., friends). Nevertheless, a 
growing number of family-owned corporations have realized the inherent issues associated with 
family-held corporations in terms of the sustainability of the business and its continuity to the next 
generations. Therefore, to tackle such issues at an early phase, these corporations have voluntarily 
adopted a wide range of corporate governance principles in running their businesses with the goal 
of sustaining their existence, captivating other investors and often taking them public.210 
                                                 
208 Supra ch.2. II. A. 
209 See 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited: Nov. 08, 2017). 
210 It is true that shareholdings of family businesses are normally circulated within the family may not be 
transferred to outsiders unless proven by other shareholders. However, the investors may be in the form of 
another acquirer corporation or franchisor, given adoption of corporate governance principles in the 
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Furthermore, the importance of regulating Saudi family businesses stems from the fact that 
Saudi family businesses constitute circa 90% of the operating establishments in the Saudi market 
with an estimated capital investment of 250 billion Saudi Riyals (roughly $67 billion).211 Most of 
these entities are LLCs and close corporations.212 Bearing these numbers in mind, one may imagine 
the leading force of family establishments in the region in various sectors of the national 
economy.213 The Saudi family businesses, as the heartbeat of the private sector, are the major 
employers in the Saudi labor market. Family businesses provide eighty percent of the total 
employment in the private sector.214  
                                                 
management of the corporation makes the corporation more attractive to investors and an appealing target 
for massive capital.  
211 For the sake of academic integrity, these figures have been circulated around for a while and cited in 
various journal reports and some papers. However, the author is deeply skeptical about the accuracy of 
these numbers and to which extent they reflect the reality of corporations’ contributions due to the 
scarcity of statistical or survey data can be relied upon, after examining the methods and variables utilized 
resulting in these numbers and making sure there is no selective bias may adversely affect the results. In 
addition, these numbers are claimed to represent the contribution of family businesses without 
distinguishing between the forms of enterprise (joint-stock corporation or limited liability company) these 
families adopt to carry out their businesses. Furthermore, these figures represent the contributions made 
by all family enterprises, listed and non-listed, which not correspond with the notion that close 
corporations differ from public ones and thus they should be regulated differently. Intuitively, they are the 
majority; however, an official figure is of necessity to better evaluate their positions, laws and regulations, 
instead of seemingly arbitrary numbers. For this research, all figures are assumed true and reliable unless 
proven otherwise. 
212 A recent trend in family ownership structure in their business is to incorporate a holding company and 
transfer their ownership in the operating business into stocks in the holding company, which becomes the 
sole shareholder of the operating business (the subsidiary).  
213 To elaborate, approximately 90% of the operating establishments and businesses in Saudi market are 
conducted by families. Family-controlled firms collectively contribute 50% of non-oil gross domestic 
product. Beyond the scope of the Saudi market, Saudi family businesses represent 48% of all family 
businesses in the Middle East. See the National Center for Family Business, 
http://www.events.csc.org.sa/Arabic/FamilyBusinessesNationalForum/Pages/Event-Sponsors.aspx, (last 
visited: Sep. 18, 2017). 
214 See McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 4, (emphasizing the importance 
of family-owned businesses as they promote economic prosperity, on the one hand, and enhance the 
social welfare on the other hand as they are viewed as job-creating corporations,); Belen Villalonga & 
Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value? 80 J. FIN. 
ECON. 385 (2006). 
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All in all, the importance of corporate governance for family corporations escalates because of 
their vital roles in the Saudi national economy and the creation of jobs in the region. Therefore, 
the CL of 2015 sets forth rules that enhance the corporations’ performance and help them become 
institutional entities. 
3. Start-Up Corporations 
In addition to the traditional form of close corporations (family-owned and small-scale), 
startups and high-tech corporations constitute a vital subset of close-corporation form as they have 
several traits in common, such as few participants, no public market and overlap between capital 
and labor suppliers.215 Startups and venture-capital-backed businesses may be incorporated in the 
form of a joint-stock corporation. Despite the significance of this sort of enterprises as highlighted 
above and being a main target of the new Law, no official record has been established yet 
concerning the number of these corporations. Nevertheless, this research assumes the protection 
of minority shareholders in these corporations as well, whether the position of minority 
shareholder is occupied by an entrepreneur or investor (e.g., venture capitalists). Given the 
formalities of the joint-stock corporation form, one may wonder—yet such a wonder falls beyond 
the scope of this research—whether a startup business should be incorporated in the form of a 
joint-stock corporation or limited liability company in terms of which form could offer the best 
efficiency, flexibility and ability to meet the business’s needs.216 
                                                 
215 See Edward B. Rock; Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and 
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) (concluding that close 
corporation forms are best to answer the needs of businesses with “a high density of match-specific assets 
because this form with its cardinal principle of no pro rata distributions will guarantee the maximizing of 
minority’s interests as majority the majority maximizes its, preventing any opportunistic behaviors).  
216 Id. 
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Conclusion 
Historically, even before the unification of the Kingdom, corporations have received the 
attention of the Saudi legislature through various laws and regulations. It began with only seven 
articles of the commercial code, whereas nowadays several laws and a wide range of regulations 
and circulars regulate the corporate world, alongside multiple authorities dedicated to serve and 
supervise this world. Nevertheless, the development of the regulatory framework of corporations 
did not correspond to the rapid growth of the economy and the evolution of corporations. Two 
significant events throughout the history of corporations are regarded as the cornerstones of 
corporate development. The passage of the Capital Market Law and the foundation of its authority 
mark a watershed in the history of not only the stock market but also public corporations. The flow 
of IPOs and the broad entry made by local investors (following the passage of the law and the 
establishment of the competent authority) betoken the significance of that phase of corporate-stock 
history. It was the first-ever introduction of corporate governance concept into the region. The 
other landmark in the history of the Saudi corporate world is the birth of the Companies Law of 
2015 amid an ocean of sweeping reforms, economically, socially and politically. Many hopes and 
predictable changes have been pinned on the Law; however, it may be early to assess the outcomes 
of the Law and its success in attaining its ends. 
Knowing the undisputable prominence of the corporate governance rules in the success of the 
corporation and the effect of the concentrated ownership structure on the shape these rules have 
led to adopting a couple of corporate governance settings. The dynamic presence of the 
government (the largest shareholder) in the stock market along with the dominance of wealthy 
family over their listed corporations require a different set of corporate governance rules from the 
ones that suit close corporations. They may, however, share the same agency problem where the 
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principal is the minority shareholder and the controlling shareholder is the agent, yet the 
expectations of the principals are contrasting, and so are the protective rules for minority 
shareholders. All in all, the passage of the CL ushers in a new era for the corporations in the region 
with the goal of generating an attractive environment for both local and foreign investors. Such a 
goal requires the strong presence of corporate governance rules that, inter alia, protect the rights 
of the minority shareholders and the newcomers to the market. 
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Chapter Three: Joint-Stock Corporations in the Law† 
 
 
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law.” 
         John Marshall 
 
Motivating Hypothetical 
Saad thinks about accepting his father offer to join him in the corporation. However, he does not 
have the know-how to incorporate the corporation. Furthermore, Saad is also interested in serving 
on the board of directors; however, he is unsure whether his shareholding lands him in the 
boardroom. If so, he would like to know his responsibilities and duties as a director; otherwise, 
Saad wants to know whether he has a voice over the corporate matters if any. In addition, his father 
desires to be both the CEO of the corporation and the chairperson of the board, so Saad is 
wondering about the legality of this desire, and whether he and his father will suffice to serve on 
the board without any outside director. Not to mention the fact that he lacks the knowledge to 
review the books and records of the corporation. 
The Scope of Chapter Three 
This chapter investigates the internal legal framework of joint-stock corporations in Saudi Arabia 
according to the CL regulating corporate institutions, corporate operations, and other corporate 
affairs. This chapter is intended to dissect the rules through an analytical and critical lens, rather 
than descriptive one, yet the description of the rules should be provided to comprehend better the 
detailed analysis and constructive criticism of the Law that follows. First, it starts with a straight 
procedural section about the incorporation requirements, including the incorporation of the one-
person corporation. Second, it casts light on the role of the shareholder and the shareholder 
meetings through which they exercise most of their rights, yet it does not exhaust all shareholder 
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matters as most of them are examined in a later chapter in the context of the statutory protection 
for minority shareholders. Third, the chapter probes the rules of corporate management, including 
the composition of the board of directors, its meetings, and its duties and responsibilities along 
with the remuneration-rewards rules. Fourth, it casts light on the role of the external auditor, 
including its appointment, powers, and tasks. In the end, the chapter concludes with an in-depth 
analysis of the procedural and substantive rules regulating the close corporations. 
Part I. Forming a Corporation 
The incorporation of the joint-stock corporation requires the incorporators to undergo several 
statutory procedures that holistically aim at protecting the interest of not only the owners of the 
corporation but also third parties (e.g., creditors of incorporators).217 Therefore, the Law, similar 
to its predecessor, sets forth precise, comprehensive rules that lead to the nullity as a punishment 
for the failure to obey these rules. Hereunder is a step-by-step explanation of the incorporation 
rules.  
A. Drafting the Establishing Contract and Corporation’s Articles of Association 
The inception of the corporation commences as the founders sign off an establishing contract 
detailing major elements existed in every corporation. Such elements include the names of the 
incorporators, their addresses, the proposed name of their corporation,218 its headquarter, its 
                                                 
† Hereinafter “the Law” refers to the Companies Law of 2015, unless otherwise noted. 
217 The Law defines an incorporator as “any person who signs the company’s articles of incorporation, 
applies for a license for incorporation, offers in-kind contribution upon its incorporation or participates in 
the incorporation with the intention to become an incorporator . . . .” See Article 56. 
218 In regulation of the name of joint-stock corporations, the Law mandates that the name be indicative of 
its purposes, and prohibits naming the corporation after a natural person’s name except in three instances: 
first, the purpose of the corporation is to utilize a patent registered in the name of such person; second, the 
joint-stock corporation decides to adopt the name of its subsidiary whose name permissibly includes a 
name of a natural person; or third, the joint-stock corporation is a result of transformation from any 
enterprise permissible to carry the name of natural person ( e.g., partnership or limited partnership). See 
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purposes,219 its share capital,220 the composition of the board of directors, its lifespan, its legal 
representative, and finally a pledge clause mandating that all signatories commit to undertaking all 
necessary strides to incorporate the business, including the advancement of the capital.221 
In addition to the written establishing contract,222 incorporators are to draft the articles of 
association (bylaws) elaborating the rules by which the corporation will be running. Moreover, the 
bylaws encompass detailed guidelines for several corporate matters. For example, the document 
covers distribution of shares, their classes, issuance of shares, trading of shares, increase and 
decrease of the capital share, regulation of shareholder assemblies, management of the corporation, 
the number of directors, the length of their periods,223 the manner of board membership’s 
termination or expiration,224 distribution of dividends, dispute resolutions, any opt-outs of 
corporate default rules, and the liquidation and dissolution of the corporation.225 
In aid to meet these requirements, the Minister of Commerce and Investments issued directive 
templates for both documents to help the incorporators fulfill the requirements correctly and avert 
                                                 
Article 53 of the CL of 2015. However, many operating establishments, including joint-stock 
corporations, carry the surnames of their owners.  
219 Some business activities require special authorization from the competent agencies in charge of 
regulating and supervising these activities. See infra note 230.  
220 See infra Chapter 3. Part I. C. 
221 See supra note 163, 164. 
222 The approach adopted by the Saudi legislature to require a contract at the outset and to recognize the 
separate personality for the corporation from its owners concurs with the view of corporation as “nexus 
for contracts.” According to this view, corporations are parties to contracts with third parties (e.g., 
suppliers, customers and employees) to carry out the main purpose of the business. In addition, the “nexus 
for contracts” concept results in the separation of the assets advanced to the corporation from the 
ownership of the corporation’s owners. Therefore, the corporation, as the new possessor of these assets, is 
solely liable for the debts and liabilities arising from its operations In fact, Article 52 of the Law reads 
that “[a] joint-stock company shall be solely liable for debts and liabilities arising from its activities.” See 
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (arguing that the economic view of corporation as 
“nexus of contracts” fails to distinguish between corporations and “other networks of contractual 
relationships”). 
223 See infra Chapter 3. Part III. A. 1. 
224 Article 68 (3). 
225 See supra note 163, 164. 
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nullification of or delays in the incorporation process. Also, it sets the minimum information 
needed for third parties to assess the corporation accurately.226 
After the incorporators draft and execute these documents, they are to file an incorporation 
request enclosed with the said incorporating documents to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Investments.227 Upon the verification of all documents, a license incorporating a joint-stock 
corporation is issued by a ministerial decision (MD No.1).228 Nevertheless, if the business purpose 
of the corporation itself requires a special license or official authorization by the competent agency 
regulating and supervising such a business,229 incorporators are to obtain such a license or 
authorization prior to the submission of the incorporation request.230  
This ministerial license does not guarantee the incorporation but merely permits the 
incorporators to move forward with the process of share-capital raising and to hold the 
incorporation assembly.231 Finally, after obtaining the MD No.1, the incorporators are to have both 
                                                 
226 See supra note 163, 164. 
227 Article 57. 
228 An important difference that is noticed in the Law is that the power to issue a “ministerial decision” is 
assigned to two organs: either the Minister or the Ministry. The former himself is solely empowered by 
the Law to compose a committee to temporarily supervise corporations with no board of directors (Article 
69), to amend the nominal value of shares (Article 105.2), to issue the guiding forms for articles of 
incorporation and bylaws for each enterprise recognized by the Law (Article 225.1), and to adopt 
whatever necessary for the implementation of the Law (225.2). Any issue falling within the scope of these 
articles has to be regulated and decided upon by a ministerial decision signed only be the Minister. On the 
other hand, licensing the incorporation of joint-stock corporations (M.D No.1) and announcing the 
incorporation of joint-stock corporations (M.D No.2) are of the Ministry’s powers (Articles 62.1 and 
65.1). Therefore, a ministerial decision may be issued by the Minister, his deputy, or any delegated 
department within the Ministry (e.g., the Companies Department). 
229 Article 60 (1,2). 
230 For example, if the business purpose of the corporation is to carry out telecom services, a ministerial 
decision licensing the incorporating of the business should be issued only after the business has acquired 
the required license from the Communications and Information Technology Commission, since it is the 
sole competent authority in charge of regulating and supervising the telecom sector in Saudi Arabia. 
231 See infra Chapter 3. Part I. B & C. 
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documents notarized by the competent authority.232 233 Failure to notarize these documents or any 
amendments to these documents gives rise to the nullity of the corporation and joint liability 
imposed upon the failing incorporators for any damages to the corporation, partners, or third 
parties.234  
B. Share Capital  
1. Share Capital Requirements 
In building the corporation’s capital, the Law requires a set of demands to be met.235 First, the 
Law presupposes that the capital suffices to embark upon the business purposes,236 yet the 
corporation’s capital, in all cases, shall not be less than 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($ 133,333).237 To 
ensure the seriousness of the incorporators and their solvency to carry out the business, the Law 
demands that at least 25% of the corporation’s capital be advanced and paid up upon the 
incorporation.238 
                                                 
232 For a long time, the competent authority was only the Notaries of the Ministry of Justice. Recently, the 
Ministry of Justice has licensed a number of lawyers to be also authorized notaries alongside the Public 
Notaries across the region.  
233 In practice, the notarization requires incorporators to provide three documents: a letter for the Ministry 
addressing the Public Notary and authorizing the notarization; incorporation’s resolution; and the bylaws 
as approved and stamped by the Ministry. 
234 Article 12 (1, 2). 
235 Building the corporate capital in close corporations differs from public corporations. In the latter, it is 
jointly regulated by the Capital Market Authority and the Ministry of Commerce and Investments because 
it involves initial public offerings. Such a difference is the requirement of underwriting. As far as close 
corporations are concerned, this thesis assumes only the incorporation process of close corporations. See 
Article 58.  
236 Article 54. 
237 No distinction is drawn between listed corporations and unlisted ones. On the contrary, the predecessor 
required that share capital of listed corporations be no less than 10 million Saudi Riyals ($ 2,66 million), 
whereas the capital of unlisted corporation would not be less than 2 million Saudi Riyals ($ 533,333). One 
may see the huge drop in the share capital as statutory encouragement for businesses to transform to or 
form joint-stock corporations. This form of entity is no longer a vehicle deployed for massive business 
projects, but it is now available relatively for all business objectives. 
238 In the past, the paid-in capital required by the Law was at least 50% of share capital. Evidently, the 
lowering of the percentage of paid up share capital and the lowering of the minimum share capital reflect 
the leniency of the 2015 Law and the statutory encouragement to carry out business purposes in the form 
of joint-stock corporations. 
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Second, the corporate capital is to be divided into negotiable, nominal shares of equal value.239 
The Law also requires that par value per share be 10 Saudi Riyals ($ 2,66)240 unless otherwise 
permitted by the Minister.241 Furthermore, the share capital (all or portion of it)242 is to be banked 
to a company-under-incorporation account with an accredited bank in the region.243 The access to 
this account is reserved for only the board of directors after the declaration of the incorporation.244 
Joint-stock corporations’ shares have several statutory features. First, all shares, in general, 
have equal value.245 This helps in several ways: it eases the calculating process of voting during 
the shareholder assembly and eases the distribution process of dividends. Another feature is that 
they are indivisible vis-à-vis the corporation.246 Therefore, if a group of individuals possesses a 
share, they must select one of them to exercise the rights attached to this share. By the same token, 
all individuals are jointly liable for any obligation arising from the ownership of this share.247 
Inheritance and gifts are a common cause for such devolution. 
Last but not least, if some incorporators advance in-kind contributions (e.g., lands, buildings, 
cars),248 it is of the incorporators’ responsibilities to ensure accurate evaluation of their shares.249 
In addition, the ownership of shares issued against in-kind contributions is transferred only after a 
                                                 
239 Article 52. 
240 It is unclear why the Law has set the par value at ten Saudi Riyals, yet going over past IPOs in the 
Saudi market, one may conclude that 10 Saudi Riyals has always fostered small investors and low-income 
people to enter the market and make profits out of these IPOs. 
241 Article 105 (2). 
242 In case the share capital is not paid up in-full, the remaining of share value must be paid within five 
years from the date of the issuance of shares. See Article 106 (2). 
243 Article 59. 
244 Id. 
245 Article 52. 
246 Article 105 (1). 
247 Id. 
248 Article 56. 
249 In doing so, the Law requires that the incorporation request be accompanied with a report with an 
estimate of the fair value of these contributions that is executed by an appraiser or accredited valuator. See 
Article 61 for further procedural information. 
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payment-in-full value is made and full transfer of the ownership of their in-kind contributions to 
the corporation is completed.250  
2. Share Capital Classes 
In principle, the share capital of the corporation consists of “common” shares that entail equal 
rights for and obligations upon their holders.251Nonetheless, corporations may decide to issue 
another class of shares that entails different rights and obligations, which is known as “preferred” 
shares.  
Under the Law, the issuance of preferred shares requires the following: first, the corporation’s 
bylaws allow the issuance of such a class; second, the extraordinary general assembly of the 
corporation votes in favor of the issuance of preferred shares.252 In all cases, the Law recognizes 
preferred shares as non-voting shares, which do not entitle their holders to vote in shareholder 
general assemblies.253  
Instead, preferred shares grant their holders the right to receive a higher percentage of the 
corporation’s earnings, provided that the corporation has set aside its statutory reserve.254 Holders 
of preferred shares are first in line to receive their portions, before any distribution of dividends to 
shareholders.255 In addition, since the preferred shares are non-voting shares, which cannot be cast 
                                                 
250 Article 106 (3). 
251 Further details and explanations of these rights and obligations are provided later in the next chapter 
under the umbrella of minority shareholder rights.  
252 The issuance of preferred shares involves an increase in the share capital of the corporation, which is 
one of few exceptional instances the Law sets a higher voting-passage percentage for than the default 
percentage stipulated in the Law for decisions by extraordinary assembly. See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 
2. b. 
253 Article 114. 
254 The Law obliges joint-stock corporations to build a statutory reserve. In doing so, corporations must 
put 10% of its net profits by every year, and they may cease putting aside the 10% portion upon two 
conditions: first, the statutory reserve has reached 30% of the corporation’s paid-in share capital; second, 
the corporation’s ordinary general assembly votes in favor of discontinuing setting aside 10% of its net 
profits for the reserve. In other words, the board of directors may not make such a decision. See Article 
129 (1). 
255 Article 166 (1). 
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upon any corporate matter, the Law protects the interests of their holders in a variety of ways. For 
instance, besides the fact that they are first in line, the Law prevents the corporation from issuing 
any class of shares that would have priority over the existing preferred shares, or to modify their 
agreed-upon percentage of the corporation’s net profits unless such issuance is approved by the 
holders of existing shares.256 Another protective aspect of this class of shares is that in the failure 
of the corporation to pay— for three consecutive years— the holders of these shares the percentage 
to which they are entitled, the Law grants these holders several temporary rights. They have the 
right to attend shareholder assemblies and cast their votes, or they may appoint a number of 
representatives of them as a class to the board of directors, proportional to their shares in the 
corporation’s capital. Such a right continues until their overdue profits are paid in full.257 
C. Incorporation Assembly 
After notarizing the foundational documents, depositing the share capital into the under-
incorporation bank account and issuing DM No.1, the incorporators must invite all subscribers to 
the incorporation meeting within 45 days from the date of MD No.1 with the proviso that there are 
at least three days between the date of the invitation and the date of the meeting.258 Every 
subscriber and incorporator have a statutory right to attend this assembly, irrespective to their 
shareholdings.259 For the validity of this assembly, the Law requires a quorum of subscribers 
                                                 
256 Such approval is obtained through a special committee consisting of prejudiced preferred-share 
holders, and meetings of this committee is held in compliance with the rules regulating extraordinary 
shareholder assemblies. See Article 89.  
257 Also, this right is exercised through the special committee of prejudiced preferred-share holders as 
class. See Article 166 (2). 
258 Article 62 (1). 
259 This is a new rule the Law introduces in Article 62 (2). In the past, attending any sort of corporate 
assemblies was restricted to only shareholders of at least twenty shares. This reflects statutory recognition 
of minority rights and the necessity of raising its voice in shareholder assembly. 
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holding at least 50% of the share capital,260 and decisions are passed by an absolute majority of 
the shares represented in the meeting.261 In the assembly, subscribers are to elect a chairperson, 
secretary and vote counter.  
The incorporation assembly is held only once in the lifetime of the corporation. It takes charge 
of five statutory tasks.262 First, it ensures that the statutory minimum of share capital, if not paid 
in full, has been advanced. Second, it confers the evaluation report of the in-kind contributions, if 
any.263 Third, it ratifies the final version of the articles of association (the constitution of the 
corporation).264 Fourth, it appoints members of the corporation’s first board of directors and 
auditor if they have not been yet specified in the constitutional documents.265 Fifth, it deliberates 
and ratifies incorporation report of expenses and activities incurred and carried out by 
incorporators. 
All in all, the incorporation assembly appears to be the practical kickoff of the business since 
it is empowered to finalize the business’s constitution and select the members who will have access 
to the banked share capital.266  
                                                 
260 The Law goes farther to regulate cases in which such a quorum is not met. It requires a call for a 
second meeting and deems the meeting valid regardless of the how much of the share capital the attendees 
represent, provided that the meeting takes place after at least 15 days of the date of first one. To avoid this 
protracted procedure, the Law allows for the second meeting to be held after one hour of the period 
prescribed for the first meeting (one-hour rule), provided that the call for the first meeting contains what 
indicates that a second meeting will be held after one hour if case the first meeting is inquorate. 
261 By an exercise of imagination and application of logic, this rule may become problematic for close 
corporations in case the majority shareholder possess more than half of the share capital. That shareholder 
would unilaterally form and finalize “the constitutional documents” of the corporation. 
262 Article 63. 
263 See supra Chapter 3. Part I. B. 
264 In case there are substantive amendments to the articles of association (e.g., change of business 
purpose), the Law requires that it be approved by all subscribers attending the meeting. 
265 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. A. 
266  
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D. Declaration of Incorporation 
The last stride in the incorporation process is the announcement of the incorporation. Within 
fifteen days of the conclusion of the incorporation assembly, the incorporators must submit a 
request for the announcement and enclose to the request three major documents: evidence of 
compliance with share capital requirements, the incorporation assembly’s minutes and decisions 
along with the approved-by-assembly articles of association.  
Upon confirming the completion of the incorporation’s requirements, the Ministry issues a 
ministerial decision (MD No. 2) declaring the incorporation of a joint-stock corporation, and such 
resolution is to be posted on the Ministry’s website.267 Members of the board of directors are to 
register the corporation in the Commercial Registry within a fifteen-day window from the date of 
announcing the incorporation of the corporation.268 
MD No.2 breeds essential results. First, the corporation becomes immune against any action 
invalidating it for a violation of the Law or the articles of association, and such actions are not 
heard, provided that the announcement has been published and the corporation has been 
registered.269 Second, all expenses and activities executed by incorporators for the incorporation 
purposes are transferred to and become borne by the corporation, only.270 
E. The Contractual View of the corporation and One-Person Joint-Stock Corporation 
At the onset of the CL of 2105, Article two words the exact definition of the corporation in the 
superseded Law.271 They both define the corporation as “a contract under which two or more 
                                                 
267 Article 65. 
268 Failure to comply with the registration requirement, or negligence to announce any amendments to the 
articles of association is penalized by the Law with a fine not exceeding 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($ 
133,333). Article 213 (N).  
269 Article 66 (1). 
270 Article 66 2). 
271 See Article one of the Companies Law of 1965. 
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persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, by contributing a share in the form of 
money, work, or both, and share profit or loss resulting therefrom.”272 However, the Companies 
Law of 1965 required a contract between at least five individuals for the incorporation of the joint-
stock corporation,273 and it disapproved of any form of one-person entity (joint-stock corporation 
or limited labiality corporation) because such a concept contradicted the long-standing view of 
corporations as contractual relationships between at least two persons.274 
The requirement of five individuals to incorporate a joint-stock corporation (or even two 
people to incorporate limited liability company) led people to gaming the system and 
circumventing the five-incorporator (in case of joint-stock corporations) or two-member (in case 
of LLCs) requirement by inclusion of sham shareholders and members to just meet the threshold 
requirement. This necessitated the adoption of the one-person enterprise since it was invented in 
part of coping with such gaming. In addition, as mentioned earlier the government needed to carry 
out several projects through corporate vehicles where it was the only owner.275 Therefore, the 
legislature realized the importance of the one-person entity, the need to depart the longstanding 
                                                 
272 Article two of the Companies Law of 2015. 
273 Article 48 of the Companies Law of 1965. 
274 A respectable argument against the view of corporation as a contract by the Saudi legislature is 
introduced by Aljaber in his book [written in Arabic]. Aljaber argues that even though the contractual 
view of corporation might succeed in explaining the complexity of corporation in the past, it has, 
however, become incapable of explicating today corporations due to the major gaps between the 
corporate rules and the general principles of contract. For example, the contract founding the corporation 
not only produces mutual rights and obligations (as all contracts do) but also it creates a new separate 
legal person that has the full capacity and is financially independent. Also, the contract features that it can 
be modified by consent of the majority of the signatories to the contract, while the general principle of 
contract requires consent of all parties to modify it. Contracts in principle are fashioned with the aim to 
reconcile between conflicting interests of their parties, whereas all parties to the contract forming 
corporations share the same goal of profiting therefrom. Instead, he believes that the corporation should 
be regarded as a legal institution of special nature where the role of individuals is limited to accept or 
reject the entry to this institution. This gives grounds for the intervention of the legislator by setting forth 
mandatory rules to attain a cluster of economic and social goals. For further justification of this argument, 
see Aljaber, at 164–165. By the same token, this argument is all-encompassing as it justifies one-person 
entities. 
275 See supra Chapter 2. Part II. B. 1. 
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view of the corporation as a contract, and the acceptance of the patrimony of affectation 
doctrine.276, 277 
In terms of the joint-stock corporations, the Law now requires only two persons, at least to 
submit the incorporation request—in principle and according to the contractual view of the 
corporation stated in Article two.278 Nevertheless, in exception to the statutory definition of the 
corporation, the Law permits the incorporation of the one-person corporation for a few persons.279 
The first category to incorporate the one-person corporation—with no minimum share capital 
threshold— includes the state, public legal persons alongside state-owned corporations.280 The 
second category to incorporate the one-person corporation are corporations whose share capitals 
are no less than five million Saudi Riyals ($ 1,33 million). Consequently, the natural person may 
not incorporate the one-person joint-stock corporation.281 
  
                                                 
276 Similar to the recent acceptance of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 of one-person entity, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) just approved and accepted the single-owner entity. See Article 8 (3) of the UAE 
Federal Law No.2 of 2015 on Commercial Companies, (“Notwithstanding the provision of Clause 1 of 
this Article [“a company is contract under which two or more persons . . .”], a company may be 
incorporated or held by a single person in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”) 
277 The refusal of one-person entity in favor of the contractual view of corporation according to the 
concept of unity of patrimony (a person is answerable for all his debts and obligations with all his present 
and future assets, and he or she cannot earmark some of the assets for a specific debt, which is known as 
patrimony of affectation) is common in the corporate laws of several Arab countries such as Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, and Oman. See HIEWA I. ALHAIDARI, ONE PERSON LIMITED LIABLITY 
COMPANY: COMPARTIVE STUDY, 121–122, (AL-HALABI LEGAL PUB. 1st. ed. 2010). 
278 In case shares of a joint-stock corporation descend to one shareholder that does not satisfy the statutory 
exception for one-person joint-stock corporation stated in Article 55(e.g., by involuntary means such as 
inheritance or a voluntary one such as a purchase of these shares), the Law grants this corporation a one 
year period to rectify its condition in compliance with the Law. Such rectification may be in one of the 
following forms: conversion to one-person limited liability, inclusion of at least one shareholder, or 
transfer of the shares’ ownership to a legal entity that is allowed by law to incorporate one-person joint-
stock corporation. Failure to take one of these corrective actions during the statutory one-year window 
results in termination of the corporation by the force of law. See Article 149.  
279 Article 55. 
280 Examples of state, legal persons are the Public Investment Fund and the Public Pension Fund. 
Examples of State-owned Corporations are the Saudi Railways Company, and the Saudi Arabian Military 
Industries Company 
281 However, the Law recognizes the right of natural person to incorporate one-person entity, in exception 
to the principle, only in the form of limited liability company. See Article 154 (1).  
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F. Incorporation Process Design  
 
 
 
 
  
Drafting Incorporating 
Contract and Articles of 
Association 
(Constitutional 
Documents)
Depositing the share 
capital into under-
incorporation bank 
account 
Notarizing Incorporating 
Contract and Articles of 
Association
Within 
45 
days
Issuing the Incorporating 
License (MD No. 1)
Within 
15 days 
Calling for Incorporation 
Assembly
Requesting 
Announcement of 
Incorporation
Within 
15 
days
Announcement of 
Incorporation (MD No.2)
Registering the 
Corporation in the 
Commercial Registry
De Jure Joint-Stock 
Corporation in the 
Market 
  
82 
Part II. Shareholders 
Shareholders are of the foremost bodies (shareholders and board of directors) the Law 
recognizes in the regulation of the corporations.282 They are indeed the corporation’s owners who 
due to the structure of the joint-stock corporation are divested of their right to operate and run the 
business. Nevertheless, they as a class enjoy a supreme power and arguably have the upper hand 
over a bundle of corporate matters as explicated hereunder.  
The question of which body has the superior power emerges in most corporate governance 
studies. Some arguments favor the management organ,283 while others align with the shareholder 
as a class.284 Nonetheless, the advocates of both arguments agree upon the importance of both 
institutions, and they would not vest a great deal of power in one body without being checked.285 
Therefore, corporate governance comes to enhance the legal and economic environment of the 
                                                 
282 Most of shareholder rights, the statutory protection of them, and other shareholder-related research 
questions are explained in a separate part later in this thesis. 
283 E.g., Delaware with its pro-management corporate law and judiciary is arguably on the top of the 
advocates’ list that favor corporate management and thus entrust them with wider powers over corporate 
affairs as a means of maximizing shareholder value. Not to mention the pervasive influence of Delaware 
corporate experience over a wide range of jurisdictions. See generally, William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–68 (1974); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 
n.61 (2002) (“All state corporate codes provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the 
board of directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents.”); Jill 
E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 
674 (2006); William W. Bratton; Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 152 (2008). 
284 A prominent proponent of the view of shareholder superiority and power over the management, 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law school, who has written several commonly-cited articles in 
support of shareholder superiority and power over the management. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth 
of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
285 See Angualia Daniel, Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board in Corporate 
Governance p.4 (2010) (attributing the collapse of the corporation to “[t]he lake of proper check on such 
powers . . . .”) (Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612962) (last visited Oct. 12, 
2017). 
  
83 
corporations and strike a balance between the two internal organs. Distinctive thoughts of the 
separation between ownership and control generate different corporate governance models that 
vary in their views and boundaries of the rights and responsibilities of each body.286 Of course, the 
variations and differences among these models stem from the fact that each model has been 
designed to reflect and suit the corporate environment it develops in.287 Such differences between 
these models are the characters in the corporate arena,288 the ownership patterns,289 the 
sophistication of the capital market,290 the regulatory framework of the country,291 and the sorts of 
corporate powers every organ enjoys.292 
As far as the Saudi corporate governance concerns, one may extrapolate from what has been 
explained earlier that the concentrated ownership structure (with the strong presence of the state) 
involves corporate governance that leans toward shareholders and empowers them.293 Evidently, 
the shareholders capitalize the corporation, incorporate it, decide the remunerations for its board 
members, and formulate its policies toward the corporation’s ends.294 The CL of 2015, however, 
                                                 
286 The most notable corporate governance models in corporate scholarships are the U.S. model, the 
Japanese model, and the German model. 
287 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (attributing the variation of corporate 
governance across the world to ownership structure, coordination and information costs along with 
different levels of enforcement of corporate laws). 
288 For example, the German model, copied by Brazilian corporate law as well, adopts a two-tier board 
system that includes a board in charge of the executive role and another in charge of the supervisory role, 
whereas the U.S. and Japanese models have one board for the management of the corporation. Other 
jurisdictions (e.g., France and Italy) grant corporations the option to select either board system. See 
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 50 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) 
289 See supra Chapter 2. Part II. 
290 See supra Chapter 2. Part II. A. 
291 See supra Chapter 2. Part II. A.  
292 E.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (“In countries where controlling 
shareholders are common, appointment and decision rights are often relatively strong, enabling such 
shareholders to exert influence directly over the management.”) 
293 See infra Chapter 3. Closing Analysis. 
294 See L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 150 (Stevens. 3rd. 1969) 
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draws, in a very detailed way, the powers’ limits of each body and the statutory duties assigned to 
it. Accordingly, members of the board are agents serving the interests of the shareholders as a 
class.  
It is worth reminding that close-corporation shareholders oftentimes, if not always, serve as 
directors of the corporation,295 so it is rare to trigger the issue of separation and superiority of 
power in such situations due to the absence of the agency problem it causes between the 
shareholders (principals) and corporate managers (agents). Nevertheless, the issue shifts to bisect 
shareholders into minority shareholders (principals) and controlling shareholders (agents). Striking 
a statutory balance between the two appears to be critical as to neither over-empower the 
controlling shareholders in a way that results in oppression nor to overprotect the minority 
shareholders in a way making them the controlling ones. 
To balance these powers, the Saudi Law articulates the rights and the duties of both bodies in 
terms of substance and form. Moreover, the Law considers that both bodies (the board of directors 
and shareholder as a class through their statutory assemblies) compose the management of the 
corporation. To elaborate on the management portion of the shareholders as a class, the emphasis 
is placed upon the channels through which they perform their statutory roles: shareholder general 
assembly and audit committee.  
A. Shareholder General Assembly 
The Law obligates the joint-stock corporations to have two sorts of general assemblies 
(ordinary and extraordinary shareholder assemblies), where shareholders raise their voice and 
                                                 
295 It is also known as “compliance board”, where the company only has the board to fulfil a legal 
requirement, as opposed to “quasi-independent board” consisting of directors with no ties to the 
corporation apart from their capacities as directors. See Catherine Bromilow & John Morrow, Family 
Business Corporate Governance Series: What is a Board’s Role in Family Business? 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (June 2014).  
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exercise their statutory rights. The Law elaborates on shareholder assemblies and the rules 
governing them, as these assemblies are regarded as the parliament of the corporation whose 
shareholders reserve the right to decide a wide range of corporate affairs the Law assigns to them 
as a class. As these assemblies differ from each other in terms of substance, they, however, enjoy 
some statutory similarities in terms of the form these meetings take. This research, therefore, 
bisects the regulatory framework of the shareholder assemblies into two categories: statutory 
similarities and statutory differences.  
1. Statutory Similarities 
a. Assembly Call 
 The Law obligates the board of directors to call for all shareholder general assemblies requires 
the chairperson of the board to preside these assemblies.296 The invitation to shareholder meetings 
may be required by law,297 or based on a request from the corporation’s auditor,298 the audit 
committee,299 or a number of shareholders representing all together no less than 5% of the 
corporation’s share capital.300 
Another similarity between shareholder assemblies is that the invitation to attend the assembly 
is to be published in a daily newspaper circulated in the province where the headquarter domiciles. 
                                                 
296 In the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson is to preside the shareholder meeting, or any 
member designated by the board of directors in the absence of the two. See Article 86 (1).  
297 See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. a. 
298 See infra Chapter 3. Part IV. C. 
299 See infra Chapter 3. Part II. B. 2. 
300 In addition, the Law specifies several conditions where the call for an ordinary general shareholder 
assembly is by not the board of directors but a resolution issued by the Competent Authority, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Investment: in case the board’s failure to conduct the statutory meeting according to 
Article 87; failure of the board to satisfy the minimum number of members to conduct a valid meeting; in 
case of violation of the Law or the corporation’s bylaws; in case of mismanagement of the corporation; in 
case of the board’s failure to call for the meeting within fifteen days upon request by the audit committee, 
auditor, or shareholders representing at least 5% of the corporation’s share capital. The call is based upon 
a request by shareholders representing 2% of the corporation’s share capital, and the Competent Authority 
is to send out the call within 30 days from the date of the request. See Article 90 (2,3). 
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This invitation must be published ten days prior to the date of the meeting. As an alternative, the 
meeting’s invitation may be mailed out by registered mail. A copy of the meeting call and agenda 
must be provided to the Competent Authority during the publication period.301 
b. Assembly Minutes 
Corporations are to maintain minutes of every shareholder meeting. Such minutes include the 
number of shareholders attending the assembly (or their delegates), the shareholdings they 
represent personally (or by proxy), decisions made (including the number of assenting votes and 
dissenting ones), and a synopsis of the meeting deliberations. The Law requires that the minutes 
of every shareholder assembly be recorded and kept following every meeting, and they have to be 
signed by the chairperson of the assembly, its secretary and the vote counter.302 
c. Voting System and One-Share-One-Vote Rule 
Shareholders are empowered to fashion their voting system in terms of the required quorum 
for issuing resolutions upon corporate affairs.303 For example, they may stipulate in the bylaws 
that a vote of supermajority is required for deciding directorial remunerations opting out of the 
default rule (requiring a simple majority vote at an ordinary general shareholder meeting). Failure 
to adopt opt-out provisions in the corporation’s bylaws implies the acceptance and thus adherence 
to the Law’s default rules. 
The shareholder’s discretion to design the voting manner, nonetheless, is not absolute. The 
Law imposes several restrictions on the exercise of this power. For instance, alterations to the 
default quorum and voting-passage requirements in shareholder assemblies.304 In addition, the Law 
imposes the one-share-one-vote rule as it underscores the equality of shares in terms of the rights 
                                                 
301 Article 91. 
302 Article 97. 
303 Article 95 (1). 
304 See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. 
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and obligations they produce (except for preferred shares).305 Also, the Law mandates that the 
cumulative voting be followed in appointing directors to the corporation’s board. Opt-out 
provisions concerning these corporate affairs are null and void.306  
d. Online Assembly and Voting (Virtual Meetings) 
The Law has taken an unprecedented step allowing the corporations to conduct shareholder 
meetings through cutting-edge technology.307 Evidently, this permission, in theory, encourages 
shareholders to play their roles without bearing a high cost of coordination and information. To 
utilize this statutory permission, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment sets forth the 
implementing rules therefor.308 Such rules are that the shareholder’s participation has to be via 
instant visual and audio transmission of the shareholder assembly.309 Also, a shareholder is to be 
enabled in the online meeting to effectively participate, express attitude, discuss and cast votes 
upon the meeting agenda.310 In addition, close corporations may allow shareholders to cast their 
votes online even if they do not attend the assembly, provided that online voting is available before 
and during the shareholding meeting (no delegates required). Plus, the online voting period is open 
for no less than three days before the date of the meeting, and the online voting upon every item 
of the meeting agenda is halted as the discussion and voting on that item conclude.311 Most 
importantly, the online voting and online meeting do not subrogate the holding of the in-person 
meeting at the venue specified in the invitation, nor do they deprive the shareholder of attending 
                                                 
305 An excessive explanation about these rights is provided in the next chapter.  
306 Further analysis of the cumulative Voting approach adopted by the Law is provided later under the 
minority shareholder representation in the boardroom as part of the statutory protection of this class. 
307 Article 86 (3). 
308 See supra Chapter 2. Part I. B. 1. 
309 See the Organizing Rules for Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 8 (1.A). 
310 Id. Article 8 (1.B). 
311 Id. Article 8 (2.A, B, C, D). 
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in person.312 In other words, the physical shareholder meeting is always compulsory, and the online 
meetings and voting are optional alternatives for the corporation to ease the exercise of the 
shareholders’ rights, and they do not substitute for the physical meeting, making it a hybrid 
physical/online shareholder meeting.313 The board of directors should adopt whatever necessary 
to verify shareholders’ identities,314 and it may also communicate the invitation to the meeting 
online in exception to the newspaper publication or registered mail method.315 
e. Compliance with Articles of Associations  
The possession of the corporation’s shares implies that the shareholder is bound by the 
constitutional documents and all decisions made through the shareholder assemblies so long as 
they comply with the corporation’s articles of association, regardless of the shareholder’s presence 
and absence or his agreement and disagreement to these decisions. However, if the decision is 
made to the contrary to the corporation’s articles of associations, such a decision is deemed void 
and null.316 For example, if the articles of association or the corporation’s bylaws set a higher 
quorum than what is required by the default rule for the validity of general shareholder meeting, 
this quorum has to be satisfied. Otherwise, the meeting is invalid, so are its decisions. 
                                                 
312 Id. Article 8 (3). 
313 From a shareholder perspective, the requirement of holding in-person meeting offers protection for less 
tech-savvy shareholders to raise their concerns and direct questions to the management directly. From the 
management’s point of view, however, this requirement appears to be expensive and time-consuming as 
hosting physical meetings often involve room-renting and catering costs, which could be avoided by 
holding online-only meetings. In addition, shareholders are less likely to confront and investigate 
directors in online-only meetings, which relieve the latter from awkward situations. For further 
information, see Robert Richardson, Glass, Lewis & Co., Virtual-Only Shareholder Meetings: 
Streamlining Costs or Cutting Shareholders Out? Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance 
and Financial Regulation (Nov. 30, 2017) (casting light on the trend that a number of public companies in 
the U.S. hold virtual-only shareholder meetings with no in-person meetings), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/30/virtual-only-shareholder-meetings-streamlining-costs-or-
cutting-shareholders-out/, (last visited: Dec. 1, 2017).  
314 Id. Article 9. 
315 Without prejudice to Article 91 of the 2015 Law (explained earlier in Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a). The 
Organizing Rules for Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 11.  
316 Article 98, 99. 
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2. Statutory Differences 
The Law stipulates that every joint-stock corporation have two kinds of general shareholder 
assemblies (ordinary and extraordinary ones), each of which is entrusted with a cluster of statutory 
obligations and powers. The differences between these assemblies stem not only from the duties 
and powers allocated to them but also from the varying statutory quorum prerequisite for the 
validity of each assembly as explained hereunder. 
a. Ordinary General Shareholder Assembly 
The call for ordinary general shareholder assembly may be either statutory or necessary. To 
clarify, every joint-stock corporation must hold an ordinary general shareholder meeting at least 
once a year.317 This is the statutory meeting required by law (regardless of the urgency to convene 
or not), so failure to comply with it is sanctioned with a monetary penalty not exceeding 500,000 
Saudi Riyals ($133,333).318 However, sometimes the corporation needs to decide on some 
corporate matters on which only the shareholders have the power to decide, such as the 
appointment to the board of directors. In this case, the board of directors, as put in charge of calling 
for shareholder meetings,319 invites shareholders to attend an “urgent” shareholder meeting. 
The Law sets forth a default quorum for the validity of this assembly. It requires the attendance 
of shareholders representing at least 25% of the corporation’s share capital.320 However, the Law 
leaves room for shareholders to set a higher percentage for the quorum in the articles of association 
on the condition that the quorum does not require more than 50% of the corporation’s share 
                                                 
317 To be specific, the statutory meeting must take place within the six months following the end of the 
corporation’s fiscal year. See Article 87. 
318 Article 213 (H). 
319 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. A. 
320 Article 93 (1). 
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capital.321 On the other hand, the passage of resolutions in ordinary general shareholder assemblies 
requires the approval of only an absolute majority (50+1) of the shares representing in the 
assembly. Again, shareholders have some discretion to stipulate a higher percentage in the 
corporation’s bylaws.322 
In principle, shareholders through the ordinary assembly have powers over all corporate 
affairs. Such affairs are, inter alia, the assignment and removal of a member of the board of 
director,323 the authorization of related-party or self-conflicted transactions by a member of the 
board of directors,324 the filing of the shareholder derivative suit,325 the approval of the financial 
statements and annual reports,326 the distribution of surpluses,327 the appointment and 
remuneration of the auditor,328 the formation of the audit committee,329 and any other corporate 
matter that is not part of the corporation’s bylaws.330 
Since the percentage for quorum and passage of the resolutions are not that high along with 
the fact that amendments to the corporation’s constitution are critical, the Law—in protection of 
the major corporate affairs— excludes the powers to amend the corporate constitution (the articles 
of association or bylaws) from the ordinary general shareholder assembly. Instead, the power is 
assigned to the second type of assemblies, the extraordinary general shareholder meeting.331 
                                                 
321 If a shareholder meeting is inquorate, the Law requires calling for a second meeting within a month 
from the date of first meeting. The invitation is to follow the rules explained in Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a. 
The second meeting is deemed valid, irrespective to meeting the required quorum or not. See Article 93 
(2). 
322 Article 93 (2). 
323 Article 68 (3). 
324 Article 71 (1). 
325 Article 97. 
326 Article 128. 
327 Article 130 (3). 
328 Article 133 (1). 
329 See infra Chapter 3. Part II. B. 
330 Article 87, 88. 
331 Article 87. 
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b. Extraordinary General Shareholder Assembly  
The corporate articles of association symbolize the constitution of the corporation. 
Constitutions often characterize as rigid in terms of the statutory procedures followed in amending 
or abrogating any of their texts, so supermajorities are of the foremost requirements to make such 
constitutional changes due to the significance of constitutions and their roles in the stability and 
continuity of the countries they come to organize. By analogy, due to the important details and 
organizational frameworks in the bylaws, corporate laws realize this significance and thus require 
another sort of shareholder assembly for amendments to these rules. The Law requires an 
extraordinary general shareholder assembly to be conducted for any of the corporation’s core 
affairs arranged by and stipulated in the corporation’s articles of associations.332 Such corporate 
matters are the issuance of new shares,333 voluntary dissolution,334 issuance of preferred shares,335 
conversion of common shares to preferred shares or vice-versa,336 issuance of debt instruments or 
Sukuk (Islamic bonds) that are convertible into shares,337 decrease of the capital share,338 increase 
                                                 
332 However, there are some statutory exceptions to the assembly’s power that cannot be modified. For 
example, change of the corporation’ nationality and relocation of the corporation’s headquarter outside 
the country are forbidden and shareholders cannot take such decisions. See, e.g., Article 88 (A, B, C, D). 
333 See infra note 339. 
334 Article 94 (4). 
335 Article 114. 
336 Article 114. 
337 In other words, issuance nonconvertible debt instruments and bonds falls within the powers of the 
board of directors, with prejudice to the corporation’s bylaws. See Articles 121–125 for further 
knowledge of the regulatory framework of issuance of debt instruments. 
338 One way to cope with loses, corporations may decrease their share capitals. Also, a decrease of the 
corporate share capital may occur if it is in excess of the corporate needs. Such a decision has to be made 
after shareholders being informed about the justifications for such a step by reading the corporate 
auditor’s report including the liabilities and effects entailing such a decrease. See Articles 144–174 for 
further regulations regarding share capital decrease.  
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of the capital share,339 usage of provisional reserve,340 and repurchase of shares.341 Also, if the 
corporation decides to opt out of the default quorums or the default resolution-passing percentage, 
such a decision must be approved by the extraordinary assembly.342 Above all, it falls within its 
powers the right to deliberate and decide on all corporate matters that are delegated to the ordinary 
assembly.343 
For the validity of extraordinary assemblies, the Law mandates a quorum of shareholders with 
no less than 50% of the share capital be satisfied.344 The Law permits the corporation to adopt a 
higher quorum, provided that it does not require more than 75% of the share capital.345 Such an 
opt-out is to be penned in the corporation’s bylaws.346 The extraordinary assemblies’ decisions are 
issued upon at least a two-thirds of the majority vote of the represented shares.347 Nevertheless, 
there are several stances the Law singles out and requires a third-quarter majority vote of the 
represented shares for the passage of resolutions related to these cases: the increase or decrease of 
                                                 
339 The Law specifies a several methods that may be utilized by joint-stock corporations to increase their 
share capital, such as issuance of new shares. In addition, it presupposes for the increase of share capital 
that the corporation’s share capital has been completed and paid in full, and grants current shareholders 
preemptive rights. See Chapter seven of the joint-stock corporation’s Part (Articles 137–143) for more 
regulations of this matter. 
340 Article 130 (2). 
341 The corporation’s repurchase of its shares is one of the ways (Article 146) the corporation utilizes to 
decrease its share capital, which is explained to be the right of the extraordinary assembly only. See supra 
note 338. 
342 Article 95 requires that a corporations’ bylaws prescribe the voting system for their assemblies. If not, 
they abide by the corporate law default rules. Amendments of such rules or opt-outs of default rules must 
be approved by the extraordinary assembly. 
343 Article 88 (2). 
344 In case the quorum required by law or stipulated in the corporation’s bylaws is not satisfied, the Law 
asks for a second meeting according to what is stated in note 321. However, the Law does not validate the 
second meeting if it does not the required quorum. Instead, it requires another call for a third meeting that 
is valid regardless the shares represented in the meeting. Calls for the second meeting and third meeting, 
if needed, is to follow the rules prescribed in Article 91. 
345 Article 94 (1). 
346 Articles 94 (1). 
347 Unlike ordinary assemblies, the Law does not allow corporations to modify this resolution-passing 
percentage requirement. See Article 94 (4). 
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the corporation’s share capital, extension of the corporation lifetime, voluntary dissolution of the 
corporation prior the expiry date stipulated in its bylaws, or the merger with another corporation.348 
B. Audit Committee 
Reviewing and accessing all corporate reports and records are of paramount importance to the 
shareholder’s rights in joint-stock corporations. Such a right is indispensable and cannot be 
detached from the roles played by shareholders. However, the exercising of this right may require 
know-how that some shareholders may lack to deal with corporate affairs, mainly financial ones. 
The more the corporation expands its business and becomes sophisticated the more complex 
understanding and reading its reports is. For this reason, the Law encourages shareholders to 
delegate their supervisory roles to a handful of experts who become the shareholders’ eye inside 
the corporation. 
1. Formation 
It is for the ordinary shareholder general assembly to organize a committee and deputize its 
members to monitor the corporation’s affairs and activities.349 The board is to facilitate its mission 
and must not hinder its work.350 To form the committee, the Law asks not to appoint to it an 
executive member of the board for the sake of integrity and independence of the committee. The 
shareholder assembly may appoint up to five members to the committee, and it may not have less 
than three members. These members may be insiders or outsiders.351 The resolution of forming the 
committee should specify its duties, its manual, and its members’ compensations.352 The validity 
of committee meetings requires the attendance of a majority of its members. The passage of 
                                                 
348 Article 94 (4). 
349 Article 101. 
350 Article 103. 
351 Article 101. 
352 Article 101. 
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resolution involves the approval of the attending majority, and the chairperson has the casting vote 
in case of a tie.353  
2.  Powers and Responsibilities 
This committee has access to all corporate records and documents, and it is entrusted with the 
right to demand clarification from the board of directors or the executive branch. It may also 
request the board of directors to call for a shareholder assembly.354 
In return, members of audit committees are to probe and scrutinize the corporation’s financial 
statements and reports. The audit committee is also supposed to evaluate the internal control in the 
corporation and provide its detailed opinion about it. The committee’s opinion and report of its 
work is to be deposited in the corporation’s headquarter and copied made available to shareholders 
alongside being recited to shareholders at their general assembly.355 
Part III. The Board of Directors 
A key feature of the corporation that makes it stands out among other enterprises is the 
separation between ownership and control or the so-called “delegated management” feature. 
Unlike partnerships (where owners of business actively participate and engage in its management), 
the structure and the function of corporations necessitate the separation between ownership and 
control rights, given that corporations generally are cut off to undertake massive projects requiring 
huge capitals a handful of people cannot build by themselves.356 Therefore, corporate laws 
worldwide agree on the importance of corporate governance structure, yet they differ in terms of 
                                                 
353 Article 102. 
354 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a. 
355 Copies of the committee’s report is to be available at the headquarter at least ten days before the 
shareholder assembly. See Article 104. 
356 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 11⎯12 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (adding that majority or unanimity 
approval rule that may work in partnerships are difficult to be applied to corporations “with numerous and 
constantly changing owners . . .” due to the high cost of information and coordination). 
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the powers vested in the corporation’s institutions (shareholders and board of directors). That 
results in two different corporate governance systems, shareholder-centric and director-centric 
corporate governance systems. 
 The Saudi Companies Law elaborates on the governing rules of the board of directors, 
setting an unprecedented presence of corporate governance principles, such as trust, integrity, 
accountability, openness, commitment to the corporation, disclosure, and transparency. These 
principles are decoded into a comprehensive set of rules governing all aspects of the corporate 
board. Such aspects are the composition of the board (including appointment, removal, and 
qualifications of the board’s member),357 specific duties and responsibilities of the board, board 
meetings, and rewards and remuneration of the board’s members. They all together set an 
exceptional division of the internal powers among corporate participants in the corporation by 
rules, rather leaving these matters to be decided on by contractual arrangements. 
A. The Composition of the Board 
The Law sets forth stringent rules governing the appointment of directors, their removal, the 
number of directors, and the separation of CEO and chairperson. 
                                                 
357 The Law does not require a director to have a certain set of qualifications. However, for public 
corporations, the Corporate Governance Regulations mandates that a director be professionally capable to 
lead, have the necessary knowledge along with skills to perform directorial tasks, and enjoy physical 
fitness. See Article 18 of the Corporate Governance Regulations. 
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1. Appointment to the Board 
The power to appoint a member to the board of directors as shown earlier is vested in the 
shareholder general assembly.358 Shareholders elect their representatives in the corporation’s 
management.359 Otherwise, the Law permits shareholders to nominate themselves to the board.360 
The appointment resolution to the board should also include the time duration of the member 
on the board. Such duration, nevertheless, is not to exceed three years.361 This stringent rule of the 
Law ensures a constant change in corporate management and brings new blood to the boardroom 
and the management team.362 The only exception to this rule is when the appointment of directors 
is made by the incorporation assembly.363 This is the only exception that the Law allows the 
incorporation assembly to appoint directors to the board for terms that do not exceed five years 
                                                 
358 However, the Law in specific, rare situations (e.g., the death or resignation of a board member) allows 
the board to appoint a member to temporarily fill the vacancy on the board. The exercise of this 
exceptional right requires the following: the board selects a member based on the number of votes 
received by each candidate; the member has adequate competency; the appointment is to be reported to 
the Competent Authority within five days of the appointment; the appointment is referred to the ordinary 
general assembly in its first meeting following the appointment; and the new member is appointed to 
compete the term of the preceded member, and not appointed to a new term. See Article 70 (1). 
359 The Law does not specify any qualifications for the board’s membership. However, the Corporate 
Governance Regulations of public corporations sets forth several conditions for the membership of the 
board. Such conditions are the ability to lead, ability to guide, competency, financial knowledge, and 
physical fitness. These conditions are of paramount importance to ensure effective and efficient 
management. See Corporate Governance Regulations, Article 18. Furthermore, given the fact that family 
corporations, listed or not, in the region represent the major employers in the private sector alongside the 
uncertainty and instability of family businesses and thus affecting the Saudi labor market (specially some 
of family businesses have thousands of workers), the author tends to the importance to have labor 
representation in the board of directors of corporations that unlisted and the number of their workers are 
large due to the vital role and positive contribution of these corporations in job security and social welfare 
of society. Worker codetermination may be an effective solution to make close corporations adopt the 
best practices of corporate governance. However, determining the threshold of employees needs further a 
thorough empirical study of these corporations and the size of their labor element in order to set an 
optimal threshold that guarantees protection of the vast majority of labor market. See Abdulrahman N. 
Alsaleh, Saudi Family Businesses upon their Founders’ Death (2015) (Unpublished L.L.M. Thesis, 
University of Southern California) (on file with the author). 
360 Article 68 (2). 
361 Article 68 (3). 
362 However, the default rule allows shareholders to re-elect the members unless the corporation articles 
of association opts out of it. See Article 68 (3).  
363 Article 63 (D). 
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during the lifetime of the corporation. This exception provides the corporation with the stability of 
management in its beginnings. 
Another statutory constraint on the appointment of directors is that the Law sets forth absolute 
minimum and maximum of the number of directors the board may have.364 As the corporation’s 
bylaws must indicate, inter alia,365 the number of corporate directors, this number must not be less 
than three directors, and not be more than eleven directors.366 Such a constraint, one may 
extrapolate, has a twofold aim: Joint-stock corporations are generally vehicles for mid-sized and 
large-scale projects with large capitals, so one or two directors may not be able to monitor the 
business efficiently and supervise its executive officers. Also, the prohibition of appointing more 
than eleven directors aims at preserving the corporation’s wealth and prevent any exploitation or 
exhaustion of its fortune alongside the fact that a bigger board may have more conflicts and clashes 
among its members in a way that adversely impacts the operation of the corporation.367 
If the shareholder general assembly fails to compose the board and appoint its members, the 
Law requires that the Competent Authority be notified. Upon notification, the Minister can 
compose a committee to temporarily run and supervise the corporation and call for an ordinary 
general assembly within three months of the formation of the committee to compose a board of 
their representatives.368 Such cases may be a result of severe tensions and clashes among 
                                                 
364 In the past Law, there was no statutory maximum on the number of directors a corporation would 
have, leaving it to be decided by corporate bylaws. An argument was advanced as setting no caps on the 
size of the board might be source of abuse by corporate controlling shareholders and senior officers, 
which called for statutory reform. See Almajid, footnote 844.  
365 See supra Chapter 3. Part I. A. 
366 The eleven-director cap was first introduced by a non-binding rule in the Corporate Governance 
Regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority in 2006, which the Law has adopted transformed into 
a mandatory rule in Article 68 (1). 
367 AHMED ALKHABTI & HISHAM ALSSEBT,  ديدجلا يدوعسلا ماظنلا يف تاكرشلا ماكحأ يف زيجولا[THE COMPENDIUM 
OF CORPORATE RULES IN THE NEW SAUDI LAW] p. 186 n. 1 (Dar AlEjadh 2017). 
368 This rule also applies to cases when all members of the board offer their resignations at the same time. 
See Article 69. 
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shareholders that bog down the appointment of directors. This rule appears to be protective of the 
corporation’s operations and stakeholders (e.g., creditors and workers).369  
2. Removal of Directors 
As the shareholder general assembly has the right to appoint members to the board, it is also 
empowered with the right to remove any member from the board. The removal may be for cause 
or without cause at any time.370 The removal of the directors may include all members or some of 
them.371 The right to remove a member from the board is a statutory right that may not be limited 
or excluded.372 In other words, if the articles of association stipulate that a certain member may 
not be removed or may be removed after serving on the board for a specific duration, such a 
stipulation is unlawful and thus void.373 No member of the board is immune from removal. In all 
cases, the removed member has the right to seek compensatory damages from the corporation if 
the member successfully shows that the removal right is exercised without proper cause or at an 
inappropriate time.374 
3. Resignation of Directors 
On the other side, the Law asserts the right for members of the board to resign from the board 
on the condition that such resignation is tendered at an appropriate time. Otherwise, the resigned 
member is accountable to the corporation for damages, if any, following the resignation.375 Still, 
                                                 
369 In remuneration of the committee, the Law requires that the corporation be responsible to compensate 
its chairperson and remembers in proportion to several considerations, such their qualifications, the size 
of the corporations, the weight of their duties, and the duration of their appointment. See Article 69.  
370 Article 68 (3). 
371 Article 68 (3). 
372 Article 68 (3). 
373 Article 68 (3). 
374 Still, the Law does not define what may constitute improper cause or inappropriate time. See Article 68 
(3). 
375 Article 68 (3). 
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“an appropriate time” is somewhat ambiguous. Unless it is defined by implementing regulations, 
the term is left to the judiciary to construe.376 
B. The Chairperson of the Board 
The importance of the corporation’s chairperson stems from the fact that chairpersons are the 
statutory representatives of the corporations before courts, arbitration tribunals, and other third 
parties.377 Therefore, the Law vividly defines some of their roles in the corporations and entrusts 
them with a range of duties and responsibilities to supervise the corporations’ operations and sail 
their corporations toward their objectives. 
To ensure their integrity and to prevent any conflict of interests in playing their supervisory 
roles, the Law (and for the first time) mandates the separation between the position of chairperson 
and any other executive posts (e.g., CEO, CFO or GM).378 The statutory prohibition of combining 
supervisory and executive roles emphasizes the importance to respect the parameters of each 
corporate institution, prevents mingling between them, and advances a strong corporate 
governance structure.379  
The Law hardly touches upon the powers of the chairperson and rather refers to the 
corporation’s articles of association for the powers and responsibilities with which the chairperson 
is entrusted. In other words, at their discretion, shareholders set the boundaries of the chairperson’s 
powers needed to perform the duties and responsibilities of which the chairperson is in charge. 
Such responsibilities are calling for board meetings, ensuring adequate flow of accurate 
                                                 
376 The role of the judiciary in the protection of minority shareholders is demystified later in the research.  
377 Article 82 (1). 
378 Article 81 (1). 
379 Almajid, at 256 (The importance of splitting these posts stems from the heavy burdens each post gives 
rise to. Therefore, separation between these positions is approved to be an effective approach for 
corporations seeking better performance, effective monitoring, and more accountability to both corporate 
insiders and outsiders.) 
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information to the board’s members to discharge their duties properly, ensuring the existence of 
actual communication channels with shareholders, preparing meetings’ agenda, creating a culture 
that encourages constructive criticism, and informing shareholders of any conflict of interest a 
member of the board has, directly or indirectly.380 
C. Meetings of the Board 
To ensure the minimum level of the board’s profession and proper performance of its duties, 
the Law obliges the board to convene at very least twice a year.381 These statutory meetings are 
called for by the board’s chairperson.382 In addition, the Law obligates the chairperson to call for 
a board meeting whenever it is deemed urgent or upon the request of two of the board’s 
members.383 
Again, this is the bare minimum set by the Law, which means that shareholders may require 
more than two meetings a year. For example, they may stipulate in the corporation’s bylaws that 
the board hold quarterly meetings, or specify incidents upon which the chairperson is to call for a 
board meeting.384 
Moreover, to ensure collaborative work and reject any unilateral one, the Law requires a 
quorum of at least half of the board’s members, in all cases not less than three members, for the 
                                                 
380 These duties are duties of the chairperson of public corporations set forth in the Corporate Governance 
Regulation, Article 27. Nevertheless, they may serve as guidelines and examples for shareholders of close 
corporations in determining the powers of the chairpersons of their corporations. 
381 Article 83 (1). 
382 Article 83 (1). 
383 Any stipulation against this rule (calling for a board meeting upon a request of two member) is deemed 
void. See Article 83 (1). 
384 The Law, in exception to in-person board meetings, allows the board to make decisions by circulation 
for urgent matters that involve prompt attention of the board, provided that no member request in writing 
that the board convenes for deliberations. Any decision is made according to this exception has to 
presented in the first following meeting of the board. See Article 85. 
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validity of the board meetings. This means that if the board consists of only three members,385 all 
three members must attend the meeting to be deemed valid.386  
Furthermore, given the sensitivity of the board deliberations and confidentiality of some 
corporate matters, the Law prohibits members of the board from delegating others to attend board 
meetings on their behalf. Instead, they may assign only another board member with the proviso 
that the corporation’s bylaws permit such assignment.387 
In principle, board decisions are passed by majority vote of the attending members. In case of 
ties, the meeting chairperson has the casting vote. However, the Law gives shareholders some 
latitude to require a different passage rate or set another rule governing the board’s ties.388 
Deliberations of the board meetings and its decisions are required to be maintained and 
recorded in minutes. They must be signed by the chairperson,389 attending members, and the 
secretary. Also, all board’s minutes must be kept in a special record that is signed by the 
chairperson and the secretary of the board.390 
D. Powers of the Board 
The board of directors well embodies the mind of the corporation. It enjoys a great deal of 
latitude and authorities to discharge its duties and responsibilities to manage, supervise, monitor 
and protect the corporation and its core business. Therefore, The Law affirms wide-ranging 
                                                 
385 The Law allows the articles of association to require higher percentage or numbers, not less than three 
in all cases. See Article 83 (2). 
386 On the contrary, a number of jurisdictions, including Italy, France, Germany, and the U.K. and U.S., 
permits one-person board or so-called single general director, particularly for small and private 
corporations. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 12 n.44 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017). 
387 Article 83 (3). 
388 Article 83 (4). 
389 The chairperson is to preside board’s meetings. In the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson 
is to head the meeting. Article 82 (2). 
390 Article 85. 
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authorities to the board in steering the corporation and achieving its ends. Unless the corporate 
matter is entrusted to the shareholder general assembly,391 the corporation’s board has the absolute 
power to decide such a matter and skillfully execute all activities within the corporation’s scope.392 
An example of the board’s powers is the creation of the executive office to run and monitor 
day-to-day operations. The board may assign to this branch one or more of its members or may 
hire an outsider.393 In all cases, chairpersons of the boards may not combine between their posts 
and any other executive jobs.394  
Another power the Law assigns to the board of directors is the board’s right to enter loan 
agreements. This power has no restrictions on the amount of these loan agreements. For example, 
the board may make a loan deal exceeding the corporation’s capital. Therefore, the shareholders 
should be acutely aware of the ramifications of such a default power and make sure whether they 
want to leave it as the Law pronounces it, or place some restrictions on it by means of stipulation 
in the articles of association. 
By the same token, the Law entrusts the board with the power to sell the corporation’s assets. 
However, there are some restrictions the Minister of Commerce and Investment has issued to 
regulate this power in joint-stock corporations.395 The ministerial resolution requires the board to 
have the ordinary general assembly approve the sale of more than 50% of the corporate assets, 
                                                 
391 Corporate matters entrusted to the shareholder general assembly find their origin either in the Law 
(e.g., appointment of the board members) or in the articles of association (e.g., sale of corporate assets). 
See generally supra Chapter 3. Part II.  
392 Article 75. 
393 The Law does not mandate that a member of the board be assigned to any executive position. 
Practically speaking, assignment of at least one of the board directors to an executive post is of paramount 
importance because this “managing director” is the eye of the board upon its daily activities, and it 
guarantees skillful execution of the board’s plans. 
394 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. B. 
395 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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regardless of the sale’s being through one or multiple transactions.396 If the corporation’s bylaws 
require that the extraordinary general assembly approves such a sale, then the bylaws prevail, and 
such approval must be obtained accordingly. 
In addition, the Law asserts for the board the power to remit the debt owed to the corporation. 
The board may decide to relieve corporate debtors from any liability vis-à-vis the corporation. This 
power is assigned to the board unless the corporation’s bylaws opt out of it or restrict it.397 
Above all, the Law empowers the board of directors with whatever is necessary to look after 
the corporation’s management and the accomplishment of its aims. The shareholders should decide 
in the corporation’s bylaws whether to leave these powers as they are, to restrict them, or to opt 
out of them, given that the corporation is always bound by the acts and transactions executed by 
the board even if these acts fall beyond the scope of the board’s powers.398  
E. Duties of the Board 
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty are of the foremost duties owed by directors to the 
corporation and its shareholders. These duties set the parameters of the board’s operations and 
conduct. According to the American Law Institute, the duty of care entails that directors are 
obligated to the corporation to discharge their duties and “act in good faith and in a manner the 
                                                 
396 If sales of corporate assets take place through multiple transactions, only the transaction that crosses 
the 50% threshold must be approved by the general assembly. This percentage is calculated from the date 
of first sale transaction occurred during the last 12 months. 
397 Article 75 (2). 
398 Holding the corporation accountable for the acts performed by the board in violation of their stipulated 
powers may be justified by the protection of a bona fide third part. Otherwise, the corporation is not 
responsible for the board’s actions executed with a third party who acts in bad faith or knows that the 
board exceeds its powers in executing such actions. See Article 77. 
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directors reasonably believe to be in the best interest of the corporation.”399 On the other hand, the 
loyalty duty requires directors to place the interest of the corporation ahead of their interests.400  
Given the locked-in structure of the close corporations and the popularity of majority 
shareholder’s directing the corporation’s affairs, a respectable counterargument, on the other hand, 
may doubt the efficacy of imposing the duty of loyalty and duty of care upon controlling 
shareholders in their capacity as directors in such a situation. Instead, the advocate of this argument 
assumes that holding a controlling shareholding is per se enough to generate “financial incentives” 
to render “well-informed decisions.”401 
The Saudi Law does not embrace these corporate standards in determining the scope of the 
board’s duties. Instead, it sets forth a matrix of obligations and prohibitions that all together convert 
these all-encompassing duties of corporate boards into laws and regulations. For example, the Law 
explicitly sets forth stringent statutory approaches to handle a wide range of party-related 
transactions of which a member of the board may straddle both sides.402 In prevention of the 
conflict of interests, the Law requires that the ordinary general assembly must approve potential 
transactions and contracts in which a director of the board may have a direct or indirect interest. If 
this director happens to be also a shareholder, the Law requires the interested director to refrain 
from casting a vote on the transaction under scrutiny. The Law places a duty of disclosure upon 
                                                 
399 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Part 
IV (1994) 
400 MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 418 (WEST ACAD. 
PUB. 2014). 
401 Jens Dammann, The Controlling Shareholder's General Duty of Care: A Dogma that Should Be 
Abandoned, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 479, 506 (2015) (The argument differentiates between non-shareholder 
directors and controlling-shareholder directors, where the latter invest largely in the corporation they 
control. One of the main reasons advanced to reject enforcement of duty of care upon controlling-
shareholders directors is that their financial incentives differ from the incentives of independent directors. 
Owners are best at advancing the interests of the corporation, and thus their interests without the need of 
duty of care to protect the interest of minority shareholders. As evidence, no Delaware court has ever 
found a controlling-shareholder director accountable for the violation of care duty.)  
402 See infra note 637 for the definition of related-party transactions. 
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any director with a conflict of interest to disclose to the board any interest, direct or indirect, he or 
she has in the corporation’s transactions and contracts. Such disclosure includes a definition of the 
interest’s nature and what financial or in-kind benefits if any, he or she may obtain.403 Also, the 
disclosure is to be recorded, and the chairperson has a duty to inform the general assembly when 
it convenes to decide whether to approve these transactions and to provide a special report from 
the corporation’s external auditor opining the questionable transaction.404 Failure to comply with 
the statutory disclosure provides legal grounds for not only the corporation but also any 
stakeholder to judicially request invalidation of the contract or transaction, or request disgorgement 
of the profits.405 
In addition, a subset of the duty of loyalty the Law recognizes is the non-compete duty. The 
Law bans board directors from engaging in any activity that competes against the corporation’s 
business or even competes with activity within the line of the corporation’s business.406 The 
prohibition of competing seems to be sensible as directors serving two corporations tend to favor 
one over the other in terms of the time and information allocated to the corporations.407 However, 
directors may seek permission from the corporation (general assembly) to engage in any 
competitive business. Otherwise, the corporation may petition to the judiciary and seek 
                                                 
403 Ministerial Resolution, No. 32565, First. 
404 Article 71 (1). 
405 Article 71 (2). 
406 Article 72. 
407 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 158,159 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (giving an example of Germany as a 
country that has non-compete rule barring top executives and directors in close corporations from 
competing against the corporation they serve).  
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compensatory damages for the harm caused to the corporation in violation of the non-compete 
duty.408 
Another traditional prohibition on the party-related transaction is the prohibition of loans 
between the corporations and their directors. The Law stretches the prohibition to also include all 
corporate fiduciaries (directors, shareholders, officers).409 The prohibition of loans to corporate 
fiduciaries include also prohibiting the corporation from serving as the guarantor for loan 
agreements these fiduciaries have with third parties.410 A Statutory exception to this prohibition is 
that loan and guarantees made by the corporation pursuant to the corporation’s incentive programs 
are permissible on the condition that such programs are adopted in the corporation’s bylaws, or by 
a resolution issued by the general assembly.411 Another statutory (and intuitive) exception are loan 
and guarantee agreements between banks and credit corporations (in the form of joint-stock 
corporation), on the one hand, and its fiduciaries (including shareholders, directors and 
executives), on the other, provided that such loans and guarantees fall within the corporations’ 
purposes and are subject to the same provisions and conditions followed with other clients.412 Any 
                                                 
408 Id. (stating that allowing directors and executives to compete with their corporation may, on the other 
hand, have some advantages, such as attracting competent executives and “[benefiting] from the know-
how gathered by . . . executives as directors of competitors in the same industry.”) 
409 Article 73 (1). 
410 The prohibition of loans between the corporation and its directors is also known in France and the 
United states. In the latter, for example, the Congress forbade public corporations from making personal 
loans to their managers following several corporate scandals (e.g., Enron). See § 402 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Another reason to forbid loans between the corporation and its fiduciaries is that managers use them “to 
leverage their ownership of company shares, thus increasing their incentives to engage in questionable 
practices aimed at bolstering the share price.” See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 158,159 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 
2017). 
411 Article 73 (3). 
412 Article 73 (2). 
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violation of this statutory prohibition or the provisions of its exceptions gives the prejudiced 
corporations the right to seek compensations for any damages the corporations sustain judicially.413  
Last but not least, the Law emphasizes the duty of the board’s directors not to disclose any 
confidential information or corporate secrets they come to know by virtue of their directorships, 
except disclosure of information to the general assemblies.414 This duty entails that they also 
refrain from misappropriating corporate information to gain personal benefit for themselves, their 
relatives or others. This may seem to be a blanket prohibition on all nonpublic corporate 
information. If a director gets caught in violation of this confidentiality duty, the Law penalizes 
the violated director with immediate removal from the board and accountability for any damages 
to the corporation because of such violation.415 
F. The Responsibility of the Board 
1. vis-à-vis the corporation 
a. Civil Liability 
To ensure the board’s performance and discharge of its duties pursuant to the book, the Law 
imposes joint liability upon the board of the corporation for damages and loses affecting the 
corporation or its shareholders. A range of scenarios give rise to joint liability upon the members 
                                                 
413 Note that the Law does not give statutory standing for stakeholder to seek compensations, or request 
invalidation of such agreements. See Article 73 (4). In this context, one may wonder why the new Law 
has excluded the requirement that a director have to own some of the corporation’s shares value to of 
10,000 Saudi Riyals($2,666), which served as an alignment-incentive strategy that would tie the interests 
of the directors to the interests of shareholders. Plus, in cases of director’s violating the Law and 
mismanaging the corporation, the corporation would claw back the shares of the errant director in case of 
the director’s refusal to pay the penalties or damages. The required amount might have been low and have 
not generated enough incentives to serve the best interests of the corporations. Nevertheless, the 
alignment-incentive strategies (such as trusteeship strategy) have significant impacts on the board of 
directors. See Almajid, at 247; REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35–36 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017). 
414 Article 74.  
415 Article 74. 
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of the board. Such cases are mismanagement of the corporation and failure to comply with the 
Law or the corporation’s bylaws.416 To elaborate, if the wrongdoing giving rise to the board’s joint 
liability is a result of a unanimous decision by the board, all board’ members are jointly liable for 
such an act. If the decision is by a vote of the board’s majority, joint liability is only imposed upon 
members who have voted in favor of the wrongful decision. Dissenting members to the decision, 
however, is not liable provided that their candid objections are recorded in the board’s minutes. If 
a member of the board is absent from the board meeting at which the decision is made, the absence 
in principle does not constitute proper cause for relief from the liability. Instead, the absentee has 
to show that she or he has no knowledge of the decision, or that the absentee is unable to object 
after becoming aware of the decision.417 
b. Criminal Liability 
Alongside the civil liability, the directors of the board are also subject to criminal liability for 
a cluster of actions that per se constitute crimes (e.g., embezzlement, forgery), or offenses the Law 
criminalizes.418 Article 211 and 212 of the Law sets forth a wide range of activities the Law 
considers as offenses, and thus puts the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution in charge 
of these offenses. Such offenses are manipulation with the corporation’s books and records 
(cooking the books), providing misleading information, abuse of powers to gain personal benefits, 
and failure to call for an extraordinary general assembly where is mandatory by the Law (e.g., 
losses exceeding 50% of the share capital). Some of these offenses are punished by up to five years 
of imprisonment and a monetary fine up to five million Saudi Riyals ($1.3 Million) or either 
                                                 
416 Article 78 (1) 
417 Explanation of shareholder derivatives and statute of limitations are provided later in this dissertation 
as statutory, protective mechanisms available for minority shareholders.  
418 V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 
1534 (1996) (comparing the pros and cons of criminal liability to other the upsides and downsides of 
other sorts of directorial liability, including civil one).  
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penalty.419 Others are penalized by up to one-year imprisonment and a fine up to 1 million Saudi 
Riyals ($ 266,666), or either penalty.420 In all cases, these penalties do not negate any other 
penalties in other legislation. 
2. vis-à-vis Third Parties 
As explained earlier,421 the corporation bears the full liability for all acts and deeds of its board 
of directors even if these actions are taken in violation of the board’s stipulated powers.422 The 
only exception to relieve the corporation from such liability is that the third party behaves in bad 
faith or knows that the board is exceeding its assigned powers. In addition to the accountability of 
the corporation over its board actions, third parties or stakeholders (e.g., creditors) have the right 
to sue the members of the board under the tort law liability. Directors are agents, so they are liable 
for their tortious conduct, irrespective to the corporation’s (the principal) vicarious liability. Also, 
the individual, in general, is liable for his wrongdoing. For example, the distribution of sham 
dividends.423 In this situation, the third party has the option to sue the corporation based on 
vicarious liability or tort law liability.424 
G. Rewards and Remunerations of the Board 
The boards’ rewards and remunerations are the main tunnels through which some 
shareholders/directors in close corporations appropriate a large sum of the corporation’s profits. 
Therefore, the Law has adopted strict remuneration policy that takes into consideration, on the one 
                                                 
419 Article 211. 
420 Article 212. 
421 See supra Part 3. III. D. 
422 Article 77. 
423 AHMED ALKHABTI & HISHAM ALSSEBT,  ديدجلا يدوعسلا ماظنلا يف تاكرشلا ماكحأ يف زيجولا[THE COMPENDIUM 
OF CORPORATE RULES IN THE NEW SAUDI LAW] 208 (Dar AlEjadh 2017). 
424 MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 99 (WEST ACAD. 
PUB. 2014) (stating that “it is often fruitless to bring such a claim if the agent is judgment proof but the 
right exists nonetheless.”) 
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hand, safeguarding the interests of the corporation and its shareholders’, and on the other hand the 
responsibility and tasks undertaken by the board of directors. 
The Law recognizes a cluster of remunerative pay and reward packages425: fixed salary, in-
kind benefits (e.g., cars, telephones, housings, newspapers), bonuses, or in the form of meeting 
allowance. The Law in principle permits the combination of two or more of these forms, provided 
that the total of monetary and in-kind rewards received by each director is no more than the 
statutory maximum of 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($ 133,333). In deciding the rewards and 
remunerations for the corporation’s directors, the Law stipulates a number of guidelines every 
corporation should follow. Such guidelines are the following: the fair proportionality between the 
remuneration and the director’s experience, powers, and duties; the size and the industry of the 
corporation; the creation of incentives to attract qualified, experienced people and maintain them; 
and the proportionality with the corporation’s work and the skills needed to manage it. That implies 
that remuneration packages may vary from a director to another accordingly. 
Since the ultimate job of the board is to maximize the value of the corporation for its 
shareholders, it is of importance to have a performance-based payment to incentivize directors to 
discharge their duties optimally. Such an incentive may be created by linking the remuneration of 
the director to a stipulated percentage of the corporation’s profits. To do so, the Law requires three 
conditions. First, the percentage of profits the director is entitled to receive does not exceed 10% 
of the net profits of the corporation after deduction of the reserves stipulated in the corporation’s 
bylaws or decided by a general assembly’s resolution. Second, the corporation must distribute to 
                                                 
425 The Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating to Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations defines 
remunerations as to include “amounts, allowances, profits and their equivalent, periodic and annual 
performance-related bonuses, short and long term incentive plans, in addition to any other in-kind 
benefits, except for reasonable costs and expenses actually incurred by the Company on behalf of a Board 
member in performing his work.” 
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its shareholders dividends constituting at least 5% of the corporate paid-in share capital. Third, the 
remuneration package of the director is to be proportionate with the number of meetings the 
director attended.426 In all cases, to preserve their independence, independent directors may not be 
compensated by a percentage of the corporation’s profits or based directly or indirectly upon the 
corporation’s profitability.427 
Deciding the board’s remunerations is of the authority of the ordinary shareholder general 
assemblies. The assembly decisions on remunerations may be based on recommendations by the 
remuneration committee (if the corporation has one similar to the compulsory committee for public 
corporations).428 In the assembly, nevertheless, members of the board who are shareholders as well 
are forbidden from casting their votes on the item of the board’s remuneration during shareholder 
assemblies to prevent any conflict of interest.429 This being said, directors may obtain, besides 
their directorships’ remunerations, additional rewards for any extra work they perform for the 
corporations. Such work includes participating in the audit committee,430 or undertakings of an 
executive, managerial, technical, or consultative task.431 
In reinforcement of transparency and strong disclosure system, the Law requires the board to 
report to the general assembly a detailed statement including all amounts (remuneration, expenses, 
and in-kind benefits) received by the board’s directors during the corporation’s fiscal year, 
                                                 
426Article 76 (2). 
427 See the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 3 (4). 
428 Close corporations may follow the rules the Corporate Governance Regulations mandates public 
corporations follow in terms of establishing a remuneration committee that has at least one managing 
director and one independent director. The ordinary general assembly is to approve appointments to the 
committee, their durations and the committee’s manual based on recommendation advanced by the board 
of directors. In addition, the Regulation requires the committee to convene at least once a year, and when 
a meeting is deemed necessary. Alongside the committee’s task to propose recommendations to the 
assembly, it is also asked to constantly review the remuneration policy and its efficiency and propose 
changes, if any, to the board of directors. See Articles 60– 63 of the Corporate Governance Regulations. 
429 See the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 3 (3).  
430 See supra Part 3. II. B. 
431 See the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 4. 
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alongside what they received in another capacity (as employees, executives, or members of 
corporate committees. This annual report has to include also the number of the meetings the board 
held, and the number of meetings each director attended from the date of the last general 
assembly.432 
If it is proved that directors have been paid erroneously because of the false and misleading 
information presented to the general assembly or the inclusion of such information in the board’s 
annual report, the corporation may reclaim return of these payments.433 Also, when the board 
member is removed because of his absence from three consecutive board meetings without 
legitimate excuse, this member is not entitled to any payments starting from the date of the last 
meeting he or she attended and has to pay back whatever is received for that period.434 
Part IV. External Auditing 
 The right to oversee the corporation is of the statutory rights the Law stipulates for 
shareholders to keep the corporate management in check regarding its adherence to the corporate 
governance of the corporation. Nevertheless, shareholders often lack the necessary knowledge and 
capability to supervise and keep an eye on the management’s compliance with the rules. To tackle 
such an issue and prevent any self-dealing by the board at the expense of shareholders’ interests, 
corporate laws emphasize the significance of the outside auditor as a gatekeeper of the corporation 
and protector of its good corporate governance.435 
                                                 
432 Article 76 (4). In addition, it is emphasized in the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted 
Joint-Stock Corporations in Article seven. 
433 the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 6. 
434 See Article 76 (5) of the Law; and the Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating Unlisted Joint-Stock 
Corporations, Article 5. 
435 The term “gatekeeper” generally refers to outside professionals who keep the corporation protect the 
corporation and its dealings with the public, and thus protect the interests of its shareholders and 
investors. See, e.g., John C. Jr. Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1293, 1297 (2003) ("[G]atekeepers are independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they 
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 As the Law has made it of its mission to promote the best corporate practices, the Law 
mandates joint-stock corporations (listed and unlisted) to have an external auditor (in addition to 
the internal audit committee explained earlier).436 The Law specifies in details the manner of the 
auditor’s appointment, its qualifications, powers, tasks, and its liability. The procedural details 
ensure the strong application of the corporate governance principles in terms of accountability, 
integrity, and independence of the auditor as displayed hereunder. 
A. Appointment 
Since the right to monitor the corporation is of core shareholder rights,437 the Law puts the 
ordinary shareholder general assemblies in charge of appointing one or more auditor to their 
corporations.438 The decision of the appointment also includes their compensations and their 
periods.439 The Law specifies some requirements of the appointment of auditors: first, the auditor 
must be accredited to operate and render services in the region; second, the total period of the 
auditor’s appointment must not exceed five consecutive years.440 In exception to this rule, the 
                                                 
withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to 
maintain some desired status."); Peter J. Henning, The New Corporate Gatekeeper, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 
29, 29 (2016) (“The term ‘gatekeeper’ is used with some regularity these days to describe the roles of 
various professionals who work to keep corporations from running afoul of the law in their dealings with 
the public, thereby helping to avoid harm to investors and the markets.”); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers 
Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413 (2008) (defining gatekeepers as “private intermediaries 
who can prevent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct of their client 
representatives.”). These definitions of gatekeepers concur with the role of these professionals to fend off 
any corporate misconduct or wrongdoing. 
436 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. B. 
437 Article 132 reads that “[s]hareholders shall monitor the company’s accounts in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in the Law and the company's articles of association.”)  
438 Article 133 (1). 
439 Article 133 (1). 
440 Article 133 (1). 
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corporation may re-appoint the auditor, who has depleted the five-consecutive-year period, after 
the elapse of two years from the expiration date of the five-year period.441 
In addition to these restrictions upon the appointment’s duration, the Law outlaws the 
appointments of the auditors who have participated in the incorporation process, served on the 
board, or executed administrative or technical tasks for the corporation’s sake.442 The Law goes 
farther as it also requires that auditors may not be partners with, nor employees or relatives of, one 
of the founding shareholders or the board’s members.443 Evidently, the Law aims at ensuring 
auditors’ integrity and independence in discharging their duties and avoiding any collision with 
the corporation’s internal institutions. 
As the shareholder assemblies have the right to appoint the auditor, they also have the right to 
replace it at any time,444 with or without cause. However, this does not negate the right of the 
auditor to seek judicial compensations for unjustified replacement or inappropriate replacement 
timing.445 
B. Powers 
To properly execute their jobs, the Law assigns several powers to outside auditors that allow 
them to access books and records of the corporations at any time. In case of ambiguities in these 
books and records, they have a statutory power to demand the board’s clarification of whatever 
falls within their scope of work, such as the verification of the corporation’s assets and liabilities.446 
                                                 
441 To illustrate, if a corporation appoints X as an auditor for five-year term ending in October 31, 2020, 
this auditor will not continue to serve as an auditor for the corporation after this date, and may be re-
appointed as an auditor only after October 31,2022. 
442 Article 133 (2). 
443 Article 133 (1). 
444 “It” in this context refers to the auditor as the Law allows to appoint as both natural and legal persons. 
445 Article 133 (1). 
446 Article 134. 
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The Law commissions the chairperson of the board with facilitating the work of the auditor 
and paving the way for it to perform its statutory duties. Any obstruction or hindering of the 
auditor’s duties, the auditor is to report to the board, and if such obstruction continues or the board 
does not react, the auditor is obliged to request an ordinary shareholder general assembly meeting 
to discuss such matter.447 
C. Duties 
To protect the interests of the shareholders and stakeholders, auditors have a duty to annually 
report to shareholders as a class (general assembly). The report includes the corporation’s status, 
the board’s position as the auditor is performing its duties (whether the board has been cooperative 
or not), and any violation of the Law or the corporation’s bylaws the auditor detects as a result of 
auditing.448 The report also includes the auditor’s opinion upon the integrity of the corporation’s 
financial statements. The report has to comply with the auditing standards as it reflects the 
corporation’s assets and liabilities. In addition, the auditor is required to read the report to the 
shareholders at the general assembly to have their approval of the report. Otherwise, the Law 
sanctions the approval of the report without reading it with the annulment of the approval, which 
stresses out the importance of ensuring the awareness of shareholders of the corporation’s status 
on all levels.449 
Another duty upon the auditors is the duty of confidentiality. Since corporate auditors are 
empowered to access corporate books and records, the Law bars them from disclosing any 
information or corporate secrets of which they have become aware as a result of performing their 
duties and exercising their powers. The duty even includes the prevention of discourse of 
                                                 
447 See supra note 300. 
448 Article 135. 
449 Article 135. 
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information to shareholders of the corporation unless disclosure is part of performing auditors’ 
duties (e.g., reading the report at the general assembly).450 
D. Accountability 
To ensure the high-level performance of duties, the Law holds auditors accountable for any 
damages the corporation sustains because of a wrongful act committed by the auditors. Their 
accountability is not only vis-à-vis the corporation and shareholder but also to third parties.451 In 
case there is more than one auditor, the Law imposes joint liability upon all auditors for such 
damages. In addition, Failure to comply with their duties may also result in mandatory removal of 
the injuring auditor and compensations to the corporation for damages, if any (e.g., disclosure of 
a corporate secret).452 
Moreover, to deter auditors from abusing their powers and to prevent them from engaging in 
any self-dealing activities, the Law penalizes auditors who violate their duties by, for instance, 
reporting misleading information or false statements to shareholders with a fine up to five million 
Saudi Riyals and imprisonment up to five years, or either penalties.453 Ensuring proper functioning 
of auditors requires strict rules regarding the liability of their work and prevent any action that may 
compromise their integrity and independence. 
Closing Analysis 
 Having depicted the regulatory framework of joint-stock corporations and their internal 
and external institutions, an observer may affirmatively conclude that the Saudi Companies Law 
of 2015 has assumed a very rigorous approach— in dealing with joint-stock corporations— that 
                                                 
450 Article 136 (1). 
451 Article 136 (2). 
452 Article 136 (2). 
453 Article 211 (A). 
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heavily leans toward shareholder-centric corporate governance, alongside the inherent nature of 
shareholder supremacy in a close corporation structure. Several grounds may justify the 
shareholder-centric tendency in the Law. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
controlling shareholders abound in the region. The government— which is unitary absolute 
monarchy— is the largest shareholder in the Saudi market. Therefore, it seems to be logic for the 
government, and controlling shareholders dominating the market to retain the powers and 
influence over the management. This is candidly found in the Law in its empowering of the 
shareholder general assemblies with a wide range of decision and appointment rights, such as the 
decision to appoint and remove directors and auditors, the decision to distribute dividends, the 
decision to approve of a related-party transaction, and the decision to approve the corporation’s 
annual financial reports. This approach may be useful in mitigating the shareholder-manager 
agency problem, especially in public corporations. However, one may be skeptical about its 
efficacy to offer adequate incentives for the management team to properly run the corporation 
without shareholders’ watching over their shoulders. 
Moreover, as far as the regulatory framework of close corporations concerns, it is evident the 
excessive use of mandatory rules and procedures in regulating corporate affairs. From the 
incorporation phase, incorporators find themselves in a pool of rules and procedures that 
systemically regulate every aspect of incorporation, deviating the contractual view of the 
corporation, albeit the statutory definition of the corporation. For instance, a statutory minimum 
of share capital must be met; special qualifications of shareholders have to exist; protracted, 
cumbersome filing and notarization procedures must be undergone.454 This may be justified as it 
                                                 
454 Conversely, the World Bank Group reports that— based on comparing business regulation for 
domestic firms in 190 economies— Saudi Arabia has simplified registration process (publication, 
notarization, and inspection). The Reports claims that Saudi Arabia has made it easier to start a business 
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protects incorporators themselves and third parties to the corporation, yet it does not mesh with 
rationale behind lowering the statutory capital requirement to 500,000 Saudi Riyals($133,333), 
which is alleged to serve as an incentive to conduct businesses in the form of close corporations 
(the incubators of future public corporations). Such an incentive should be coupled with simple, 
inexpensive incorporation procedures. It may be true that the old statutory minimum of capital 
share requirement (2 million Saudi Riyals) may have prevented some businesses in be in the form 
of joint-stock corporations; however, lowering the share capital requirement should be 
accompanied by simplicity of incorporation that would drive more businesses to select this 
corporate form, as a practical matter. 
In addition, the Law adopts a cluster of mechanisms to alleviate agency problems between 
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Such statutory mechanisms come in the 
form of disclosure requirements, reporting system, decision rights, and other “legal strategies”455 
that all together aim at reducing the costs of information and coordination among corporate 
players, namely the majority and the minority shareholders in the context of close corporations. 
Otherwise, the high costs of shareholder information and coordination would aggravate the 
situation. Therefore, from the very start of the business, the Law sets forth either mandatory rules 
or default rules for most of corporate affairs; some of these rules empower shareholders as a class, 
while other rules restrict the management, such as mandatory discourse of a “potential” conflict of 
                                                 
by an online system. See The World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, Table 3A.1, 
(15ed. Oct. 2017). 
455 A “legal strategy” is a term utilized by the authors of Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
Functional Approach to indicate “a generic method of deploying the law instrumentally in afunctional 
way.” It may come in the form of a default rule, mandatory rule, or a set of different rules. See REINIER 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH p.39, n.49 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017). 
  
119 
interest and self-dealing,456 or systemic reporting to shareholders, and mandatory meetings. The 
rigid regulations of substantive aspects of the relationship between minority shareholders and the 
management (represented by majority shareholders) ex ante afford a great deal of protection for 
the minority shareholders as it ensures the flow of information. Also, it affords protection for the 
outsiders as they will presume that a set of mandatory rules bind the corporation they are 
contracting with, and failure to follow them entails very severe consequences, including nullity of 
the action, monetary fines, or imprisonment.  
However, by the exercise of imagination and employment of logic, the excess of mandatory 
rules and absence of standards, which would provide leeway not only for the relationship between 
the minority and the majority shareholders but also for an external authority to intervene, have led 
to some loopholes and counterproductive results the regulator may fail to notice. One example is 
the regulation of party-related transactions. The Law sets forth a bunch of mandatory rules 
(including disclosure and direct reporting to the board and the shareholders as a class), yet it may 
be a source of concern that the Law has indirectly empowered the minority with a veto right. The 
hypothesis drawn from this criticism is that there is a close corporation with two shareholders, the 
minority and the majority. The majority in its management capacity finds that the corporation 
needs to transact with another corporation where the same majority has some interest, a crisp 
example of a conflict of interest regulated by the Law. According to the Law, the board would 
have to report this deal to the general assembly to decide whether to authorize this deal. In this 
situation, the minority shareholder solely would have the right to make such a decision since the 
majority may not cast any vote. Of course, to decide such an issue, the Law requires the external 
                                                 
456 It is worth noting that the World Bank Group report of 2017 finds that Saudi Arabia has scored 7 
points out of 10 in the conflict of interest regulation index. By comparison, this is higher than the regional 
average, 4.9 points, and the average of OECD high-income economies, which is 6.4 points. See The 
World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (15ed. Oct. 2017). 
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auditor to submit and recite its opinion about this transaction, yet it is not compulsory to comply 
with its opinion. Rather, this requirement is to help shareholders to make an informed decision. 
This concern is that the minority shareholder arbitrarily declines to approve of such a transaction 
despite its fairness to the corporation and the favorable opinion from the external auditor. As a 
majority, one may find himself trapped in a corporation where its minority is paradoxically 
controlling. Even as an attorney of the majority, it is ambiguous whether such arbitrary refusal 
would constitute a cause of action that could be challenged in a court of law, given the absence of 
fairness constraint on the exercise of this right and the indeterminacy of the fairness standard.457 
A standard-based regulation of the party-related transactions may be more capable of 
preventing such a problem, capturing different self-dealings not recognized by a rule-based 
regulation, and affording discretion for the judiciary to decide ex post whether a violation of duties 
has occurred. A counter argument may be raised as standard-based regulations require strong, 
active judiciary that immerses itself in assessing and shaping corporate affairs. Such a judiciary 
has yet to develop.458 Therefore, as long as the judiciary plays limited roles in shaping the corporate 
arena, rule-based regulations will dominate, yet thorough attention should be paid to their drafting 
to avert any loophole that cannot be filled, even by contract. 
Another point that merits serious attention is the statutory maximum and minimum of the 
numbers of directors a corporate board has to embrace. One may argue in favor of the statutory 
cap as it, as mentioned earlier, prevents exploitation and misuse of the corporate fortune by over-
appointing members to the board of directors and thus exhausting its earnings in the form of 
                                                 
457 By analogy, the situation may be applicable to the rights of the holders of preferred shares, whom the 
Law requires their approval to modify the rights of or issue new preferred shares. In the absence of a 
fairness standard, these holders may prevent the corporation from further financing the corporation. See 
Supra Chapter 3. Part I. B. 2. 
458 The commercial judiciary system, its roles, and the remedies it offers are discussed in a later chapter as 
part of the enforcement mechanisms available to minority shareholders.  
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salaries and rewards for the board’s members. This may be true given the unavailability of 
standard-based regulation. Nevertheless, the statutory minimum of three directors poses a seeming 
paradox in the regulatory framework of close corporations. Imposing this rule upon public 
corporations may be justified due to their massive capitals and projects that cannot be managed by 
one director. Nevertheless, compliance with this rule from a close corporation’s point of view may 
force the corporation to incur additional expenses in the form of remunerations for the board’s 
members, which would be distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or redirected to the 
corporation capital for developmental purposes. The Law has lowered the statutory capital share 
requirement to make the form of the joint-stock corporation available to startups and small 
businesses that may be better off being run by a single director, as a matter of efficiency and 
function. As a minority shareholder, one prefers a multiple-member board that ensures— with 
cumulative voting— the minority voice in the boardroom, and thus finds this rule to be protective. 
However, there are other devices to raise the minority’s voice in the boardroom without having 
unnecessary directors and paying for expensive compliance.459 
Speaking of the board of directors under the Law, one may raise some concern about the 
mandatory rules for the board rewards and compensations. The Law offers a range of plans from 
which corporations select to structure their directorial pay packages— in light of the statutory 
proportionality standard.460 Also, the Law gives the right to decide the board’s pay packages to 
shareholders only who are not members of the board. From a minority shareholder’s point of view, 
this accounts for a great deal of protection as it prevents any opportunism and misappropriation of 
                                                 
459 Further explanation about this argument is provided in the next chapter in the context of minority 
shareholder’s right for representation. 
460 The Law requires that managerial compensations be proportional to the work done by the board. This 
requirement represents a standard that leaves room to decide not only for shareholders as a class but also 
for the external authority to intervene for enforcement or adjudicative purposes. 
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the corporate wealth. To ensure adherence and reduce the cost of supervising and monitoring, the 
Law imposes a disclosure requirement, as a valid legal strategy, on the board to submit to the 
shareholder body a report containing what members of the board have received. Unlike other 
corporate statutes that come to regulate how corporations remunerate their directors, the Saudi 
Law, however, goes above and beyond to stipulate—by means of compulsory rules— how much 
a corporation can compensate its board of directors. Theoretically, this may be worrisome as it 
disheartens the board to properly execute their ultimate duty of maximizing the wealth and 
advancing the interests of the corporation, and thus its shareholders —including the minority. The 
size of the corporation is different, so it seems absurd to impose a one-rule-fits-all cap on the 
boards’ remunerations of titanic corporations with thousands of shareholders (e.g., corporations of 
the petroleum and petrochemical industry) and medium or small close corporations with a handful 
of shareholders. In both sorts of corporations, boards will be disinclined to thrive in doing their 
unless they receive encouraging—or at least adequate— payments proportional to the jobs with 
which they are entrusted. Otherwise, the corporation’ performance and prosperity would be 
proportional to the compensations offered to the board.461 Another argument about the efficacy of 
this statutory cap (as it is allegedly protective of corporation’s wealth by preventing exportation) 
is that it does not encompass the remunerative mechanisms for executive officers, whom the board 
has the right to appoint, supervise, and compensate. Therefore, a controlling shareholder may 
appoint himself to an executive post, and —by a power of the board’s majority— arrange 
expensive pay package for his post. 
                                                 
461 E.g., Nithya Narayanan, Activist Nominee Compensation: Balancing the Hedgehog's Dilemma, 41 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 373 (2017) (criticizing the use of capping in remunerative mechanisms as a 
distinctive). 
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 After all, the legislation does recognize the indispensable function of the board as the wheel 
of the corporation when it broadens its powers over corporate matters and holds the corporation 
liable, in principle, for all board’s actions vis-à-vis third parties. To prevent any abuse of such 
power, the Law, on the other hand, reinforces the board’s accountability to shareholders as a class 
and holds its members personally responsible for any corporate malfeasance or mismanagement 
of the corporation. The principle of accountability is of the foremost corporate governance 
principles that have been embedded in the Law in different forms and buttressed by several 
shareholder rights and strong external enforcement devices, including the criminalization of some 
directorial mismanagement and harsh punishments ex post.462 Broader jurisdiction for the board 
over the corporation goes hand in hand with well-defined accountability rules for its actions, 
particularly in an environment where the judiciary seems unequipped to evaluate highly corporate 
affairs yet. 
Another dimension to this analytical discussion of the Law is the maximum and minimum 
percentages for shareholder meetings’ quorums and decision-passing. The Law differentiates 
between shareholder assemblies as it entrusts them with different tasks based upon their criticality 
to the corporation. Of course, the higher the required quorum and decision-making percentages are 
the greater the role played by the minority shareholders in shaping and deciding on the 
corporation’s affairs, as an exercise of logic. Consequently, the Law requires the approval of 75% 
of the share capital represented in a quorate extraordinary shareholder meeting for several 
                                                 
462 However, some concerns may arise as that “too-zealous imposition of personal liability on managers 
might induce them to behave in a risk-averse fashion,” adversely affecting the interests of shareholders on 
the long-term. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 71 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017). See also Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 900 (1984) 
(“The legal risks of the firm's individual participants grow more onerous as we expand the scope of 
absolute personal liability and the range of participants at risk.”) 
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instances (e.g., dissolution of the corporation, and increase or decrease of the share capital), which 
influences the existence of the corporation and the value of its shares. 
As far as the statutory protection for the minority shareholder concerns, it is worth reminding 
that the dilemma of minority shareholders is a subset of a greater agency problem.463 To reduce 
the cost of the problem, the Law requires mandatory disclosure and makes of it a duty upon various 
corporate fiduciaries, including the chairperson, interested director, auditor, and the board as a 
whole. Again, the obligations of periodical and ad hoc disclosure foster the corporate transparency 
and generate a constant flow of information to not only the shareholders as a class but also to the 
third parties, which helps make informed decisions and assess corporate fiduciaries’ 
performance.464 Another statutory instance with the goal to reduce the cost of information and 
coordination is the permission for the corporations to conduct their shareholder meeting via 
modern technology, which reduces the costs the shareholder may have to incur to exert his rights 
otherwise. The disclosure requirements translate into strong corporate governance of the 
corporation, on the one hand, and help outsiders (the market) to become informative of the 
corporation and thus to accurately assess the corporation. 
So far, this chapter finds that the Law asserts several statutory rights for shareholders, and —
in the protection of these rights— outlaws any alteration or contractual waiver of these rights 
whatsoever. At the top of these rights is the non-negotiable right to attend shareholder assemblies, 
irrespective to the percentage of shareholding. A shareholder of either one share or thousands of 
shares is statutorily entitled to attend shareholder’s meetings and vote on the corporate matters. 
                                                 
463 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 71 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (asserting that mandatory disclosure is 
not a legal strategy itself; rather it “plays in the functioning of all legal strategies. . . .” [e.g., in directors’ 
compensations in the Saudi Law]). 
464 Id. at 72. 
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This gives rise to another statutory right of appointing directors to and dismissing them from the 
corporate board. That is an influential instrument in the hand of shareholders as a class that 
logically meshes with the ownership rights, given that shareholders are the owners of the 
corporation and only their interests are at stake. The Law’s recognition of shareholder’s right to 
attend and vote in a shareholder assembly coupled with the right to appoint and remove directors 
safeguards minority’s rights in close corporations where their voice would be lowered, if not 
muted, otherwise. 
Because of the unsophistication that dominates most close corporations, the auditing rules 
examined in this chapter appear to be a primary source of efficacy for the corporation. The Law 
mandates two sources for corporate auditing, internal and external. Both represent the structure of 
the shareholder’s monitoring and supervision rights in close corporations. They are of the foremost 
tools employed to keep shareholders as a class in the loop about the corporate matters, assist them 
to make well-versed decisions, ensure corporate fiduciaries’ compliance with the Law alongside 
corporate bylaws, and detect corporate malfeasance if any. For the monitoring and supervising 
structure to fructify, the Law sets forth rigorous rules governing the powers and tasks of both the 
audit committee and external auditor and holding them to a high standard of accountability for 
their wrongdoing if any. 
All in all, one may conclude that the Law has translated a range of corporate governance 
principles into straightforward rules and procedures that encompass most of the corporate affairs, 
including a vivid governance structure, the board structure (appointment, removal, duties, powers, 
and remunerations), and auditing rules. On the book, those jointly accumulate for the advancement 
of corporate transparency, disclosure, openness, and accountability. However, whether these rules 
could attain these goals with efficiency and smoothness—not with unduly burden and high costs— 
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is an empirical question that may remain unanswered for a while due to the newness of the Law, 
and such spotted loopholes have not scratched the surface yet. 
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Chapter Four: The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholder in the Law † 
 
 
“The law is the only sure protection of the weak, and the only efficient restraint upon the strong.” 
 
         Millard Fillmore 
 
Motivating Hypothetical 
Now the business is incorporated in the form of a close corporation. Saad and his brother, Khalid, 
possess 25% each of the corporate capital. Their father owns 50% of the corporate capital. The 
three of them are deeply involved in the corporation’s day-to-day operations. They are also 
members of the board of directors. Saad reads the news that Saudi Arabia has introduced radical 
reforms that improve the protection of minority investors. Saad is wondering how the Law protects 
his interests, and whether he has a say in the management of the corporation.  
The Scope of Chapter Four 
This Chapter represents a case study of the minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia. It is 
divided into five sections. The first part introduces the reader to the minority shareholders’ issues 
in Saudi Arabia, and the factors affected the change in the policy of protecting their interests, 
leading to an indispensable role of law in the region. The second part offers an analysis of statutory 
shareholder rights. The third part demonstrates⎯through analytical reading⎯how the Law is an 
effective device to curtail oppressive conduct, and how it handles minority shareholders’ issues, 
including the minority’s directorial representation, the dilution of interests, and the unmarketability 
of shares. The fourth part underscores the role of formalism in the Law in one section, and it 
highlights some issues and limitations associated with this statutory approach in the other section. 
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Part I. Introduction 
A. Overview 
Due to the universal structure of the corporation, minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, 
presumably like their counterparts in other parts of the world, suffer from inherent issues to which 
the close corporation structure gives rise.465 In short, the minority shareholders often have 
expectations while they are making investments, but these expectations are not necessarily met. 
That makes these disappointed shareholders want to exit the entity, yet the fact that disposing of 
their shareholdings for fair value ⎯with no escape through the market⎯is relatively problematic 
and makes them stuck in an awkward position, as displayed earlier in chapter one. 
Saudi Arabia has recently carried out a range of significant reforms to enhance business 
environments and captivate foreign investments. That requires the modernization of the regulatory 
framework governing the business domain, and the reinforcement and the protection of 
businesspeople and entrepreneurs’ rights. To this end, one of the primary steps the country has 
taken is the enactment of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015. 466 
To this point, the Law has earned an excellent reputation for its strong protection for investors. 
According to the World Bank Group Report of 2017, the region ranks the 10th globally in 
protecting minority investors, whereas it was reported 36th in the 2016 Report.467 Moreover, the 
Report highlights the existence of a strong conflict of interest regulation, which exceeds the 
regional average.468 All together symbolizes the governmental determination to move forward and 
                                                 
† Hereinafter “the Law” refers to the Saudi Companies Law of 2015, unless otherwise noted. 
465 See supra Chapter 1. Part II. 
466 See supra Chapter 2. Part I. A (4). 
467 See The World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, Country Tables, p. 190 (15ed. 
Oct. 2017). 
468 Id. 
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ensure a business climate for entities of all sizes. Nevertheless, a question arises, how has Saudi 
Arabia set this unprecedented record in such a short period? And why? 
To begin with, unlike the orthodox method utilized in protecting minority shareholders and 
curbing opportunistic and oppressive conduct of majority, the Saudi legislature has taken an 
unconventional approach in addressing the issues of minority shareholders and protecting their 
interests. In the United States, for instance, oppression of minority shareholders in close 
corporations are squarely handled by the judicial intervention ex post, which has created judicially 
established principles (e.g., heightened duty on controlling shareholders, partner-like duty, 
mandatory buyouts, and the judicial consideration of the minority’s reasonable expectations) in 
deciding oppression claims brought by minority shareholders.469 The judicial protection comes as 
a result of the minority shareholders’ failure to contract against oppression and opportunism by 
the controlling shareholders. In this sense, corporate laws play a gap-filling role, leaving the 
governance rules of the corporation to shareholders to decide how they want to manage and run 
their businesses (contractarian view).470 
A number of writings on the minority’s issues in the United States advocate for, and rely on 
heavily, the judicial intervention to curb opportunism and oppression by controlling shareholders. 
This appears to mesh well with the contractarian view of the corporations besides an effective 
judicial system that is sophisticated to execute its functions of applying fairness and resolving 
shareholder squabbles. The same can be said about minority shareholder dilemma in Saudi Arabia 
except for the part of the effective judiciary that would rectify the situation ex post. 
The commonplace failure of shareholders to bargain for their protection alongside the limited 
role of the Saudi judiciary led Saudi lawmakers to intervene and take a different route in protecting 
                                                 
469 See supra Chapter 1. Part III. B.  
470 See supra Chapter 1. Part III. C. 
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minority investors, including close corporations’ shareholders. The newness of the Saudi approach 
is represented by an assortment of prescriptive rules that shareholders must adhere to in governing 
their business, setting a benchmark for effective corporate governance for the corporations in the 
region. The general theme of these rules is centered around empowering shareholders as a class 
with agenda-setting supremacy.471 
This core chapter seeks to convince the reader that the statutory protection for minority 
shareholders⎯through a set of compulsory corporate governance rules⎯is an effective approach 
to blocking the way ahead of controlling shareholders from engaging in any abusive or 
opportunistic conduct toward the minority at the first place. The unsophistication of both the 
judiciary and shareholders of close corporations in the region necessitates the governmental 
intervention to eliminate, or at least minimize, the issues generated by the locked-in structure of 
the close corporations, such as illiquidity of shares, selective repurchase of shares, dilution of 
interests, and management expectations. 
Another dimension of this chapter is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the minority 
shareholder of close corporations by putting forward a proposal for a statutory approach in 
protecting minority shareholders that may be followed by countries with similar circumstances as 
Saudi Arabia’s. The prevalence of family businesses that are run by blinded trust among their 
members makes it difficult for these members, in reality, to bargain for themselves or at least 
expect conflicts and tensions in the future when it looks rosy at the outset. Furthermore, the 
developing corporate judiciary poses a threat that its rulings may not be anticipated ahead of time, 
and thus foreign investors appear to be reluctant to rely on such an approach in facilitating 
shareholders’ private ordering, or in construing their agreed-on provisions. Because of these 
                                                 
471 See The World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, p. 29 (15ed. Oct. 2017). 
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circumstances, a corporate law with governance rules⎯that protect minority shareholders, balance 
the power, and ensure the exercise of rights472⎯is of necessity as explained hereunder in 
reinforcing investor’s trust and offering a healthier business environment. 
B. The Role of Law in the Region 
The importance of corporate law’s role in the Saudi business environment stems from four 
overlapping factors. First of all, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state that is mostly influenced by the 
civil law system.473 Hence, Laws and regulations are the primary sources for the legislation, 
especially for the business sector.474 Therefore, the necessity of the new law is unquestionable to 
chase the rapid changes the country has been pursuing. 
Second, in developed countries (e.g., the U.S. and the U.K.), corporate laws are not only 
statutes that legislatures promulgate. Instead, they also include other players of social, judicial, and 
legal aspects.475 In fact, some scholars claim that corporate laws themselves perform a “trivial” 
role.476 On the other hand, corporate laws in emerging markets and economies are the linchpin of 
                                                 
472 See infra Chapter 4. Part II. 
473 For an in-depth explanation about the legal system of Saudi Arabia and the role of Sharia in shaping it, 
see Faisal M. Al-Fadhel, Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi 
Arabian Law: A Brief Overview, 1 I.J.L.D.L.R. 95 (2012); Abdullah F. Ansary, A Brief Overview of the 
Saudi Arabian Legal System, GLOBALEX (2008) 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html; George N. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law 
Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1988); FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGALSYSTEM: 
STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA, BRILL (2000); FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ch.4 Lambert Academic 
Publishing (2014). [hereinafter: AlMajid] 
474 See FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, pp.140 Lambert Academic Publishing (2014) (referring the special 
recognition for regulating the business sector and incorporating modern legal concepts to the 
establishment of the country in 1932. It “intensified…when large oil fields were discovered in the Eastern 
province.”) 
475 See Bernard S. Black& Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1914 (1996) (claiming that t corporate law in developed countries includes “other legal, market, and 
cultural constraints on the actions of corporate managers and controlling shareholders to achieve a 
sensible balance among . . . competing needs.”) 
476 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 542 (1990). 
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the business and the only wheel that rotates the market. Their contribution to the businesses in 
these countries outweighs the value added by corporate statutes in developed countries clearly 
because of the weak role played by other institutions477 that shape the corporate behaviors in the 
developed ones.478  
Third, corporate laws in developed countries coexist with other supporting legal institutions. 
As stated above, the U.S. state courts represent the cornerstone in the protection for minority 
shareholders by for instance defining oppression and imposing a partner-like duty on dominant 
shareholders.479 However, this is not always the case in Saudi Arabia or other developing countries, 
where the judiciary works and develops sluggishly.480 
Not only do rules and regulations aim at protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders⎯when they neglect or fail to bargain for their protection⎯, but also they serve an 
essential role in protecting the interests of outsiders.481 Outsiders include creditors of the 
corporation, its workforce, and its bondholders. An example of such an immutable rule is that 
corporations must maintain a statutory reserve of 30% of the advanced corporate capital.482 
                                                 
477 Id. at 1913, (defining “the term "institution" in a broad sense to include private organizational 
structures such as stock trading systems and securities registrars; public organizational structures such as 
securities regulators, courts with experience in commercial matters, an honest police force, and a reliable 
mail system; and mixed public private structures such as self-regulatory organizations, an accounting 
profession, and sophisticated financial accounting rules.”) 
478 Id. 
479 Id. 
480 Classifying Saudi Arabia as a developing country is still debatable. AlMajid argues that Saudi Arabia 
should be considered as a developed country, particularly in terms of wealth. He believes that his 
discussion can serve as supportive evidence for such a claim. See FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A 
CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
footnote 76 Lambert Academic Publishing (2014); but see RODNEY WILSON & OTHERS, 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA, pp.6 RoutlegdeCurzon (2004) (asserting that 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country). 
481See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 237 (Harv. Univ. Press 1991) (ascribing the importance role played by rules and 
regulation in protecting third parties to the fact that “. . . voluntary contracting is not feasible.”) 
482 The Law obliges joint-stock corporations to build a statutory reserve. In doing so, corporations must 
put 10% of its net profits by every year, and they may cease putting aside the 10% portion upon two 
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Another example is the approval requirement of a special assembly consisting of bondholders 
concerning any change in their entitlements in addition to the approval of the shareholder general 
assembly.483 Such mandatory rules reinforce the third party’s confidence in dealing with 
corporations in the region, which accumulate for the public good of the market as a whole.484 
These four points heighten the significance to put together, inter alia, a corporate act that fulfills 
the needs of the country, especially with the declaration of the Kingdom’s 2030 Vision. In short, 
the 2030 Vision reflects, inter alia, a steadfast commitment to end the era of oil dependency. 
Instead, it aims at rehabilitating the business ambiance to attract foreign investments, and empower 
small and medium-sized enterprises.485 Such a goal requires the existence of strong corporate 
governance embedded in an effective corporate law.486 All in all, knowing that Saudi Arabia is one 
of the emerging markets, it is of prominence to comprehend the role played by laws in such a 
country that lacks sophisticated institutions that would otherwise contribute to shaping the 
protective system of minority shareholders. 
Part II. Statutory Shareholder Rights 
The Law incorporates a set of statutory rights that shareholders enjoy so long as they hold to 
their shares. These rights differ in their importance, yet they all together, the research argues, 
                                                 
conditions: first, the statutory reserve has reached 30% of the corporation’s paid-in share capital; second, 
the corporation’s ordinary general assembly votes in favor of discontinuing setting aside 10% of its net 
profits for the reserve. See Article 129 (1). 
483 Article 166 (2). 
484 As mentioned earlier, close corporations have a vital role not only in the Saudi economy⎯due massive 
size of their capitals,⎯ but also in the labor market as they are the employers of circa 80% of workforce 
in the private sector. See supra Chapter 2. Part II. B (2). 
485 For an in-depth look at the Saudi 2030 Vision, including its themes, goals, and challenges, see 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en  
486 See Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1914 (1996) (claiming that even if the issues that a corporate law endeavors to redress are 
worldwide, it is of importance for the corporate law to be context-specific). 
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establish strong protection for and a great deal of deference to the minority shareholders. This 
result flows from⎯and is premised upon⎯the statutory view of the shareholder. In principle, 
shareholders in close corporations are co-owners who enjoy equal rights and impartial treatment 
under the Law. There may be, nevertheless, some exceptions to the general rule, such as preferred 
shares, yet the Law sets forth a number of rights to ensure that the minimum impartiality is upheld.  
To begin with, a “statutory” right under the Law implicates two significant results: First, the 
right may not be eliminated or limited by any means of a contract, agreement, or an opt-out 
provision, and such an arrangement is deemed void and null under the Law.487 Second, the 
shareholder enjoys the right by force of law, without the need to be stipulated in any of the 
corporation’s constitutional documents (i.e., articles of associations and corporate bylaws) and 
irrespective to the size of his shareholding (one share or million shares).488 These results are of 
paramount importance for shareholders, mainly minority ones, as they prevent the controlling 
shareholders from, by means of bargaining power, denying the minority of any rights explained 
hereunder. In addition, it reduces the cost of contracting the minority shareholder may incur as 
these rights are guaranteed by law, and thus even if the minority shareholder is an unsophisticated 
businessperson, he has these rights in any case. 
The shareholder’s statutory rights can be categorized by subject into two collections: economic 
rights (e.g., right to receive dividends, right to sell shares, and right to residual claim upon 
liquidation) and control rights (e.g., right to vote, right to elect directors, right to supervise the 
corporation, right to inspect the corporation, and right to call for a shareholder meeting). 
                                                 
487 See Article 110, which read that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall 
have all rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to dividends. . . .” and Article 88, which 
constrains the powers of the extraordinary shareholder assembly as it may not deprive a shareholder of his 
fundamental rights, including “obtaining a share of distributed dividends. . . .”  
488 Id. 
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Shareholders advance capitals with the expectation that they in return obtain some financial 
benefits and run the corporation⎯or at least have a say in the corporate management. Therefore, 
the Law embraces a set of fundamental rights that assert the shareholder supremacy in the 
corporation. 
Note that, for the sake of clarity and given the importance of several rights, the research 
examines these rights under different rubrics as they are useful tools to eliminate and minimize the 
minority shareholder’s issues. These rights include the right to elect directors and the right to file 
derivative or direct action. 
A. Economic Rights 
1. The Right to Receive Dividends 
One of the fundamental rights the share confers on its holder is the right to receive dividends. 
As a matter of law, it is one of the main elements of the statutory definition of the corporation, the 
share of profits and losses.489 No shareholder shall be denied receiving returns on his investment.490 
Returns may be in pecuniary form, in the form of bonus shares, or both. Moreover, an important 
aspect of this right is that only shareholders⎯through their assemblies⎯ have the power to declare 
dividends.491 The board of directors may make some suggestion or propose a distribution plan,492 
but the shareholder assembly always retains the ultimate say by means of a shareholder resolution.  
                                                 
489 Article two. 
490 Article 88, 1 (a). 
491 By comparison, the board of directors in the United States reserves the right to declare dividends or 
not, yet such a power is limited by judicial review, or so-called the business judgment rule. See 11 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 5320, at 562⎯63 & nn.7-8 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003), and Julian Velasco, The 
Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414 (2006). 
492 Article 175, (“The company’s directors shall prepare . . . proposals on distribution of dividends within 
three months from the end of the fiscal year.”) 
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Therefore, given the limitation placed on the board’s remunerations,493 the controlling 
shareholder has a strong incentive not to vote against the declaration of dividends, and thus all 
shareholders receive some of the corporation’s net profits after it satisfies its statutory obligations, 
such setting aside the statutory reserve.494 Unless the shareholder possesses preferred 
shares⎯which may not have a voting right495⎯, all shares yield the same percentage of returns 
regardless of the position of their holders, controlling or minority shareholders.496 Nevertheless, 
the Law does not obligate the corporation to distribute dividends in a timely manner, yearly or 
quarterly.497 Instead, shareholders may stipulate it in the corporation’s bylaws, or leave it to the 
shareholder assembly to decide.498 Placing the discretion to declare dividends within the 
shareholder assembly makes this right of paramount importance in protecting minority 
shareholders, rather than it is being so “illusory” and of little significance had it been within the 
will of the board of directors.499 
Another constraint⎯that ensures the distribution of dividends and not to be obstructed by 
controlling shareholders⎯is tying the directorial remuneration in the form of profits to the 
declaration of dividends to shareholders.500 To illustrate, the Law grants the corporation freedom 
                                                 
493 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. 
494 Article 131. 
495 Article 114. 
496 Article 110. 
497 See Article 37 of the RRP (listing a number of requirements with which corporations have to comply 
whenever they consider a distribution of dividends, including regular positive profitability, reasonable 
liquidity, and possible foreseeing of the scale of the corporations’ profits). 
498 Article 131. 
499 In the United States, for instance, shareholders have the “right” to receive dividends, yet only the 
board of directors has the right to declare dividends, which renders shareholders’ right illusory and trivial. 
See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 424 (2006) 
(prioritizing shareholder rights in the United States and dividing them into illusory or ancillary rights, on 
one the hand, and fundamental rights, on the other). 
500 Article 76 (2). 
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to select how it compensates its directors.501 Nevertheless, if the corporation wants to tie its 
directors’ compensation to their performance and thus to the corporation’s profitability, the Law 
requires, inter alia, that the corporation distribute dividends⎯representing at least 5% of the 
corporation’s paid-in capital⎯to shareholders.502 Evidently, such a requirement deprives the 
controlling shareholder of appropriating the corporation’s profits to themselves only. In sum, if 
the controlling director/shareholder wants a slice of the pie, so do other shareholders. Thus, he has 
to share the pie with them. 
2. The Right of Residual Claim on the corporation’s Assets upon Liquidation 
Another basic, yet significant right to which the shareholder is entitled is the right to claim his 
share in the remaining of the corporation’s assets after liquidation. Only after the corporation enters 
into liquidation and all of its creditors are paid, shareholders can have a claim against the 
outstanding assets if any.503 As in the right to receive dividends, this right is protected in multiple 
positions within the Law as it cannot be contracted out or denied, for it is of the statutory, 
inseparable rights the share accords to its holder.504 
B. Control Rights 
1. The Right to Vote 
Voting right is the shareholder’s mechanism to exert power over the corporation’s 
management, given the separation between ownership and management in today corporation. 
                                                 
501 Article 76 (1). 
502 Article 76 (2). 
503 Article 110 reads that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall have all 
rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to dividends, the company’s assets upon liquidation . . 
. .” 
504 Article 88 (1) (A) (II) constrains the powers of the extraordinary shareholder assembly as it may not 
deprive a shareholder of his fundamental rights, including “obtaining a share of the company’s assets 
upon liquidation . . . .” 
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Therefore, the Law, similar to other corporate laws, confirms the voting right for shareholders to 
decide corporate matters.505 However, the extent of this right over corporate affairs differs from 
law to another based on whom the law empowers the most: shareholders or directors.  
The CL vests a great deal of power in shareholders as a whole by requiring their votes to 
approve a broad range of corporate affairs. Such affairs are the director’s compensation,506 
mergers,507 increase or decrease in the corporate capital,508 bylaws amendments, issuance of 
shares,509 and appointment and removal of directors.510 Such a right exemplifies the shareholder’s 
control over not only shareholder affairs (e.g., restrictions on share sale) but also managerial affairs 
(e.g., issuance of share and approval of related-party transactions). 
2. The Right to Attend the Shareholder Assembly 
It may seem to be intuitive that the right to vote implies the right to attend; otherwise, where 
else would shareholders cast their votes? However, the access to shareholder meetings was denied 
to shareholders with tiny shareholdings⎯less than 20 shares under the superseded law.511 
As it is demonstrated in the previous chapter, the shareholder assembly as a powerful organ is 
the mainstay of a number of rights the Law asserts for shareholders. It is the regulatory instrument 
by which shareholders, for instance, elect (or oust) directors,512 declare dividends,513 amend 
                                                 
505 Article 110 reads that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall have all 
rights associated with shares, particularly . . . voting on resolutions . . . .” 
506 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. 
507 Article 64 (4) ( requiring an extraordinary shareholder assembly with 75% of the shares represented in 
the assembly in favor of the merger to approve of such a transaction).  
508 Articles 137 & 138. 
509 Articles 137 & 138. 
510 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. A (1) & (2). 
511 Article 83 of the Companies Law of 1388H. 
512 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. A (1) & (2). 
513 See supra Chapter 4. Part II. A (1); Article 129 (2). 
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corporate bylaws,514 approve of a related-party transaction,515 decide managerial remunerations,516 
and so on. To ensure that shareholders exert their statutory powers, the Law guarantees the right 
to attend for all shareholders⎯irrespective to the size of their shareholdings.517 A change signifies 
the legislature’s intention to reinforce the minority shareholder’s participation in corporate matters, 
and also it signals the impartiality of the Law toward all shareholders.  
To make the shareholder’s attendance effective (rather than illusory) and substantive (rather 
than procedural), this right entails a couple of ancillary rights that enhance the role of the 
shareholder during corporate assemblies. Any shareholder⎯or his representative518⎯has the right 
to discuss any corporate matters listed in the meeting agenda and also has the right to direct 
questions (about these matters) to directors of the board or the external auditor.519 Both of which 
are of great importance in reducing information and coordination costs for shareholders to be well-
informed and thus efficiently exercise their rights. 
The Law penalizes the violation of these rights in two ways. First, the Law imposes a monetary 
fine up to 500 thousand Saudi Riyals ($133,333) on anyone who intentionally denies or deprives 
a shareholder of his right to attend a shareholder assembly or cast his vote.520 Second, the harmed 
shareholder is entitled to submit an order to the assembly to nullify any resolution issued in 
                                                 
514 Article 88. 
515 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. E. 
516 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. 
517 Article 86 (2) reads that “[e]ach shareholder shall have the right to attend meetings of shareholder 
general assembly, even if the company’s articles of association stipulates otherwise. . . .” 
518 Shareholders have the right to attend themselves, or delegate this right to their representatives⎯except 
directors of the board and the corporation’s employees⎯ to attend on their behalf. See Article 86 (2) 
(stipulating shareholder’s right to delegate his right to attend and vote to other person) and Articles 44 to 
47 of the RRP (detailing the implementing rules for the exercise of this right. 
519 Article 96.  
520 Article 213 (F). 
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violation of his rights⎯ even if in his absence due to an acceptable excuse.521 Although it is unclear 
what constitutes an “acceptable excuse”, it indicates that the shareholder’s presence is encouraged, 
protected, and treated with great deference, however. 
3. The Right to Request Shareholder Meeting 
Knowing that a number of shareholder’s rights are exercised through only the shareholder 
assembly, the Law has asserted that shareholders (as well as members of the board and auditors) 
have the right to request the board to call for a shareholder assembly. Such a request has to be 
submitted by a shareholder or a number of them in possession of at least 5% of the corporate 
capital.522 The board of directors has no discretion but to carry out the request.523 
The board’s failure to respond to shareholder’s request permits shareholders with only 2% of 
the corporation’s shares to submit the request to the Ministry of Commerce and Investment to hold 
a shareholder meeting within 30 days from the request date.524 Such a procedure emboldens the 
minority shareholders to raise their voice about any corporate matter that would not be enclosed 
in a prepared-by-board agenda. 
4. The Right to Monitor and Supervise the Corporation 
This informational right allows any shareholder to access and observe corporate books and 
records.525 Unlike other laws,526 this right is of great significance as it is absolute. To clarify, the 
                                                 
521 Article 178 (1). However, the Law stipulates statute of limitation of one year from the date of the 
prejudiced decision. See Article 178 (2). 
522 Article 90 (1) stipulates that “[t]he board of directors shall call for an ordinary general assembly 
meeting if so requested by . . . a number of shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital.” 
523 Id. 
524 Article 90 (3). 
525Article 88 (1, a, v) prohibits any amendment to the shareholder’s right to access the corporation’s 
books and documents.  
526 For example, Shareholders in some U.S. states bear the burden that they have a proper purpose to 
review “some” corporate documents. In other words, it is the board’s call whether to allow shareholders 
to access corporate information. See, e.g., Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 
563, 568 (Del.1997).  
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Law does not mandate shareholders to prove a legitimate purpose to exercise this right. The board 
has no statutory ground to refuse the shareholder’s access to look at the board’s minutes, the 
corporation’s financial records, or other documents. Such a denier (e.g., the controlling shareholder 
or a member of the board of directors) is subject to a monetary penalty.527 In addition, the judiciary 
has ruled in multiple cases in favor of letting shareholders access and review not only primary 
documents (e.g., bylaws and board’s minutes) but also financial records and assessment.528 
There may be, nevertheless, some concern about the minority shareholder’s abusing this right 
to harm the corporation, or expose it to potential damage, yet the Law stays silent about any 
restrictions imposed on this right. By employment of logic and exercise of imagination, it may be 
proposed that this right be subject to the same limitations imposed on the director’s answering 
shareholder’s questions. In principle, the Law obligates directors to answer the shareholder’s 
question to the extent that the answer does not sabotage the corporation’s interests.529 In case the 
shareholder is dissatisfied with the director’s response, the Law sets a mechanism to settle such a 
conflict. The displeased shareholder may then petition to the assembly, which adjudicates whether 
the answer at dispute is inadequate.530 
5. The Right to Judicial Inspection  
The right to judicial inspection offers minority shareholders the chance to have an outside 
player reviewing and assessing some corporate matters. For example, shareholders may have their 
suspicion about some directorial misbehavior taking placing within the corporation or that the 
                                                 
527 See infra Chapter Five, Part II. 
528 Article 213 (J) states that “[w]ithout prejudice to any harsher penalty stipulated in any other law, a fine 
not exceeding 500,000 riyals [$133,333] shall apply to: (J) any person who fails to give shareholders or 
partners access to necessary documents in accordance with the provisions of the Law. . . .” 
529 Article 96 states that “[t]he board of directors or the auditor shall answer shareholders’ questions to the 
extent that does not jeopardize the company. If the shareholder deems that the response to a question is 
unsatisfactory, he may appeal to the general assembly whose decision shall be final.” 
530 Id. 
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auditor has engaged in malpractice. For this reason, the Law grants the shareholders⎯who hold at 
least 5% of the corporation’s outstanding shares⎯the right to request the judiciary to order 
inspection of the corporation.531 
In terms of procedures, the inspection shall be approved only after the court has heard the 
defendant’s response.532 In addition, to ensure that inspection requests are justified and with some 
merit, such inspection is entirely at the expense of the complaining shareholders so that 
shareholders will not submit a groundless, or abusive request.533 If the request turns out to be valid, 
the court has a basket of options it may select from: it may call for a shareholder meeting, and it 
may remove the directors of the board or the corporate auditor and appoint temporary directors 
whose powers and terms are also defined by the court.534 
Part III. Minority Shareholder’s Issues in Light of the Law 
This part explores how some prescriptive rules of the Law address the major issues confronted 
by minority shareholders in close corporations. It also argues that strengthening corporate laws 
can eliminate⎯or mitigate⎯ the issues associated with minority status in close corporations. A 
strong corporate law can enhance the minority shareholder’s role in management, form a 
framework of continuous, compulsory disclosure about the business’s affairs, and ensure the 
integrity and professional judgment through the strict conflict of interest laws that uphold fairness 
and profitability for all shareholders.  
This part continues to examine the Law’s response to the issue of shareholder’s expectation to 
run and manage the business through representation in the boardroom. It also casts light on the 
                                                 
531 Article 100 (1). 
532 Article 100 (2). 
533 Id. 
534 Article 100 (3). 
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statutory treatment for the dilution of share value. Another issue this part addresses is the exit issue 
and how the Law protects the tradability of shares. In addition, it shows the Law’s approach to 
curbing opportunistic conduct and conflict of interest transactions. 
It is important to keep in mind that these rules are neither fully comprehensive nor perfect. 
They only empower minority shareholders with the necessary instruments to play their roles 
without fearing the cost of information and coordination and ensure them strong standing armed 
with a group of economic and control rights. If the shareholders seek more rights and powers, they 
should optimally bargain and contract for them. The following analyses of the Law are intended 
to be critical, rather than descriptive, and encapsulate the relevant rules and regulations that may 
be potent weapons in the hand of minority shareholders in their confrontation with close 
corporation’s issues. 
A. Enhancing Minority Shareholder’s Representation on Corporate Board 
Shareholders in close corporations oftentimes are a small number with interpersonal 
relationships and with expectations to manage the business.535 However, the expectations of 
minority shareholders may not be met unless they are secured by a provision in the corporate 
documents or by a long-term employment contract.536 Regardless of the rationale behind 
shareholders’ failure to protect their expectations, the Law delivers reliable backup for these 
shareholders to play their statutory roles effectively and efficiently. 
As the Law protects minority shareholders as the ultimate owners of the business through a set 
of economic and control rights, it also ensures that their stakes are represented (and not overlooked) 
in corporate boardrooms⎯proportionately to their interests’ size. This lays in the shareholders’ 
                                                 
535 See supra Chapter 1. Part II. C. 
536 See supra Chapter 1. Part III. C. 
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ability to nominate one of them (or an outsider) to represent their interests on the board. To this 
end, the Law sets forth a couple of fundamental tools that ensure the representation of the 
minority’s interests: the election of directors is a statutory right, and the cumulative voting is 
mandatory. 
1. The Right to Elect Directors 
One of the core rights of the shareholders is the right to elect their representatives to the 
board.537 This is a statutory right that may not be contracted out, waived, or denied.538 Moreover, 
it is argued that the shareholder’s right to elect directors is of the foremost rights, and superior to 
other economic and control rights discussed earlier because of the powers this right confers on 
directors.539 
In close corporations, however, shareholders oftentimes wear the hats of directors and 
managers; they elect themselves to the board of directors.540 Not all shareholders can wear such a 
hat, which makes the decision-making power resides in an individual or a small group of 
shareholders who possess a majority of the voting shares that suffice to elect the entire board.541 
Therefore, in solidification of the statutory right to elect directors and to ensure a greater chance 
of representation for the minority shareholders’ interests on the board, the Law enjoins the 
                                                 
537 Article 68 (2) affirms that “[e]ach shareholder shall be entitled to nominate himself or one or more 
other persons for board membership, based on his share in the capital.” 
538 See supra Chapter 4. Part II. 
539 See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 
409 (2006) (arguing that shareholder right to elect directors along with the right to sell are the most 
fundamental rights of shareholder). 
540 See, e.g., John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in 
the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 660 (2007) (differentiating between public corporations 
and close corporations based on the fact that minority shareholders often anticipate to occupy salaried 
positions, which constitutes de facto dividends). 
541 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 435 (6th ed. 1998); Julian Javier Garza, 
Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A Comparative Study, 31 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 613, 646 (2000). 
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observance of the cumulative voting in electing the board’s members, thus eliminating the 
corporation’s discretion to adopt such a rule. 542  
2. Cumulative Voting  
The general principle is that shareholders have the discretion to design their voting system.543 
In principle, shareholders vote on corporate matters⎯including the election of directors⎯by 
plurality voting. This voting system in the context of the director’s election involves that every 
voting share is cast for each post on the board.544 Under such a system, the shareholder with a 
majority of the voting shares may select the entire board’s members,545 which leaves the minority 
shareholders destitute of any chance to have their representatives on the board unless they have 
secured a voting agreement ax ante, or they voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system.546 
An exception to the general rule and in determination to reinforcing the minority shareholders’ 
rights and raising their voice in the boardroom, the Law obligates joint-stock corporations⎯public 
and close⎯to adopting the cumulative voting in electing directors.547 The cumulative voting 
entails that the shareholder’s voting shares are multiplied by the number of for-election posts on 
                                                 
542 In the United States, for instance, cumulative voting is optional. Corporations have to stipulate such a 
method in their bylaws if they want to implement it in the election of directors. See, e.g., Maddock v. 
Vorclone Corp. 147 A. 255, 255 (Del. Ch. 1929) (asserting that voting cumulatively is a special right that 
is mandated by statute, and thus it is prone to be amended, and incorporators have discretion whether to 
adopt such a voting manner ); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (B) (2016) (“Shareholders do not have a 
right to cumulate their votes for directors unless the articles of incorporation so provide.”) 
543 Article 95 states that “[t]he company’s articles of association shall prescribe the manner of voting at 
shareholder assemblies.” 
544 See infra note 548. 
545 This voting approach is known as “ straight voting” under the Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA), which is adopted by a group of U.S. states. See also JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS § 13.17, at 328 (1997) (describing straight voting as casting votes according to the 
number of shares held for each vacancy). 
546 See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
ch. 3, § 3.17, at 37 (3d ed. 1998) (advising attorneys to stipulate cumulative voting for the election of 
directors in close corporations as a method to divide control power among all shareholders). 
547 Article 95 excludes election of directors from the general rule (shareholder freedom to design the 
voting system). Instead, it mandates that “[c]umulative voting shall be used for electing the board of 
directors.” 
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the board, and the result is the product the shareholder may cast for a single candidate or divide 
among two or more candidates.548 Obligating corporations to assume the cumulative voting in 
electing directors accentuates the statutory role in promoting the minority’s rights and its role in 
the governance of the corporation.  
A significant effect the cumulative voting yields is that it enhances the chance of minority 
shareholders with considerable shareholdings (e.g., 10% or 20%) to have their interests represented 
and their voice heard as the board is vested with a great cluster of powers in formulating corporate 
policies and deciding corporate matters. It is worth bearing in mind that, however, the cumulative 
voting does not guarantee the minority’s representation on the board, but rather it increases its 
opportunity to secure the board’s representation depending on the size of the board. If the size of 
the board is large, the minority shareholders have a greater chance to elect one or more members 
to the board, and vice-versa.549 This meshes well with the statutory minimum of directors the 
corporation must have, preventing controlling shareholders from making the board small so that 
they would appoint all of the directors. 
From a critical point of view, the Law mandates the cumulative voting in the appointment of 
directors, yet it stays silent whether the system must be followed in their removal. Assuming that 
this is a statutory loophole, directors will be therefore susceptible to removal by a plurality of 
                                                 
548 To clarify the difference between plurality voting and cumulative voting in the election of directors, 
assume that a corporation has two shareholders (X owns 50 shares, and Y and Z possess 20 shares each) 
and three vacant board seats. Under plurality voting, X can elect the entire board because X can cast his 
50 votes for each seat. Under cumulative voting, shares are multiplied by the numbers of vacant seats. In 
this assumption, X has 150 votes (50  3), and Y and Z 60 have 60 votes each (20  3). Candidate run at 
large rather than for specific seat. Therefore, candidates that receive the most votes get elected and 
become directors. X would be better off if it divides its votes between two seats because it can divide its 
votes among the three seats in a way that makes it win all seats, whereas Y and Z, the minority, should 
consolidate their votes to win one seat. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (c). 
549 For example, assume corporation has two shareholders: X with 80 share, and Y 20 shares, and three 
vacant board seats. Even with cumulative voting, Y is unable to secure a seat on the board. If the there are 
five, however, the cumulative 80 votes of Y can secure it a seat on the board. 
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shares, eroding the usefulness of the cumulative voting for minority shareholders. To fill this gap, 
it may be suggested that the Law protects its cumulative voting and the appointment of minority 
shareholder’s representative through a special requirement similar to the one stipulated in the 
MBCA. According to section 8.08, a resolution to remove the director may not be passed if a 
number of shares⎯enough to elect him by means of cumulative voting⎯are voted against such a 
resolution.550 By doing so, the Law would ensure that the controlling shareholder could not 
circumvent the minority shareholder’s director of choice. 
In sum, the shareholder’s right to elect directors espoused by the mandatory cumulative voting 
manner in the appointment allows the minority shareholders to have access to the management of 
the corporation, represent their interests, stay informed about the corporate matters, engage in the 
formulation of corporate policy, and affect the governance of the corporation. It is an effective 
device to augment the minority’s chance to participate in corporate management. 
B. Protecting Share Value 
The dilution of share value is another issue faced by minority shareholders.551 During the 
lifespan of the corporation, the corporation may need to issue more shares for various reasons, 
such as raising capital in pursuit of a new business opportunity and conducting the first public 
offering. The issuance of new shares dilutes the voting power⎯and thus the value⎯of the 
shareholdings of the minority shareholders.  
 The prescriptive rules may serve as a protective device to ensure that the dilution of the 
minority’s shareholdings is not driven by opportunistic nor oppressive motives, but rather it is the 
                                                 
550 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (c) (2016) (“If cumulative voting is authorized, a director may 
not be removed if the number of votes sufficient to elect the director under cumulative voting is voted 
against removal.”) 
551 See supra Chapter 1. Part II. B. 
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result of a purely business decision. The statutory protection for the minority shareholder’s share 
value flows from two main rubrics fished out from the Law: the approval requirements for share 
issuance, and the preemptive rights. Note that the following subsections do not divulge all of their 
procedural details, but rather they single out the significant rules that, I argue, constitute the 
statutory protection from the minority shareholder’s standpoint. 
1. Approval Requirement for Share Issuance 
With respect to the shareholder primacy and the shareholder equality themes throughout the 
Law, the Law stipulates procedural mixture of protective rules that must be followed in case the 
corporation desires to increase its capital through the issuance of new shares.552 
 The first and foremost rule is that the decision to issue new shares is within the extraordinary 
shareholder assembly.553 Because the issuance of new shares entails an increase in the corporate 
capital and consequently a change in the corporation’s articles of association, only the shareholders 
(via extraordinary assembly) may decide such a matter.554 Furthermore, the Law requires a higher 
resolution-passing percentage for the decision to, inter alia, issue new shares.555 In principle, 
resolutions pertaining one of the matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the extraordinary 
shareholder assembly (e.g., changing the corporation’s name or engaging in a new business 
purpose) require the approval of at least a two-thirds of the voting shares represented in the 
                                                 
552 Article 138 considers the issuance of new shares as the primary vehicle to increase the corporation 
capital, and it lists a number of options against which shares may be issued (e.g., cash, in-kind 
contributions, corporate reserve, company’s debts, and debt instruments). 
553 As Article 137 defines the extraordinary shareholder assembly as the competent authority to decide on 
the issuance of new shares with the proviso that the corporate capital has been paid in-full, except if 
shares are issued as a result of bondholders’ right to convert their debt instruments into shares. 
554 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b). 
555 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b); Article 94 (4) (requiring a different resolution-passing 
percentage for the following corporate matters: increase or decrease of capital, extension of the 
corporation’s lifespan, voluntary dissolution, and merger with another entity).  
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assembly.556 Nevertheless, a three-quarter majority of the voting shares represented in the 
assembly must approve of the decision to increase its capital⎯through the issuance of shares.557 
By employment of logic and given that the validity of the assembly requires at least representation 
of 50% of the corporation capital,558 this resolution-passing percentage empowers the minority 
shareholders to have their say on such a decision, and prevent the controlling shareholders from 
exploiting the tool (issuance of share) to dilute their share value. 
2. Preemptive Rights 
Another protective aspect of the minority shareholders by the Law is the statutory recognition 
of the preemptive right for the existing shareholders.559 As a result of increasing corporate capital, 
shareholders enjoy the right to purchase new shares in proportional to their shareholdings.560 This 
right enables “registered” shareholders561⎯including minority ones⎯to avert the dilution of their 
shares’ value and voting power in case the corporation increases its capital through the issuance 
of shares.562 
                                                 
556 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b). 
557 Id. 
558 Id. 
559 Preemptive rights may be, however, granted to non-shareholders provided that the extraordinary 
shareholder approves of such an arrangement. See Article 140. 
560 Article 139 stipulates that “[a] shareholder shall . . . have a preemptive right to subscribe to new shares 
issued against cash contributions.” 
561 According to the RRP, registered shareholders are the ones who are registered in the shareholder 
registry at the end of the day on which the extraordinary shareholder assembly approves of a share capital 
increase, or at the end of the day specified by the ordinary shareholder assembly (or the board) on which 
shareholders become entitled to dividends. Moreover, the importance of knowing the status of registered 
shareholder intensifies as the Law mandates that changes to share’s ownership or its entitlements be 
marked in the shareholder registry. Otherwise, such a change (e.g., transfer of share’s ownership to 
another person) does not produce effect vis-à-vis the corporation. Article 162. 
562 See generally JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 16.14, at 475 (1997) (claiming that 
preemptive rights are an effective tool to prevent manipulation of voting control and dilution of share 
value); Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A 
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 620 (2000) (“This right is essential for minority 
shareholders, because without it, the majority could dilute both the holdings and the voting power of the 
minority.”); Lorenzo Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the United 
States: Parmalat as a Case Study, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 373, 408 (2006) (suggesting that 
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Comparatively speaking, the Law’s treatment of this right, I believe, is unique. Unlike the 
United States where this right is purely contractual,563 the Law recognizes this right as a “quasi-
statutory” right. Describing this right as a quasi-statutory right stems from the fact that it is a 
shareholder’s right by default, meaning that shareholders do not need to include an opt-in provision 
in the corporate documents to enjoy the right.564 On the other hand, this right may be subject in 
special circumstances to some limitations that preclude the shareholders from exercising the 
right.565 The statutory recognition of the preemptive rights weighs substantially in favor of 
protecting the minority shareholders, who (due to their fragile contractual position) may fail to 
bargain for and include the right in their corporate bylaws or the articles of association.566 
Preemptive rights under the Law are not wholly statutory.567 The Law sets forth some 
circumstances under which this right may be suspended. For instance, the extraordinary 
shareholder assembly may suspend shareholders’ preemptive rights only if such suspension 
“deems beneficial for the company”.568 While it is ambiguous what constitutes a beneficial 
suspension, the statutory designation of this power to the extraordinary shareholder assembly 
represents protection that likely⎯ by means of its representative quorum⎯ brings about an 
informed and justified decision. 
                                                 
“[e]liminating preemptive rights significantly impairs the rights of minority shareholders [in close 
corporations] because it leaves them without economic protection and active participation in the 
business”). 
563 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (2016) (“The shareholders of a corporation do not have a 
preemptive right to acquire the corporation’s unissued shares except to the extent the articles of 
incorporation so provide.”); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 16.14, at 475⎯76 (1997) 
(asserting that preemptive rights are not mandatory but permissive). 
564 See supra note 560 and accompanying text. 
565 See infra notes 568 & 569. 
566 See supra Chapter 1. Part III. C. 
567 See supra Chapter 4. Part II. for the definition of “statutory right”. 
568 Article 140 states that “[t]he extraordinary general assembly shall . . . have the right to suspend 
shareholders’ preemptive rights to subscribe to the capital increase against cash contributions . . . in cases 
it deems beneficial for the company.” 
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Another limitation upon the exercise of the preemptive right is when the purpose of the share 
issuance is to distribute these shares to the workers of the corporation (or its subsidiaries).569 This 
constraint may apparently pose a threat that controlling shareholders issue new shares to 
themselves as employees of the corporation and thus deprive minority shareholders of their 
preemptive rights. Nevertheless, it worth reminding that the power to issue new shares as a matter 
of law is within the extraordinary shareholder assembly,570 and the share issuance requires a high 
resolution-passing percentage,571 which enhances the minority shareholder’s chance to have a say 
in the matter. 
Decisions in violation of the shareholder’s preemptive rights are null and void.572 For example, 
the issuance of shares without complying with the notification rule.573 Not to mention that the 
shareholders who prevent others from exercising their preemptive rights may be subject to 
monetary penalties, or even face criminal charges.574 In a word, the preemptive right is a powerful 
tool for the minority shareholders to maintain their power, preserve their share value, and probably 
prevent controlling shareholders from diminishing them. 
C. Transferability of Share and Exit Option  
A major issue inherited from the close corporation structure is the absence of a ready market.575 
The frustrated or oppressed minority shareholders have no public market through which they may 
                                                 
569 Article 137 (2) confers the power to issue new shares to employees on the extraordinary shareholder 
assembly, yet shareholders’ exercising preemptive rights is impermissible if such issuance of shares is 
allocated for the corporation’s employees. 
570 See supra Chapter 4. Part III. B (1). 
571 Id. 
572 Article 88, 1, a (vi). 
573 Article 139 requires that shareholders be notified of such a right, and of the decision of capital increase 
along with the conditions and the period of subscription as well as beginning and ending dates, via 
publication in a daily newspaper, or transmission by registered mail. 
574 See generally Articles 211⎯213. 
575 See supra Chapter 1. Part II. A. 
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exit the corporation for fair value. Although the unmarketability of close-corporation shares is an 
integral part of the close corporation structure, several statutory steps help escape the adverse, 
likely consequences (e.g., freeze-outs). The steps include the statutory recognition of the share 
transferability (including the right to sell and the right to mortgage shares), the statutory limitations 
on the contractual restrictions of such a principle, and recently the mandatory offering rule. 
1. The Statutory Principle of Share Transferability 
One of the distinctive features of the joint-stock corporation the Law asserts is the tradability 
and transferability of its shares.576 This feature flows from the fact⎯and is premised upon the 
principle⎯that shareholders have property rights over their shares.577 Adjacent to the right to 
receive returns on their investments ( as one of the property rights),578 shareholders are entitled to 
the statutorily-protected right to transfer their interests, which encompass both economic and 
control interests.579 
a. The Right to Sell 
The transferability of shares involves the shareholder’s economic right to sell all or part of 
their shares or interests.580 Evidently, it is of the most important rights as it permits shareholders 
to liquidate their shares and consequently exit the corporation as well as making profits from 
                                                 
576 Article 88, 1, a (iv) (confirming that a shareholder’s right to dispose of his shares is of the fundamental 
rights that shareholder assemblies have no power to exclude). Article 110, (“Shareholders shall have all 
rights associated with shares, particularly . . . disposal of shares . . . .”) 
577 Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (22) (2016) (defining shares as “units into which the 
proprietary interests in a corporation are divided”); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the 
Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414⎯15 (2006) ([S]hares are a form of personal property.”) 
578 See supra Chapter 4. Part II. A (1). 
579 See supra Chapter 4. Part II. A & B. 
580 See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414⎯15 
(2006) (arguing that shareholder’ right to sell is one of the most two significant rights shareholders enjoy, 
above other rights); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover 
Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103 (2003) (spotlighting the role of shareholder with the right to sell in the 
governance of the corporation). 
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selling parts of their interests,581 such as selling their preemptive rights.582 In principle, 
shareholders may dispose of their shares at will. It is the result of the separation between ownership 
and management in joint-stock corporations.583 However, this right⎯in the close corporation’s 
context⎯is oftentimes subject to a range of contractual restrictions discussed hereunder.584 
b. The right to Mortgage 
Another right that stems from the transferability feature and the conceptualization of share 
ownership as personal property585 is shareholders’ right to mortgage their shares. Again, the shares 
are part of the shareholder’s personal property, and thus the shareholder may pledge their shares,586 
which lets creditors step into the shareholders’ shoes and exercise share-related rights⎯including 
the right to receive dividends.587 Nevertheless, such creditors may neither attend shareholder 
                                                 
581 Cf. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 425 
(2006) (“This right of alienation [the right to sell] is of the utmost importance to shareholders both 
because it is a means of obtaining economic benefit from their investment in the corporation and because 
it is their means of exit should they become dissatisfied with management.” 
582 Accord Article 141, (permitting shareholders to sell or reassign their own preemptive rights in the 
newly issued shares to others during the subscription period). 
583 But see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 132 (9th ed. 2004) (arguing that the feature of 
separation between ownership and management in close corporation’s context appears to be more 
theoretical than actual). 
584 Id. at 109, (considering the absence of potential buyers as an implicit restriction upon transferability of 
shares in close corporations). 
585 See supra note 577 and accompanying text. 
586 Article 112 (2) (“Shares may be pledged in accordance with rules set by the Competent Authority.”) 
The Regulatory Rules and Procedures issued pursuant to the Companies Law relating to Unlisted Joint 
Stock Companies sets forth, in Part five, the governing rules of pledge of shares by shareholders, which is 
different from the rules stipulated in Part 4, Chapter 3 regulating the pledge of shares by the corporation. 
The most important rule, besides executing a mortgage contract, is that in order for share mortgage goes 
into effect vis-à-vis the corporation and third parties, share pledge has to be submitted to the board of 
directors and recorded in the shareholder registry in the corporation, which every corporation has to 
maintain and which includes names of shareholders, their nationality, place of residence, and shares’ 
numbers. See generally articles 24⎯30 for further details about the information that has to be in a 
mortgage contract.  
587 Id. (“The pledge creditor shall receive profits and use share-related rights, unless the pledge contract 
stipulates otherwise.”) 
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assemblies nor cast the votes of mortgaged shares since these rights are only exercised by the 
registered owner of the shares (or his delegate).588 589 
2. Restrictions on Share Transfer 
In spite of the fact that the share transferability is of the core features of joint-stock 
corporations, the Law subjects this feature to a temporarily statutory constraint, and it also allows 
the corporations to restrict this right. Nevertheless, these both restrictions do not negate the 
statutory protection of the right as explained hereunder. As a matter of fact, they, I believe, should 
be perceived as protection for the shareholders rather than external constraints upon the 
shareholder’s rights. 
a. Statutory Restriction 
In exception to the principle of free transferability of shares, the Law precludes the 
incorporating shareholders from disposing of their shareholdings during the following years of the 
incorporation. Only after the publication of the corporation’s financial records and statements of 
two fiscal years may shareholders sell their shares.590 Through an analytical lens, such a restriction, 
one may deduce, accords twofold protection.  
First, it protects the third parties (e.g., potential buyers) from being deceived or lured into a 
fraudulent business. At the oust of the business, it is unlikely to accurately evaluate the business’s 
success and thus pay the fair value for its shares.591 After two years, nonetheless, the potential 
buyer is in a better position to assess the business and estimate how much the corporation’s shares 
                                                 
588 See supra note 518 and accompanying text. 
589 Article 112 forbids “pledge creditors” from attending and voting in shareholder assemblies. 
590 Article 107 (1) (“Shares subscribed by incorporators may not be tradable except upon publication of 
the financial statements for two fiscal years, each is not less than twelve months, as from the date of the 
company’s incorporation.” 
591 To ensure such protection is provided for third parties and communicated to the outside world, the 
Law requires the certificates of shares be marked with the date of the incorporation of the corporation and 
the restriction period for trading. Article 107 (1). 
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deserve, given its financial records and statements of its two fiscal years, which should reflect the 
corporation’s performance and lucrativeness.592 
Second, which is more relevant to the present discussion of this chapter, this statutory 
restriction ties the interests of the minority shareholders with the interests of the controlling ones, 
who have the upper hand in managing and operating the business. By the exercise of imagination, 
if the business were falling apart or seemed fruitless, the controlling shareholders⎯by virtue of 
the superior and managerial status⎯ might exit the corporation by selling their controlling 
shareholdings and leaving the minority shareholders stuck in the failing business. The beginnings 
of businesses are of the most challenging time a business may undergo, so the minority 
shareholders are better off with this statutory restriction because of the sense of reassurance it 
produces that they are sailing through the whirlwind with other controlling shareholders on the 
same boat. 
Most importantly, during the two-year trading ban, the Law exempts some forms of 
transferability.593 Allowable trading includes the transfer of shares among existing shareholders,594 
and the transfer of shares to the heirs of a deceased shareholder.595 In addition, the Law permits 
the transfer of shares that transpires as a result of enforcement against the insolvent shareholder’s 
shares,596 yet the other shareholders enjoy the right of first refusal in such cases.597 After all, both 
of the exceptions prove the rule. 
                                                 
592 Note that, not only does the Law require the elapse of two-year period in order for shareholders to sell 
their shares, but also it requires that such passage is to be accompanied with publication of the financial 
records and statements of the corporation, which underscores the message underlying such requirements 
for third parties. 
593 Article 107 (2). 
594 Id. 
595 Id. 
596 Id. 
597 Id. 
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b. Corporate Restrictions 
Worldwide, the tradability of close corporations’ shares oftentimes undergoes some 
restrictions imposed by the shareholders themselves for a variety of reasons, such as to prevent the 
shares from being sold to outsiders with no personal or familial relationships to the rest of 
shareholders. The small number of shareholders in close corporations and the interpersonal 
relationships among shareholders make it sensible for the shareholders to restrict the free 
tradability feature of shares. The most prevalent form of share resections is the right of first refusal. 
This restriction is widely recognized by corporate law,598 including the Saudi Companies Law of 
2015.599  
 Nevertheless, to ensure that the shareholder’s discretion is neither abused nor exploited in a 
way that contradicts the general principle (free transferability), the Law prohibits the corporations 
from imposing restrictions that implicitly render shares untradeable.600 An example of an outlawed 
restrictions is that requiring shares be sold exclusively to shareholders while no one wants to buy. 
Even if the shareholders agree to the provision, this provision violates a statutory right, and thus it 
is void and null under the Law.601 The essence of the contractual restrictions on share tradability 
should design a mechanism by which shareholders sell their shares, not create a blanket ban that 
eliminates the shareholder’s right to transfer shares. 
                                                 
598 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 202 (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (2016) (authorizing 
contractual restrictions on the transfer of shares).  
599 As matter of fact, the Law recognizes the right of first refusal for shareholders of close corporations in 
a couple of instances in the Law. Both instances asserts shareholders’ right of first refusal if a 
shareholder’s shares are subject to enforcement due to shareholder’s insolvency or bankruptcy. As a side 
note, there is a major difference between the two terms: insolvency and bankruptcy, and thus the laws and 
regulations concerning them. 
600 Article 108, (“The company's articles of association may provide for restrictions related to trading of 
shares, provided that such restrictions do not lead to permanent ban of trading of such shares.”) 
601 See supra note 576.  
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3. Mandatory Offering 
A unique rule that has been introduced by the Competent Authority and appears to account for 
the protection for the minority shareholders is the mandatory offering.602 The uniqueness of this 
rule finds its roots in the fact that it is commonly imposed on shareholders of public corporations, 
not close ones.603 According to the ministerial resolution, if the ownership of the shareholder in 
the corporation exceeds 50% of the corporation’s capital by means of share purchase (in one or 
multiple transactions), that shareholder has to offer the remaining shareholders (the minority) to 
buy their shares for the best of the prices and terms the acquiring shareholder paid for the shares 
during the last 12 months prior to the offer date.604 From the perspective of an advocate for the 
minority shareholders rights, this rule represents protection for minority shareholders’ interests 
against the unexpected rise of the controlling shareholder or a sudden change of 
control⎯especially if the corporation has no controlling shareholder⎯and thus the dilution of 
share value and power.605 
                                                 
602 Ministerial Resolution, No. 32565, Fifth. 
603 See generally Zohar Goshen; Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE 
L. J. 560, 617 (2016); Stephanie Luiz; Kathleen Van der Linde, The Mandatory Offer Obligation and 
Intermediaries, 2011 J. S. AFR. L. 113, 126 (2011); S. M. Luiz, Protection of Holders of Securities in the 
Offeree Regulated Company during Affected Transactions: General Offers and Schemes of 
Arrangements, 26 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 560, 586 (2014). 
604 In addition, the acquiring shareholder has to make the offer to other shareholders during the following 
60 days after his shareholding crosses the 50% threshold. See Ministerial Resolution, No. 32565, Fifth. 
605 Notwithstanding the protection mandatory offering provides, this rule is surrounded by grave concern. 
By thorough reading and analyzing of the Law, I think that the Competent Authority crossed the 
boundaries the legislative branch drew in the Law. According to the Law, the Competent Authority is 
empowered to issue whatever necessary for the implementation of the Law (Article 225,2). However, this 
rule, I think, is beyond its statutory power because it effects a new substantive obligation the Law has 
neither mentioned nor implicated. Unless this rule becomes part of the Law through the right channel, I 
am skeptical about its legality and enforcement in a court of law. As far as I know, this rule is under 
reconsideration by the Competent Authority as of March 2018. 
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D. Corporate Share Repurchase 
Repurchases of shares is a tool that alters the structure of the corporation’s share capital.606 As 
a matter of fact, it is a form of distribution by the corporation.607 During its lifetime, the corporation 
may decide to buy back its shares for an assortment of operational and financial causes. Such 
causes (stipulated in the Law) include decreasing the corporation’s share capital to tackle losses, 
or awarding shares to its employees.608 Unlike these reasons, which seem to be legitimate and for 
good cause, the repurchase of shares may be driven by corrupt intents, such as the oppressive 
elimination of a dissenting shareholder or by opportunistic appropriation of a larger portion of 
corporate profits,609 which has generated the abusive practice of what is so-called “selective 
repurchase”.610 
The selective repurchase denotes that the corporation buys back some of its shares⎯that are 
in the hand of selected shareholder(s)⎯upon favorable conditions and prices to the latter, 
depriving other shareholders (the minority) of benefiting from the repurchase.611 Because share 
                                                 
606 Cf. Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 
71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (1983). 
607 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (2016) (The definition of “a distribution includes the payment 
of a dividend, a purchase by a corporation of its own shares [emphasis added], a distribution of evidences 
of indebtedness or promissory notes of the corporation, and a distribution in voluntary or involuntary 
liquidation.”) 
608 See Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 
288, 288⎯289 (2010) (citing other reasons behind corporate repurchases, such as are reduction of 
administrative costs, perseverance of control in case of repurchasing the shares of perished or retiring 
employee). 
609 Id. (“ Getting rid of a troublesome shareholder is another motivation.”); Languta A. Manganye, 
Selective repurchases of Shares and Protection of Shareholders in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(2016) (published L.L.M. Thesis, University of Johannesburg) (on file with the author). 
610 The term “ selective repurchase”, however, is coined in the Saudi Law; unlike some other jurisdictions 
(e.g., South Africa and New Zealand), the Law regulates repurchases in a broader scope in a way that 
bans selective share buybacks, completely. See Languta A. Manganye, Selective repurchases of Shares 
and Protection of Shareholders in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2016) (published L.L.M. 
Thesis, University of Johannesburg) (on file with the author) (comparing between South Africa and New 
Zealand’s regulations of repurchases). 
611 In addition to selective repurchases, another abusive form of repurchase is the proportional repurchase 
provided that such a repurchase occurs with the knowledge that shareholders are unable to accept the 
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buybacks may give rise to oppression against the minority shareholders (e.g., freeze-outs),612 the 
Law prescribes some mandatory rules that ensure the application of the equity doctrine in such 
circumstances, deterring the controlling shareholders from misusing corporate repurchases for 
vicious drives.613 
Based on the Law,614 the corporation may buy back its shares only in three events: to decrease 
the share capital,615 to retain treasury shares,616 or to redeem shares.617 The discussion hereunder 
is narrowed to crystallize the protection for the minority shareholders underlying the procedural 
requirements the Law stipulates to guarantee that all shareholders have the chance to render their 
shares in lieu of discriminatory repurchases of selected shareholders’ shares. 
1. Share Repurchase for Capital Decrease 
The protection of minority shareholders against abusive repurchases is signified in a number 
of procedural rules that together establish a mechanism of fairness and equity among all 
                                                 
offer. For further information, see Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of 
Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 289 (2010). 
612 See supra Chapter 1. Part II. D. (explaining what freeze-outs mean and how they occur). 
613 Note that not only are procedural rules the statutory approach to protect shareholders from abusive 
repurchase, but also they may be protected through fiduciary duties and the principle of fairness. In the 
United States, for example, repurchase decisions in principle are regulated of the board’s duty of utmost 
good faith and equal opportunity rule for all shareholder, in many states. Accordingly, shareholders have 
the right to have their shares repurchased or redeemed; otherwise, non-selling shareholders have to 
approve of selective repurchases. See Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of 
Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 297⎯298 (2010).  
614 Article 112 (1) permits corporations to repurchase its shares in accordance with the rules set by the 
competent authority, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment in case of close corporations.  
615 Article 144 stipulates that corporations may decrease their share capitals under one of two conditions: 
First, the share capital is in excess of the need of the corporation. Second, the corporation incurs losses. 
616 See infra note 625. 
617 The Law allows corporations to issue callable or redeemable shares. See generally Article 111 
(regulating the issuance and redemption of callable shares). Repurchases due to the corporation right to 
redeem its shares is excluded as it falls beyond the concern of this research, and since such shares are 
presumably owned or purchased with the knowledge that these shares are callable, which differs from 
share repurchase due to decreasing share capital or retaining treasury shares as repurchases for such 
causes are aimed at non-callable shares and with no prior shareholder’s expectations of such repurchase. 
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shareholders.618 First of all, as seen earlier, the decision to decrease the corporation’s capital is of 
the exceptional corporate matters that require a higher quorum and higher decision-passing 
percentage to approve of it,619 which ensures a greater role played by the minority shareholders in 
the decisions. Furthermore, it is not a mere decision to decrease the corporation’s share capital, 
but rather it includes (in case of approval) specifications such as the number of shares to be 
repurchased, the price, and the terms for the repurchase offer.620 
Moreover, the Law mandates that the corporation notify all shareholders of its resolution to 
buy back a certain amount of their shares.621 This ensures that all shareholders are acutely aware 
of all the necessary information about the repurchase transaction and gives them equal 
opportunities to sell their share back to the corporation. 
Most importantly, the repurchase price is to be “fair”.622 Despite the fact that there are an array 
of determinants affecting the fair value of close corporation’s shares along with the fact that there 
is no clear-cut definition of what constitutes “fair value”,623 the shareholders are not coerced to 
sell their shares at the end. Instead, they have the ultimate freedom to accept or reject the offer if 
they think that their shares are underpriced. The absence of the ready market poses a heavy burden 
                                                 
618 As a sideline, the Law extends its protection to encompass creditors of the corporation as well. In case 
the repurchase of shares is for the purpose of decreasing share capital due to its excess of the 
corporation’s needs, the repurchase decision is to be communicated to the creditors who have 60 days to 
raise their objection to the decease of the corporation’s share capital. If such an objection is raised during 
the statutory 60-day period, the corporation has to either pay the debt if it is due, or provide the creditor 
with a sufficient guarantee if the debt is not due. Article 145. 
619 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b); Article 12 (H) of the RRP. 
620 Article 12 (H) of the RRP. 
621 Article 148 (1) (“The call shall be made by notifying shareholders of the company’s wish to 
repurchase shares by registered mail or by publication in a daily newspaper distributed in the area where 
the company’s head office is located.”) 
622 Article 148 (3).  
623 On the other hand, public corporations may rely of the market to determine the fair value of shares. As 
a matter of law, public corporations my fix the repurchase price not exceeding 5% of the closing price on 
the day preceding the day the repurchase transaction is finalized. See Article 12 (6) of the RRP of Listed 
Companies. 
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upon the close corporations to fashion an attractive deal in a way that incentivizes shareholders to 
vend their shares, avoiding overpricing and underpricing.624 
2. Share Repurchase for Retaining Treasury Shares 
At times, the corporation may seek to repurchase its shares to retain them as treasury shares.625 
Treasury shares may be piled up only for a collection of statutory purposes.626 The purposes are 
awarding the corporation’s employees as part of employee share ownership plan,627 share swap,628 
or fulfilling the right of the holders of convertible bonds to convert their debt instruments into 
shares.629 
A number of procedural requirements are prescribed by the Law to achieve adequate protection 
for the interests of the minority shareholders. Once again, the repurchase of shares for the treasury-
share purposes has to be approved by a resolution of the extraordinary shareholder assembly,630 
yet this resolution does not require the same stringent resolution-passing percentage required to 
repurchase shares for the capital decrease.631 In addition, the fraction of shares the corporation may 
                                                 
624See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of 
Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 743⎯744 (1969); Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and 
the Protection of Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 289 (2010). 
625 Treasury shares are repurchased shares the corporation retains for different future purposes, such as 
employee share ownership plan. Most importantly, repurchase of shares for purposes other than deceasing 
the share capital due to losses are to be stipulated in the corporate charter and bylaws. Article 1 (C) of the 
RRP. 
626 Article 13 of the RRP. 
627 The employee share ownership plan is a program that is adopted voluntarily by the corporation in its 
corporate charter or bylaws, which allow it to confer some of its treasury shares on its workforce. See 
Article 137 (2) (empowering the extraordinary shareholder assembly to decide on granting its employees 
some shares in the corporation as part of incentives). 
628 A share swap is a transaction via which exchanges of shares of different corporations take place in 
various forms. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, for instance, a target corporation’s shares are 
exchanged for the shares of acquiring corporation. See Article of 13 (B) of the RRP (limiting the retaining 
of treasury shares for, inter alia, [s]hare swap transactions for the acquisition of shares or limited liability 
company’s interests or an asset purchase”). 
629 Article of 13 (A) of the RRP. 
630 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. (b). 
631 Remember, a share capital decrease is one of the corporate matters for which the Law requires the 
approval of three-quarter of the shares attending the extraordinary shareholder assembly, while 
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retain as treasury shares are limited. According to the Law, the treasury shares of the close 
corporation may not exceed 10% of the corporation’s aggregate shares, at all times.632 Otherwise, 
the corporation, namely the controlling shareholders, would abuse the option to exhaust the 
corporate cash to make the corporation repurchase their shares, and thus channel corporate profits 
to the vending shareholders. 
3. Repurchase as Part of Employee share ownership Plan 
The Controlling shareholders may exploit treasury shares in a way that puts these shares in 
their possession⎯as employees of the corporation. To curb such a theoretical⎯but practically 
possible⎯assumption, the Law goes above and beyond to set forth a number of rules that promote 
protection in the face of the potential abuse of the employee share plan by the controlling 
shareholders. First of all, the extraordinary shareholder assembly has to approve of the plan as well 
as the permission of the corporation’s bylaws to adopt such a plan.633 Second of all, non-executive 
directors of the board may not benefit from the plan,634 and most importantly the executive 
directors may not cast their votes on any employee-share-related matter that is the subject of the 
board’s deliberating and voting.635  
As an observer may find in these rules rigorous requirements, they, from the viewpoint of 
minority shareholders, constitute a protective shield against opportunism and oppression. They 
ensure that the shares are repurchased and re-issued for the sake of the corporation’s employees, 
rather than a way to augment their shareholdings. Evidently, these requirements safeguard the 
                                                 
repurchases for share-treasury purposes requires the default percentage approval of two-thirds of the 
shares attending the extraordinary shareholder assembly. See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. (b). 
632 Article 12 (C) of the RRP. 
633 Article 21 (A) & (B) of the RRP (The extraordinary shareholder assembly may designate to the board 
the power to determine the plan’s details, including the price if it is offered for consideration.) 
634 Article 21 (C) of the RRP. 
635 Article 21 (D) of the RRP. 
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integrity of the decision related to such a repurchase, and they make sure that the decision is not 
tainted or driven by personal benefits of the controlling shareholders, who presumably control the 
board and manage the day-to-day operations.636 
E. Regulation of Related-Party Transactions 
In a number of instances, the controlling shareholders may engage in self-dealing transactions, 
or they may benefit directly or indirectly from some of the transactions they execute while wearing 
the hats of directors or officers. These transactions raise concern about their fairness to the 
corporation, and whether they are detrimental to the interests of other shareholders. In response, 
most jurisdictions, if not all, impose a set of regulatory rules to uphold the equality doctrine among 
shareholders, and deter or eliminate transactions that may harm the minority shareholders’ 
interests. Nevertheless, the legal devices adopted to tackle related-party transactions vary from 
county to the other.637 
As far as the statutory protection for the minority shareholders within Saudi Arabia is 
concerned, the Law has approached the related party transactions with a set of legal rules that 
                                                 
636 To illustrate how these rules prevent an abusive repurchase in a real life example, let us assume that X 
is a controlling shareholder of Y corporation, whose board is presided by X, who appointed his son, Z, to 
the corporation’s CEO post as well as to a seat of the board. The Y corporation decides to launch an 
employee share ownership program, which is permissible by Y’s bylaws. The board has been designated 
the power to start the program. For the sake of the presented argument, X’s intent to launch the plan 
appears to be for the corporation’s employees’ interests, yet the ulterior motive is to enlarge his and his 
son’s shareholdings. With these rules in play, however, X may not benefit from this plan at all because he 
does not fit the definition of employee for the sake of the plan. Plus, Z, the CEO and director of the 
corporation, may not cast his vote to approve of such a plan due to a conflict of interests because he fits 
the definition of corporate employee and thus benefits from the plan. 
637 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 145 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (defining party-related transactions as 
“these include both transactions in which related parties such as directors and controlling shareholders 
deal with the corporation—traditional self-dealing and managerial compensation—and transactions in 
which related parties may appropriate value belonging to the corporation—the taking of corporate 
opportunities and trading in the company’s shares”). Party-related transactions fall within a wider scope 
known as “tunneling”. This term is first used by Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000), to characterize the expropriation 
of minority shareholders in the Czech Republic. 
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mandate disclosure and shareholder approval on the one hand, and prohibit sort of conflicted 
transactions on the other hand. They collectively forestall the related-party transactions, including 
self-dealing and the misappropriation of corporate opportunity, at least in theory.638 The discussion 
hereunder may be found repetitive of what is stated in the earlier chapter under the subsection of 
the Duties of the Board; however, this subsection differs as it embraces the role of the minority 
shareholders and review these rules in light of their standpoint. 
1. Mandatory Disclosure 
One of the devices the Law adopts to curtail suspicious transactions involving conflicts of 
interests and probable misappropriation of wealth that belongs to the corporation is the obligation 
to disclose. Mandatory disclosure is one of the effective legal mechanisms that has been decoded 
in the corporate literature as a tool that, inter alia,639 warns the shareholders of questionable 
conduct by the controlling shareholders and the management team. 
According to the Law, transactions and contracts that involve direct or indirect benefits to a 
member of the board may be executed only after the board obtains the permission of the general 
shareholder assembly.640 The chairperson has to report to the assembly about the suspicious 
transaction and request its authorization from the shareholder assembly.641 To ensure that the 
shareholder assembly is fully informed, it is of the external auditor’s duty to review the 
questionable transaction and submit a report about its fairness to the shareholder assembly.642 
                                                 
638 Note that whether the regulatory apparatus succeeds in deterring controlling shareholders and directors 
from engaging in such transactions is an empirical question that falls beyond the scope of this study. 
639 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 147 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (asserting that mandatory disclosure also 
supports the “internal decision-makers’ independence and ensures compliance with the Law and the 
corporation’s bylaws). 
640 Article 71 (1). 
641 Id. 
642 Id. 
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Although this requirement yields advantages, some concerns are surrounding the statutory 
prescription of this requirement. First, the Law fails to define what constitutes a direct or indirect 
benefit, making it ambiguous for the obligees to comply with this requirement. The ambiguity 
includes, for example, whether the benefit has to be pecuniary, to what extent an indirect benefit 
may stretch, and whether the size of the benefit matters. Another concern is that compliance with 
this rule as described in the Law is seemingly prohibitive and does not mesh with the doctrine of 
delegated management. The corporation engages in many transactions, so seeking the approval of 
shareholders as a whole every time a potential conflict of interest transaction pops up is inefficient, 
economically and intuitively. The board may forgo good deals just to avoid the lengthy⎯and 
costly⎯requirement to call for an assembly and seek its approval.643 
Furthermore, the Law imposes an obligation to disclose and report the remuneration packages 
of the board’s directors to the shareholders.644 The compensations of directors oftentimes give rise 
to conflicting interests. Therefore, this obligation⎯along with other constraints imposed by the 
Law⎯constitutes an effective mechanism as the board has to report to the shareholder organ 
compensation-related details, including their monetary and in-kind benefits, other amounts 
received by the member of the board under another capacity (e.g., CEO), and the number of 
meetings attended by the member.645 
In sum, the mandatory disclosure is a vital apparatus to keep the management of the corporation 
in check, to prevent any expropriation of the corporation’s wealth, and to alert the minority 
                                                 
643 Although the Law provides for an exception that the general assembly may allow the board to decide 
on related-party transactions, this rule still makes legitimate related-party transactions subject to scrutiny 
and require approval. In addition, the permission for the board to decide conflicted transactions is 
temporary; it may be granted for only one year, subject to renewal. Article 71 (1).  
644 Article 76 (4). 
645 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. for a comprehensive explanation of the governing rule of directorial 
compensations. 
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shareholders of any red-flag-raising transaction. Nonetheless, the status quo of the mandatory 
disclosure may be baffling and overregulating as the definition of direct and indirect benefit is still 
undetermined, and as the reporting system poses cumbersome procedures that do not match with 
the rapidity involving the business sector. After all, this does not negate the significance of the 
informative role played by the mandatory discourse in protecting the minority shareholders. 
2. Shareholder Approval 
Another effective device to eliminate related party transactions is the statutory requirement of 
shareholder approval. The Saudi Law, unlike other jurisdictions,646 imposes a blanket approval 
requirement for every conflicting-interest transaction.647 Moreover, the Law mandates the 
transaction-related party abstain from voting on the matter in question.648 The abstention 
empowers the minority shareholders in cases where the party is the controlling shareholder. In 
such cases, the transaction is approved by a majority of the minority of shareholders. 
3. Prohibition of Conflicted Transactions 
To curb opportunistic and self-dealing transactions, the Law bans some types of transactions 
where directors’ interests⎯or the controlling shareholders’⎯ are present at both ends of the 
transactions. For instance, corporations may not grant any forms of a loan to its directors or 
shareholders alongside the prohibition that the corporations may not serve as guarantors of the 
shareholders and directors’ loans.649 
                                                 
646 E.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Brazil. 
647 But cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (“No jurisdiction [the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Brazil] mandates across- the- board shareholder approval for related- 
party transactions, not even with controlling shareholders. This is because doing so might be excessively 
cumbersome. . .”). 
648 Article 71 (1) (“Said member [with conflicting interests] may not participate in voting on the 
resolution to be issued on this matter by the board of directors and the assembly of shareholders.”) 
649 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. E. for elaborate illustration of this statutory prohibition as a matter of 
director’s duties. 
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Another prohibition that signifies the statutory protection of shareholders’ interests is barring 
the board’s directors from competing against the business they are supposed to advance its 
interest.650 This prohibition may be waived only if the shareholder general assembly authorizes the 
competition in question. Otherwise, competing against the business without obtaining proper 
authorization makes the violating director subject to the removal, litigations, and the damages. 
Note that this prohibition stretches over business activities within the corporate line of the 
business.651 
In the same fashion, insider trading is a ubiquitous example of a conflict of interest that is 
forbidden in most jurisdictions, if not all. Insider trading includes the disclosure of secret 
information they obtain by virtue of their directorships to unauthorized persons, and the trading on 
such information to gain or direct to someone else personal benefits.652 Albeit an old argument in 
the literature that insider trading may yield some benefits,653 violators under the Law are subject 
to removal from the board as well as to civil liabilities.654 
Despite the obscurity of some rules regulating the related-party transactions, these rules 
provide an acceptable level of statutory protection for minority shareholders. The flow of 
information into shareholders and the shareholder-approval rule go hand in hand to thwart dubious 
practices and contracts executed by interested parties, as well as the ban on the competition and 
the personal loans to the management and the directors of the board. The prohibition of insider 
                                                 
650 Article 72. 
651 Id. 
652 Article 74. 
653 Such benefits include that it constitutes a type of incentive remuneration and it provides a “superior 
channel of non-public information” embedded in the share price. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 160 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 3rd. ed. 2017); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis W. 
Carlton; Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 896 (1983(.  
654 Article 74. 
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trading as part of the Law is logically necessary, yet its importance in the context of close 
corporations may be marginalized as the insider trading is an issue that is associated with the listed 
corporations. 
F. Shareholder Derivative Actions 
The right to bring lawsuits against the corporation and its management is of paramount 
importance to the protection of the minority shareholders.655 It represents a statutory tool available 
to the shareholders to hold the management of the corporation liable for its wrongdoing and seek 
a judicial remedy based on the oppression of the controlling shareholder or based on a violation of 
the governing law and documents (e.g., corporate charter and bylaws). Note that the protection of 
the minority shareholders through shareholder actions is not a mere matter of recognizing the right, 
but rather it is a matter of the procedural rules that regulate shareholder actions. In the United 
States, for instance, the board has a great deal of discretion to whether allow shareholders to bring 
a derivative against the management. 656 This rule makes the shareholder right to sue the 
corporation more tentative than protective as it poses a limitation on the right. 
                                                 
655 Accord Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders – A 
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 636 (2000) (“Minority shareholders may not control the 
company, but their role in a corporation through. . . derivative suits influences corporate governance and 
makes minority shareholders significant players in the corporate world.”); F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression 
of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 139-40 (1987) 
(confirming the use of derivative suits by minority shareholders against controlling shareholders wearing 
the hats of directors or officers). 
656 The requirements to bring derivative action against the corporation and its incumbent management 
vary from state to state. One of the most commonplace requirement is the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement, which mandates that shareholders bringing the suit has to have been a shareholder of the 
corporation at time of the alleged harm that affected the corporation. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 581 
N.W.2d 380, 385 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (determining the nature of derivative actions); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT §7.41 & 7.44; MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 549 
(WEST ACAD. PUB. 2014). 
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In Saudi Arabia, nevertheless, the Law recognizes the shareholder’s right to sue the corporation 
and takes arguably a lenient approach in setting the governing rules of shareholder actions.657 For 
example, the Law does not require the shareholders to obtain the approval of the board to file an 
action. Instead, it sets forth a cluster of statutory requirements that once are met, the shareholder 
has the right to file the case against the corporation. As demystified hereunder, the statutory 
requirements are more procedural than substantive, yet they make shareholder actions powerful 
instruments in the hand of the minority shareholders, conceptually. 
Derivative Action Requirements 
One of the statutory rights shareholders enjoy is the right to bring a suit on the corporation’s 
behalf.658 These lawsuits claim that harm has disturbed and hurt the welfare of the corporation, 
and the shareholders (as the ultimate owners of the corporation).659 Therefore, the relief sought in 
derivative actions belongs to the corporation, not to the shareholders filing the action. In short, 
derivative actions stem from the wrongdoing done to the corporation. 
The Law establishes two ways to bring actions vis-à-vis the corporation. The first sort of 
derivative actions is an action that brought pursuant to a resolution by the shareholder general 
assembly. According to the Law, the shareholder general assembly has the power to sue the 
directors of the board because of their wrongdoing or mismanagement that results in harm to the 
corporation, and thus shareholders⎯as a whole.660 Needless to say that the resolution to sue the 
management is subject to the regulating rules of the shareholder general assembly (e.g., quorum 
                                                 
657 Article 110 (“Shareholders shall have all rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to. . . 
[initiate] a liability suit against Board members and appealing resolutions issued by shareholder 
assemblies.”) 
658 Article 88 (a.v.) forbids the elimination or deprivation of shareholder’s right to sue the board of 
directors, declaring this right as a statutory right that may not be altered or modified. 
659 Cf. MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 549 (WEST ACAD. PUB. 
2014). 
660 Article 79. 
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and resolution-passing requirements).661 In practice, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
minority shareholders to bring a derivative action by means of the assembly resolution, mainly if 
the controlling shareholder also serves on the board as a chairperson or director. Logically, no 
shareholder votes to bring a suit against themselves. For this reason, the Law advances another 
way to file the derivative action. 
Alternatively, the derivative action may be brought by the shareholder⎯as an individual. The 
individual shareholder may seek judicial intervention to redress the violation of the corporation’s 
right on behalf of the latter. Based on the Law, if the shareholder general assembly fails to act or 
decide not to sue the corporation’s board of directors, the shareholder may file the action instead 
provided that the statutory requirements for the derivative action by the shareholder are met. The 
first requirement is that the suing shareholder establish the harm to his interest due to the board’s 
wrongdoing,662 which is unusual since derivative suits are brought on behalf of the corporation 
and for damages sustained by the shareholders as a whole.  
One may interpret that the Law fails to distinguish between derivative and direct action. 
However, the second requirement requires the validity of the corporation’s right to bring the 
lawsuit. The Law mandates that the corporation’s right to sue the board exists and has not yet 
expired.663 The Law sets a statute of limitations of three years from the date of discovering the 
wrongful deed.664 If the affected shareholder fails to act during this time, he loses his right to bring 
the derivative action. 
                                                 
661 See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A.2(a). 
662 Article 80. 
663 Id. 
664 Article 78 (3) (“A liability suit shall not be heard after the lapse of three years from the date of 
discovering the wrongful act. Except for fraud and forgery, a liability suit shall not be heard after the 
lapse of five years from the end of the fiscal year in which the wrongful act was committed, and three 
years from the expiration of membership term of the concerned member, whichever occurs later.”) 
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The third requirement is that the prejudiced shareholder alert the board of the intention to file 
a derivative action.665 Note that it is merely a notification; no approval from the board is required. 
The fourth requirement, which also seems unconventional to the concept of the derivative suit, is 
that the judicial remedy be limited to the damages sustained by the suing shareholder,666 while the 
traditional understanding is that remedies based on derivative suits belong to the corporation. 
Admittedly, there is perplexity in the differences between the two ways to bring a derivative 
action. One may think of the second way as a substitute for the direct action since the affected 
shareholder has to establish personal harm along with the fact that the remedy is limited to that 
sustained harm. On the other hand, the confusing requirement of the existence of the corporation’s 
right and the description of this suit as a derivative suit in the Law may lead others to consider it 
as a derivative suit of special nature. Otherwise, what would be the kind of actions the shareholder 
might bring if the corporation sustained no harm, but the shareholder did? Furthermore, the 
requirement that the shareholder prove that the harm to the corporation results in personal harm to 
his interest makes it impractical as the harm is presumably impossible to prove; otherwise, the 
shareholder would bring a direct action if the harm were demonstrable.667  
One idea to address the confusion of the current procedural requirements for derivative actions 
in a way that will strengthen the protection for the minority shareholders is the adoption of 
abstention rule. Under this rule, I propose, the shareholder⎯especially controlling one⎯who is 
also a director of the board would not cast his vote in deciding whether to bring a derivative suit 
against the board due to an existing conflict of interest. A rational shareholder would never vote 
                                                 
665 Article 80. 
666 Id. 
667 A direct action is the traditional type of action that a shareholder bring in their name vis-à-vis the 
corporation, a director, or an officer of the corporation because an wrongful act that results in a direct 
injury to their interest. Needless to say that direct actions are governed by the Civil Procedures Law as a 
tort liability lawsuit. Explained in next chapter. 
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in favor of a lawsuit against him. In support of this idea, the Law has recognized this use of rule 
when it comes to deciding the remunerations of the board’s directors,668 so it is not a novel device 
deployed by the Law. If adopted, this rule would empower the minority shareholders who had no 
representation on the board (even with the use of cumulative voting in the appointment of 
directors) to challenge the board’s decisions and hold its members accountable for their negligence 
and misconduct by means of a derivative suit brought by a majority vote of the minority 
shareholders. 
Part IV. Evaluation of the Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders 
This Part bisects into two sections. The first section sheds light upon the role of formalism 
throughout the Law to establish a primary source of the statutory protection for minority 
shareholders. My analysis’s goal is to accentuate the positive of the Saudi approach in addressing 
minority shareholder’s issues in close corporations by form, rather than substance. The second 
section voices some concern surrounding the statutory protection of minority shareholders as it 
emboldens them to oppress majority shareholders or frustrate corporate management.  
A. The Formalities of the Law 
Having investigated a variety of prescriptive rules of the Law consisting the statutory 
protection for the minority shareholders, it is evident that the Law, similar to most corporate laws, 
abounds with formalism.669 Unlike other areas of the law where substance prevails, corporate laws 
                                                 
668 See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. 
669 See, e.g., Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, CIV.A. Nos. 14893, 14713, 1996 WL 466961 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 
1996) (“[W]hen construing the reach and meaning of provisions of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, our law is formal. . . . [T]he entire field of corporation law has largely to do with formality.”); Julian 
Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 427–37 (2006) 
(arguing that corporate laws are characterized by a high level of formalism). 
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have always preferred form and process. While formalism may involve different meanings,670 the 
term hereunder donates the regulatory apparatus utilized throughout the Law to assert the 
shareholder supremacy, regard the shareholder rights, and protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. 
In principle, comparatively reading of the Law leads to the argument that formalism in the Law 
tends to favor the shareholder over the management, in a rare exception to the general premise.671 
While the Law defines the roles of both shareholders and directors, it entitles the shareholders to 
an array of powers to decide not only the shareholder affairs but also the management affairs.672 
An outstanding example, as seen above, is the requirement of the shareholder approval in different 
instances (e.g., the board’s remunerations and issuance of shares).673 The exceptional expansion 
of the shareholder intervention in corporate matters by the Law signifies the inclination of the 
formalism toward shareholders. Another example of the formalism⎯that provides great deference 
to the fundamental rights of the shareholder⎯is the statutory inviolability for some of the 
shareholder’s rights (e.g., election right, voting right, liquidity right, and the right to receive 
dividends).674 Most of these rights, if not all, are surrounded by procedural details to ensure the 
shareholder’s exercise of his statutory rights. 
                                                 
670 Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 621 (1999) (differentiating between 
three meanings of formalism). Formality is different from formalism. “ Formality is strict adherence to 
rules, manners or customs. Formalism is also adherence to rules, but with the emphasis on procedural 
minutiae regardless of substance and fairness. Both formalism and its adjective form, formalistic, are 
usually pejorative terms.” https://www.thetrcompany.com/en/difference-between-formality-and-
formalism/  
671 Cf. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 427 
(2006) (“This formalism tends to favor directors by affording them a great deal of discretion: they may 
take almost any action, provided that they follow the appropriate rules.”) 
672 But see, id. at 430 (citing examples of cases and articles of corporate codes that displays that corporate 
laws excel at defining the role of directors rather than the role of shareholders). 
673 See supra Chapter 4. Part III. B & E.  
674 See supra Chapter 4. Part III. 
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A positive view of the formalism is the reduction of the costs associated with bargaining for 
these rights along with the costs of coordination of information. A framework that ensures 
systematic inflow of information into the shareholders with a group of rights to act on such 
information is a reliable tool rest in the shareholders’ hands. As a matter of policy, nevertheless, it 
may be argued that it is unwise to vest a great deal of power in the shareholder organ in lieu of the 
management, such an argument defends the standpoint of directors, and therefore falls beyond the 
scope of the research subject. 
B. The Controlling Minority Shareholder 
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns and loopholes raised about some rules of the statutory 
approach, as a defender of the minority shareholder’s protection on the one hand, and a critic of 
the Law on the other, I extrapolate that the Law might have led to an unsolicited consequence that 
makes the minority shareholders controlling ones in the corporation. Note that the controlling 
minority shareholder status in this research’s context does not betoken the status resulting from 
prior arrangements (e.g., pyramids and dual-class shares),675 but rather it means the excessive 
power the minority shareholder may wield as a side effect of some of the regulatory rules that are 
intended to protect the minority shareholders against opportunism and oppression. However, they 
may be utilized in bad faith to frustrate the corporate management or annoy the majority 
shareholders, particularly at times of shareholder tensions and clashes. 
In a handful of instances, I visualize, the minority shareholders are emboldened to take 
advantage of and abuse the legal apparatus for vicious purposes. For example, the Law precludes 
                                                 
675 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1313 (2009) (“Controlling shareholders may use arrangements such as pyramids, 
dual-class shares, and other mechanisms to separate cash-flow and voting rights. When such 
arrangements are in place, the controller can have an absolute lock on control even though it has 
less⎯and sometimes substantially less⎯than half of the company’s cash flows.”) 
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the shareholders on the board to cast their vote on the approval of a suspicious, related-party 
transaction. Legally speaking, the voting minority shareholders may refuse to approve of the 
transaction, albeit its fairness to the corporation, for arbitrary reasons or no reason at all. Another 
example is the decision of capital increase. Because the Law requires an exceptional resolution-
passing vote (i.e., three-quarter of attending shares in the extraordinary assembly), one may 
imagine a situation where the minority shareholders indiscriminately vote against the resolution, 
despite the fact that an increase is sought to embark upon a sound investment. 
In both examples, the minority shareholders exercise their legal rights, which means that no 
one may challenge or stop them, irrespective to the concealed or conspicuous drives behind their 
manners, and to whether they are voting rationally or irrationally. The Law does not provide a 
judicial ground for other shareholders (i.e., majority shareholders) or the corporation’s 
management to challenge the abusive or oppressive exercise of rights, which may leave the 
controlling shareholders with no choice but to wheedle votes out of these minority shareholders 
every time their votes matter. Otherwise, the resolution will never be passed, regardless. 
An effective option to rectify the controlling-minority-shareholder dilemma, I propose, is to 
establish a judicial ground in the Law to keep the minority shareholder’s exercising his rights in 
check on the one hand, and to provide the affected shareholders with an option to sue these the 
minority shareholders on the ground of abusing their rights. This may be done by inserting into 
the Law a fairness standard that may be adjudicated in a court of law or conditioning the 
shareholders to exercise their statutory rights with good faith and fair dealing. The fairness 
standard or good faith and fair dealing is a term that paves the way for the judiciary to intervene 
ex post and adjudge whether the disputed exercise of the right is oppressive, case by case. 
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Closing Analysis 
The use of the prescriptive rules⎯in lieu of default rules⎯ to arrange a crowd of shareholder 
affairs widens the role of the shareholder in corporate governance. The stipulation of a host of 
statutory rights replaces the traditional “passive shareholder” with a more “functional shareholder” 
the Law (through its rules) invites to take an effective role in overseeing the corporation and 
deciding on its shareholder matters.676 From the minority shareholder’s viewpoint, the 
functionality of shareholder, which is expected in close corporations,677 also is espoused by virtue 
of statutory rules that may not be contracted out. Therefore, the merits of this approach should 
account into statutory protection that mitigates, if not eliminates, the minority shareholder issues 
as extrapolated above.678 
In the popular imagination, this Saudi approach⎯to asserting the shareholder supremacy and 
the minority shareholder protection⎯ is not immune from criticism. The proponents of the 
director-centric corporations raise several objections against the empowerment of shareholders.679 
Although some of their arguments merit attention, they fail to recognize the upsides of the 
functional shareholder, which outweighs the benefits realized from the passivity of shareholders, 
specifically in the context of close corporations. 
                                                 
676 See supra Chapter Three, Part II, A. 
677 See supra Chapter 1, Part II.C. 
678 See supra Chapter Four, Part III. 
679 For in-depth discussion of director supremacy, see, for example, Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits 
of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 808 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for 
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2002); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of 
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1969). 
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A prevalent objection to the strong shareholder rights⎯as opposed to the current state of 
director-centric corporate laws⎯ is the shareholder indifference.680 Because shareholders 
commonly have little interests in the corporation, they appear to be apathetic about corporate 
matters. Furthermore, the expenses the shareholder may incur in an exercise of his rights 
oftentimes outnumber the benefits he may obtain,681 so no rational shareholder would care to 
exercise his rights or endeavor to effect change.682 In addition to the counterarguments to these 
claims,683 one may add that these arguments would not exist had been there a regulatory framework 
that would ensure the flow of information into shareholders and thus make them informed of the 
corporate matters without bearing excessive costs.684 In addition, this argument may fit in the 
context of public corporations where there are countless shareholders. In close corporations’ 
context, one shareholder has a greater chance to affect, given the small number of the shareholders 
of the close corporations.685 
Another objection lodged to empowering shareholders is that shareholders are inadequate to 
make sound business decisions.686 This allegation stems from the notion that directors are superior 
to shareholders and more informed than the latter.687 This may be true, yet it should not 
                                                 
680 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–92 (1986); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 526–29 (1990). 
681 See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously , 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 622 (2007) 
([T]he expense of remaining informed about the company exceeds the expected benefit.”) 
682 Id. at 623, (rebutting the notion of shareholder apathy as “it is not that shareholders do not care, but 
rather that they find it inefficient to over-invest in monitoring behavior. Thus, the negative connotation of 
the term “apathy” is unjustified.”) 
683 Id. at 622–25, (defending shareholder rights against shareholder-apathy claims). 
684 See supra Chapter Four, Part IV., A. 
685 See supra Chapter One, Part I, B.  
686 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1735, 1745–49 (2006); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 
1259, 1276–77 (1982). 
687 See Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
408 (1962) (“The great fault has been the lack of information available to shareholders, with a resulting 
inertia on the part of shareholders about corporate matters.”). 
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underestimate the power to supervise the corporation and access its books and records in informing 
shareholders better. The oversight role coupled with external auditing reports and advice⎯and 
sometimes a director at the boardroom⎯ renders the shareholders competent enough to make 
business decisions. As a matter of risk-bearing, the shareholders ought to partake in the process of 
decision making because they ultimately will bear the risks of these decisions.688 
An unavoidable yet significant line of objection is that the Law excessively regulates the 
corporate matters that go against the contractual nature of the close corporations. Knowing the fact 
that the Saudi market is a developing one, and the fact that social and economic transformations 
flow only from laws and regulations, one may find it justifying to utilize this approach for the 
higher public welfare. Evidently, laws have profound effects on reshaping individuals’ behaviors 
and protect their interests and rights. Without them, the shareholder looks vulnerable and is left 
with no option but to depend upon the partial contracts.689 Furthermore, this claim subscribes to 
the venerable theory advanced by sociopolitical thinkers, notably Gerald Rosenberg, that refutes 
the overrating view of the judicial bench to effect change or spark progress in a society, solo.690 
Social change is a process that involves a mountain of political, legal, and social mobilization. 
Social reforms that are thought to be produced by courts have been already preceded by a great 
deal of change through executive and legislative branches alongside the civil rights movement.691 
If laws have the power to bring about social change, then why would they not effect change in the 
business society? 
                                                 
688 For further rebuttal of this argument, see Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously , 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 625–27 (2007). 
689 See supra Chapter One, Part III, A & C.  
690 For further insights into this debate, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (Univ. of Chicago Press 2d. ed. 2008). 
691 Id. at 35, (“While the conditions suggest that courts can be effective producers of significant 
social reform, . . . they also suggest that this occurs only when a great deal of change has already been 
made.”) 
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All in all, the minority shareholder armed with a host of statutory rights should be powerful 
enough to deter the oppressive conduct and assert a voice in the management of the corporation. 
As demonstrated above, the shareholder right to cumulatively elect the members of the board 
enhances that shareholder’s chance to engage in the management. The shareholder right to sell his 
interests freely is another principle establishing a fundamental right for shareholders in close 
corporations to exist without the fear of being stuck therein. Plus, the right to request a meeting or 
to inspect the corporation and access its books and records confidently avails the minority 
shareholders to keep the management’s discretion (i.e., dominant shareholder’s discretion) in 
check and to stay informed about corporate operations. 
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Chapter Five: Enforcement of the Statutory Protection of Minority 
Shareholders 
 
“To know the law is not merely to understand the words, but as well their force and effect.” 
 
Justinian, Digest, Book 1, Title 3, 17 
 
Motivating Hypothetical 
Although their business is flourishing, Saad has expressed some frustration and been dissatisfied 
with the management of his father and brother because of his constant disagreement over the 
preferred direction of the business. He has been removed from the board and replaced by an outside 
director, and the corporation has not distributed dividends for the past three years despite its 
prosperity. His brother has prevented him from accessing the books and records of the corporation, 
and Saad thinks about requesting the court dissolve the corporation, for the book value of his shares 
is far less than his pro-rata would the corporation be liquidated. However, Saad is confused about 
in which Saudi courts he should file the lawsuit, and he is uncertain about his odds of prevailing 
though he is acutely aware that it is of his statutory rights to receive dividends, to access the 
corporation’s books and records, and to request a court-ordered dissolution of the corporation. 
The Scope of Chapter Five 
This chapter scrutinizes the second component of the research theory, the enforcement of the Law 
in Saudi Arabia as it is a major player in protecting minority-shareholder interests. Laws and rules 
alone do not suffice to protect minority shareholders. Instead, they are to exist interdependently. 
For this reason, this chapter expounds the role of the judiciary ex post, as it is the sanctuary for all 
disgruntled and oppressed shareholders on the one hand, and the principal enforcer of the law on 
the other. To do so, the chapter first provides a foundational stone of the historical development 
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of the corporate judiciary in Saudi Arabia. Second, the chapter differentiates between the role of 
the judiciary in enforcement into two subsections: public enforcement and private enforcement. 
Under each category, the chapter examines the nature of the judicial intervention ex post and 
accentuates the protective aspects of these interventions.  
Part I. The Development of the Corporate Judiciary in Saudi Arabia 
Overview 
The Saudi judiciary is a dual judicial system and thus divided into two kinds of courts,692 Sharia 
courts (akin to civil courts) and administrative courts, each of which has its judicial hierarchy, 
including, subject-specific courts,693 multiple appellate courts, and a supreme court resting at the 
top. The term “corporate judiciary” is coined here to embody every competent court that has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate corporation-related and shareholder-related disputes. While there are no 
corporation-specific courts, throughout the history disputes arising out of the corporations have 
been ruled on in specialized tribunals, including the so-called commercial circuits and some quasi-
judicial committees.694 
After the issuance of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 alongside massive changes dictated 
by the Vision 2030,695 the Saudi corporate judiciary underwent a transformational change aiming 
at high efficiency and rapidity. Although a comprehensive discussion of the Saudi framework of 
                                                 
692 The duality of the Saudi judiciary was copied from the Egyptian system, which was inherited at first 
place from France, the origin of dual legal system. See generally Almajid, at 177; and Maren Hanson, The 
Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB L.Q. 272, 291(1987) ( 
explaining how the French legal system found its way into the Middle East and thus the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia). 
693 See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007. 
694 An Example of quasi-judicial committees is the Committee for Resolution of Securities’ Disputes, 
which adjudicates security-related conflicts and violations, including shares of joint-stock corporation. 
For further information, see Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian Publicly 
Traded Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, 196–199 (2014). 
695 See supra Chapter Two, Part I, A (4).  
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the judiciary falls beyond the scope of the research, to understand the development of the Saudi 
corporate judiciary and its complexity, a brief show of the history of its development is of 
necessity. Therefore, a distinction is made here between the development of corporate judiciary 
before 2015 and after 2015. 
A. The Corporate Judiciary before 2015 
After the promulgation of the first Companies Law in 1965, the Law, similar to previously-
enacted laws,696 faced fierce oppositions from Sharia-court judges and religious jurists at that 
time.697 In other words, the courts declined to apply and implement any of these “positive laws”, 
for the implementations of these laws would run afoul of Sharia, the opponents alleged.698 One 
example of their rejections was the refusal of the limited liability feature of some enterprises, 
including the joint-stock corporations and the limited liability companies.699 
                                                 
696 E.g., The Law of Commercial Court. 
697 This comes as a natural result of the different Islamic schools of thought and how a jurist interprets 
Sharia texts. See, e.g., H. S. Shaaban, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law Governs, 
31 LAW & POL’Y INT'L BUS. 157, 172 (1999). 
698 E.g., Hossein Esmaeili, On a Slow Boat towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi 
Arabia Legal System, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 48 (2009) (highlighting the effects of religious 
leaders on the progress and reform in the country alongside social factors). 
699 Cf. CHIBLI MALLAT , INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 329 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2009) (documenting the refusal of limited liability feature: 
“Yet neither law nor the business world has fully digested the separation, and some 
courts are reluctant to stop at the company’s assets in case of unpaid debt. This 
phenomenon is difficult to document in the absence of systematic law reporting, 
particularly in the Gulf states, where the size and importance of the companies in the 
era of oil is evident. Legal practice, as far as can be ascertained from lawyers and 
businessmen, confirms the difficulty, in countries where the persona of the directors 
and major shareholders of the companies is paramount, in limiting liability to the 
capital and assets of the company, without touching upon the personal property of the 
decisive actors in such business ventures.”) 
However, see Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian Publicly Traded 
Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, 73 (2014) (Unpublished SJD dissertation, 
University of Pittsburgh) (on file with the author) (“[R]ecent developments in Islamic jurisprudence 
approve compatibility of limited liability with Sharia.” 
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The rejection of implementing positive laws (including the Companies Law) resulted in the 
creation of another judicial body consisting of several quasi-judicial committees and circuits, to 
each of which the judicial power was delegated by law to adjudicate disputes pertaining to positive 
laws.700 Therefore, this approach to overcome such a rebuff led to the formation of commercial 
circuits within the hierarchy of the administrative judiciary.701 The commercial circuits would 
review and rule on disputes pertaining to the Law of Commercial Court and Companies Law. 
These disputes included corporation-related lawsuits, shareholder-related conflicts, brokerage-
related claims, commercial transport complaints, bankruptcy cases, and other commerce-related 
disputes. 
The commercial circuits showed great deference to the Companies Law of 1965. They would 
rely on its articles in solving lawsuits and exercise their gap-filling power in the absence of a 
written rule according to the common law (principles and rules derived from Sharia).702 
                                                 
700 Nowadays, there are circa 75 quasi-judicial committees ruling on different sorts of disputes. Each 
enjoys judicial jurisdiction that helps it to perform its duties in resolving and ruling on disputes of certain 
types. Some of these committees’ power even include the power to impose monetary penalties or 
imprison violators. 
701 Cf. Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, 19 ARAB L.Q. 5, 27 
(2004)(“ The Board has been authorized since 1987 to decide most of the commercial disputes which 
used to be under the authority of what was the Commercial Dispute Committees. It has been granted this 
authority by Royal Decree number m/63 on 26/11/1407AH (1987).”); Abdullah F. Ansary, A Brief 
Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System, GLOBALEX (2008) 
[http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html] (“Although Article 1 [of the Law of the 
Board of Greivance of 1982] states that the Board is an independent administrative judicial board, it has 
been authorized to decide cases and disputes to which the administration is not a party. It is authorized to 
temporarily adjudicate criminal, and commercial disputes . . .”) 
702 See generally George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi 
Arabia, 9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 211, 213 (1987) (“The statutes are intended to supplement rather than 
modify the Sharia, and are at least theoretically subordinate to it in cases of conflict.”); Ahmed A. Al-
Ghadyan, The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia, 13 ARAB L.Q. 235, 235 (1998) (“Islamic Sharia is the law 
applicable to all judicial matters. It should be applied according to the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.”); 
Faisal M. Al-Fadhel, Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi 
Arabian Law: A Brief Overview, 1 I.J.L.D.L.R. 95, 98 (2012) (“The primary sources of Sharia are the 
Quran [the holy book of Islam] and the Sunnah [a collection of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad and 
examples of his behavior] and there exist [sis] a closed number of other secondary sources of Sharia or 
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In 2007, a new judicature act was enacted,703 launching a new era for the Saudi judiciary. One 
of the prominent aspects of this law was the adoption of subject-matter jurisdiction. It establishes 
that Sharia first instances are to be restructured into subject-matter jurisdiction of five courts: 
family courts, commercial courts, labor courts, criminal courts, and general courts that hear all 
complaints that do not fall within any of the subject-matter jurisdictions.704 This should have ended 
the longstanding divorce between the commercial circuits and the Sharia courts. However, the 
status of these circuits continued as it had been until 2015. One of the most side effects of this 
messy divorce was the confusion about which court would have jurisdiction over a complaint. That 
resulted in lengthy trials and countless cases dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction by both 
courts. 
B. The Corporate Judiciary after 2015 
Enacting the Companies Law of 2015 alongside far-reaching changes brought by the 
successive government called for the transformation of the existing commercial circuits into 
commercial courts as the Judicature Law stipulates.705 Two years later (September 2017), the 
Ministry of Justice inaugurated its commercial lower courts. It was the end of an era of confusion 
for the public and of withholding of the Judicature Law.  
This turning point in the commercial judiciary is believed to effect changes on various levels. 
Having specialized courts for only commercial disputes implies a greater capacity of specialized 
                                                 
methods for adducing appropriate normative behaviour in response to new incidents and unregulated 
circumstances.”) 
703 This Law was enacted by a royal decree No. M/78, in 2007. It was part of a bigger project aiming at 
comprehensive reforming of the judiciary (both Sharia and administrative courts) in Saudi Arabia by the 
former king, King Abdullah AlSaud, who allocated nearly 2 billion U.S. dollar for this shake-up project.  
704 See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007. 
705 See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007. 
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judges designated to these disputes, which result in shortening the span of litigations.706 Another 
ramification that has been already observed is the periodical publication of the courts’ rulings. 
Since the inception of the commercial courts, the rulings have been published on the Ministry’s 
website on a monthly basis.707 Needless to say that such publications make these courts more 
predictable and thus reliable,708 which positively contributes to the confidence of litigants, 
especially foreign ones.709 
Part II. Public Enforcement 
Public enforcement connotes state authorities that are vested with powers to uphold the 
Companies Law of 2015 and prosecute the lawbreakers. In the Saudi close corporation’s context, 
public enforcers include the Public Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment.710 
This part explores the role of the corporate judiciary in lawsuits brought by public enforcers, the 
Public Prosecution alongside the Ministry of Commerce and Investment. To that end, the 
parameters of powers of each authority are of significance to determine within which authority an 
illegal activity falls, and what forms of intervention each authority may seek. 
                                                 
706 Contra Youseif A. Alzahrani, Rights of Shareholders under Saudi Company Law 1965, 21–22 (2013) 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brunel University) (on file with the author) (arguing that the judicial 
system is still suffering from shortage of judges in courts in comparison with the number of lawsuits filed 
each year in Saudi courts). 
707 See the Ministry of Justice website at https://www.moj.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx. 
708 Note that these rulings do not constitute precedents, but rather they provide common understanding of 
how a judge may rule in similar circumstances. See generally David J. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: 
What Foreign Attorney's Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 131, 149–150 (1991) (“[J]ust 
because a judge, qadi, issued a particular ruling in the past does not mean that he or any other judge will 
rule the same way in the future, even if presented with an identical set of facts.”) 
709 E.g., David J. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorney's Should Know, 25 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 131, 169 (1991) (there are indications that Saudi Arabia’s legal system may 
become increasingly hospitable toward international commerce, and increasingly aligned with Western 
doctrines.”). 
710 In the context of public corporations, the squad of public enforcers includes (alongside the Public 
Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) the Capital Market Authority and the 
Committee For Resolution of Securities Disputes. 
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A. The Public Prosecution 
1. Powers 
The Law delegates to the Public Prosecution the power to investigate and press charges against 
offenders committing any of the illegal activities itemized in Articles 211 and 212.711 These powers 
constitute ex post intervention that may take different forms, including pecuniary interventions 
(e.g., fines), non-pecuniary intervention (e.g., incarceration), or both.712 These interventions, 
nevertheless, are subject to the judicial review that must find the defendant to be guilty of violating 
the Law and thus deserving of the punishment.713 
Furthermore, the Law goes above and beyond by allowing the Public Prosecution to prosecute 
the corporation itself in case the prosecution of the real offender is unavailable for any reason.714 
For example, if the perpetrator perishes, the Public Prosecution may seek imposition of monetary 
fines upon the corporation instead. 
2. Scope of Powers 
The Law restricts the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Public Prosecution to the 
offenses enumerated in Articles 211 and 212. These articles are crafted in a way to be all-
encompassing, leaving no room for maneuver. Such offenses include providing misleading 
information,715 willful omission of material facts,716 misuse of voting right to the detriment of the 
                                                 
711 Article 215. 
712 Articles 211 & 212. 
713 On the other hand, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment may impose monetary penalties for 
violations stipulated in Article 213 without a judgment, as explained in the subsequent subsection. 
714 Article 217. 
715 Article 211 (a) 
716 Id. 
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corporation or gaining personal benefits,717 failure to call for a shareholder meeting (where a duty 
to call exists),718 divulgence of corporate secrets,719 and the mishandling of corporate funds.720 
Theoretically, the language of both Articles grants the Public Prosecution broad discretion over 
the interpretation of what actions constitute an offense by law. For example, the Law criminalizes 
the use of power by directors and officers in a way detrimental to the corporation’s interests, either 
by realizing personal benefits or extracting direct or indirect gains from deals the corporation 
executes by virtue of that power.721 This text provides the authority with a great deal of latitude to 
make sure that such the offender may not escape justice, while it also acts as a deterrence that the 
prejudiced people may favor avoiding a suspicious business activity instead of being criminally 
accountable for it.722 
3. Penalties 
The intervention by the public Prosecution may take different forms, including pecuniary 
interventions (e.g., fines), and non-pecuniary interventions (e.g., incarceration). Either of these 
forms of intervention, the Public Prosecution is to obtain a judgment finding the defendant guilty 
of violating the Law and thus deserving of the punishment. The Law empowers the authority to 
seek two kinds of punishment premised on how drastic an illegal activity is. For instance, the Law 
enables the Public Prosecution to seek (for acts stipulated in Article 211) imposition of monetary 
fines not exceeding 5 million Saudi riyals (1,33 million U.S. dollars), or imprisonment of the 
                                                 
717 Article 211 (c) 
718 Article 211 (d) 
719 Article 212 (b) 
720 Article 211 (b) 
721 Article 211 (c) 
722 Practically, I was not able to locate a case brought by the Public Prosecution against a close 
corporation or a shareholder thereof. In the context of public corporations, nevertheless, the Public 
Prosecution regularly brings lawsuits against offenders of the Companies Law or capital-market 
regulations based on referral by the Capital Market Authority as the Competent Authority of regulating 
and supervising public corporations.  
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offender not exceeding five years, or both. These acts include the mistreatment of corporate funds, 
the manipulation of corporate books and financial statements, and the engagement in self-interest 
dealings.723 For less drastic misconduct (Article 212), the Public Prosecution may seek imposition 
of fines not exceeding 1 million Saudi riyals (266,666 U.S. dollars) or a maximum of one-year 
imprisonment, or both.724 To add a layer of deterrence, the Law doubles the punishment in both 
Articles in case of recidivism. Repeat and persistent offenders committing the exact violation may 
be subject to a doubled punishment.725 
That being said, the corporate judiciary’s role is of paramount importance as it assesses the 
charges and ensures that whatever the form of intervention the authority is seeking is proportional 
to the alleged violation or misconduct, subjecting the enforcement by state authority to the judicial 
review of its statutory discretion.726 
B. The Ministry of Commerce and Investment 727 
1. Powers 
The Ministry assumes a leading role in the enforcement of the Law. As the Law assigns an 
array of powers to the competent authority of close corporations, these powers can divide the role 
of the Ministry into supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary roles. These roles jointly strengthen 
                                                 
723 Article 211. 
724 In both circumstances, punishment in accordance with the Companies Law does not negate other 
punishment in any law. For instance, if a director utilizes his voting power to the detriment of the 
corporation as a result of a bribe he receives, that director may be prosecuted for misuse of her voting 
power according to Article 211 (c) of the Companies Law, and she may be prosecuted for bribery 
according to the Law of Anti-Bribery, if applicable. 
725 To recognize an offender as a recidivist, three conditions are to be met. First, the offender commits the 
same violation, for which, second, a final judgment is made against her. Third, the second violation 
transpires within three years from the date of the sentence. See Article 214. 
726 Article 223 stipulates that “[t]he competent judicial authority [commercial courts] shall decide all civil 
and penal lawsuits and disputes arising from the implementation of the provisions of the Law, and shall 
impose prescribed penalties.” 
727 Hereinafter “the Ministry”. 
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the enforcement of Law by the non-judicial authority since most of the actions the Ministry may 
take do not involve the review of the judiciary or its approval, making the Ministry a more 
responsive enforcer to the needs of the corporations (and shareholders) and the to the violations of 
the Law.728 
2. Scope of Powers 
According to the Law, the Ministry assumes various tasks. First, it is incumbent upon the 
Ministry to watch and superintend the operating business enterprises⎯including the close 
corporations. To that end, the Ministry enjoys the right to inspect the corporations, review their 
books, and request their records (supervisory role).729 This includes the chairperson’s duties to 
notify the Ministry about any changes or updates in the corporation’s constitutional documents 
(e.g., change in the bylaws or shareholders), and to submit the financial statements and the 
resolutions decided by the shareholder assembly.730 The role goes farther to permit the Ministry to 
deputize some of its personnel to inspect the corporation and its accounts alongside attending its 
shareholder assembly, if necessary.731 On the other hand, the officers and directors of the 
corporation are to allow the Ministry’s officials to access the corporation’s books and records and 
provide them with all documents they demand.732 This role lets the Ministry ensure the conformity 
of the corporations with all applicable laws and regulations by keeping an eye on them. 
Second, the Law empowers the Ministry to take whatever deemed necessary for the 
implementation of and compliance with the Law (regulatory role).733 Examples of the Ministry’s 
                                                 
728 Infra Chapter 5, Part II, B (3). 
729 Article 220. 
730 Supra Chapter Three, Part III, E. 
731 Article 220. 
732 Article 221. 
733 Article 225 (2). 
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exercising this power include the regulation of online voting,734 and the issuance of the guiding 
templates and forms for the incorporation of each enterprise.735 In an evaluation of this role, 
nevertheless, it may seem to be a double-edged weapon. It is true that such a role allows the 
Ministry to respond more effectively to rapid changes, while it may adversely affect the stability 
and predictability of the market, and it becomes a source of demagnetizing the market and turns 
off foreign investors. 
As the Ministry polices the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia, it also enjoys the power to 
penalizes wrongdoers within its jurisdiction (disciplinary role). Article 213 stipulates various 
violations that fall within the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Such violations include depriving the 
shareholder of the right to attend shareholder assembly and vote,736 distributing dividends in 
violation with the corporation’s constitutional documents or shareholder-assembly resolutions,737 
obtaining a loan from the corporation in violation of the Law,738 obtaining benefits to vote in a 
certain way,739 and blocking a shareholder from accessing the books and the records of the 
corporation.740 
3. Penalties 
The statutory jurisdiction of the Ministry to penalize wrongdoers brings a further dimension to 
the discussion of protecting the minority shareholders. Unlike penalties imposed by the Public 
Prosecution (where the judiciary has to approve these penalties),741 the Law allows the Ministry to 
                                                 
734 Supra Chapter Three, Part II, A, 1(d). 
735 Supra Chapter Two, Part I, B (4). 
736 Article 213 (f). 
737 Article 213 (a). 
738 Supra Chapter Three, Part III, E. 
739 Article 213 (g). 
740 Article (j). 
741 Supra Chapter Five, Part II, A (3). 
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impose monetary fines on lawbreakers without the need to a court judgment.742 As soon as the 
Ministry comes across an offense stipulated in Article 213, or is notified about it by other 
shareholders, the Ministry may impose a fine⎯up to 500,000 Saudi riyals ($133,333).743 As a 
matter of justice, the Law allows fined individuals to appeal before the commercial court.744 
The nature of the violations prescribed in Article 213 underscores the importance of this role 
in protecting the minority shareholders. Most of these violations constitute oppressive conduct and 
opportunistic behaviors committed by dominant shareholders that need immediate attention in 
order for the harmed party to exercise their statutory rights. Therefore, asserting this role to the 
Ministry to intervene and immediately penalize wrongdoers ensures the protection for the minority 
shareholders the Law promotes. It allows the oppressed shareholders to seek an immediate 
intervention by the Ministry to retrieve their statutory rights, without bearing the cost of lengthy 
lawsuits.745 
C. Overall Assessment 
Given the crisp description above, it is critical to point out to a number of conclusions 
stemming from a comparative view of both laws. First of all, the Law comes to reset the corporate 
arena in terms of the authorities in charge of regulating its actors. The ambiguity of authorities no 
longer exists, but rather it is replaced with a comprehensive framework that specifies every 
enforcer, and the powers to which each enforcer is entitled. The claim is that the introduction of 
the Public Prosecution as a competent authority of violations the Law comes to criminalize⎯for 
                                                 
742 Article 216. 
743 Article 213. In case of recidivism, see supra note 725. 
744 Article 216. 
745 Whether the disciplinary role of the Ministry is effective on the ground is an interesting yet empirical 
question. Given the newness of the Law and the absence of published data about such fines, it is unlikely 
to reach reflective assessment of the Law in this regard. Nevertheless, the employment of logic and 
imagination suggests that knowing the Ministry’s power of immediate disciplining should suffice to act as 
a deterrence to would-be wrongdoers unless otherwise proven. 
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the first time746⎯ and the roles of the Ministry craft an institutionalized environment where the 
shareholder’s rights matter. Moreover, the enlargement of the Ministry’s role is of paramount 
importance as it oversees the corporate actors in on hand and punishes the violating ones on the 
other. These inspective and disciplinary powers granted to a responsive institution ensure the 
growth of a rights-respectful business environment. 
Most importantly, the judicial jurisdiction over the prosecutorial and ministerial authorities is 
an integral part of a well-institutionalized market where the courts keep other institutions in check. 
The nature of the court’s intervention aims at the fairness of the machinery of public enforcement. 
The accused lawbreakers and fined violators have the right to make their cases and defend 
themselves before an impartial institution that guarantees the just exercise of power by the 
governmental and prosecutorial institutions.747 The judiciary has to decide whether the accused is 
criminal (in case of the cases brought by the Public Prosecution) or to hear the appeal of a fined 
person (in case of the pecuniary penalties imposed by the Ministry). 
Finally, the absence of data and the recency of the Law make it difficult to gauge the efficacy 
of public enforcement and the protection with which it may provide the minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the existing structure of the public enforcement should theoretically reinforce “legal 
mobilization”748 enabling the affected shareholders to have faith in the competency of these 
                                                 
746 Although no lawsuit has been spotted in regard with close corporations, the Public Prosecution⎯in 
cooperation with the Public Market Authority⎯ has an indispensable role in regard with public-
corporation-related crimes. Evidently, the Public Market Authority’s website includes a range of criminal 
cases brought by the Public Prosecution and adjudicated by the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes.  
747 Accord Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, 19 ARAB L.Q. 5, 6 
(2004) (claiming that in sheltering the rule of law, “judges become powerful players in maintaining the 
submission of the government to the law: they prevent potentially arbitrary acts of the government and its 
instrumentalities”). 
748 Notwithstanding the difference between subject matters, the term legal mobilization is used by Charles 
Epp to refer to all resources available for individuals to realize the effects a bill of rights brings about. 
Such resources include governmental financing, rights-advocacy organizations, and the access to lawyers 
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institutions to redress violations of the Law, and thus seek their interventions to rectify oppression 
and retrieve their statutory rights. Reliable courts alongside well-established institutions (i.e., the 
Public Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) with well-fashioned roles 
ought to mobilize support for the protection of minority shareholders. 
Part III. Private Enforcement 
Private enforcement refers to litigations triggered by an individual shareholder. Under certain 
circumstances, violations of the Law do not cause harm to the corporation (and thus shareholders 
as a whole), but rather they harm a particular shareholder, who then seeks the judicial intervention 
to retrieve a statutory right, to rectify harm or oppression, to be remedied or both. That being said, 
this Part excludes the private enforcement of the Law brought on the corporation’s behalf by means 
of derivative actions;749 instead, it focuses on the direct action as a corrective instrument that 
responds to the close corporation’s issues.750 This Part investigates the status quo of the direct 
action, and it scrutinizes what remedies the shareholder may demand under this action. Finally, it 
casts the light on the stance of the Saudi judiciary in regard to other remedies and actions the Law 
does not stipulate, and on the availability of these remedies. 
A. Direct Action 
1. The Nature of Shareholder Direct Action 
The close corporation’s issues are frequently associated with direct personal harm to certain 
shareholders (i.e., minority shareholders). Therefore, the shareholder may bring a direct action 
                                                 
and the structure of legal profession. For in-depth look into this argument, see Charles R. Epp, Do Bills of 
Rights Matter? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 90(4) AM. POT. SCT. REV. 765, 765 
(1996). 
749 See supra Chapter 4, Part III, F. 
750 Supra Chapter 1, Part II. 
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against the corporation, its directors, officers, or a dominant shareholder to redress the harm.751 
However, it is paramount to differentiate between two causes for personal harm. First, the 
shareholder may incur harm as a result of the corporation’s violating the Law or obstructing his 
statutory right. Second, the shareholder may be affected as a result of a legitimate corporate action 
(e.g., refusal to pay dividends); the recognition of the latter harm may be traced to the judicial 
understanding of the special nature of the close corporation and its inherent problems, as it is the 
case in several U.S. states. 
In Saudi Arabia, however, the Saudi courts have not yet considered the special characteristics 
of the close corporations, which meshes with the legislative approach that also does not distinguish 
between close and public corporations. Nonetheless, this may not negate the existence of direct 
action on such harm. In fact, one of the judicially-implemented maxim rooted in Sharia (common 
law) is that Al Darār Yuzal (injury must be removed).752 While there is no ruling about the issues 
at hand, one may imagine the shareholder bringing a direct action predicated upon this tort doctrine 
as it is a core maxim upon which rulings in different subject matters have been established.  
That being said and given the Islamic theme of the country, this maxim should be the 
underpinnings for the statutory cause of action for shareholders in close corporations. The failure 
to recognize such an action raises grave concern about the shareholder’s standing to fight against 
oppressive, opportunistic yet legitimate conduct. Such failure stems from the absence of both 
statutory and judicial division between close and public corporations.753 A discontented 
                                                 
751 Accord Wade H. III Watson; J. Bertram Levy, The Development of the Shareholder’s Direct Action 
Damage Remedy, 28 GA. ST. B. J. 195, 195–96 (1992) (tracing the origin of the shareholder’s direct action 
to the unique nature of close corporations). 
752 Al Darar means harm, while Yuzal means removed. It is of the comprehensive Islamic maxims. See 
generally Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature in Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 20 ARAB L.Q. 77, 85–87 (2006) (elaborating on the concept of Darar (harm) in Islam and 
what other maxims raising out of this concept). 
753  
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shareholder of the public corporation has the right to exit the corporation at any time for fair value, 
while a frustrated shareholder in the close corporation (like Saad) finds it difficult to liquidate his 
interests without the minority discount. Therefore, the statutory cause of action for the shareholders 
in close corporations should be an indispensable aspect of every statutory corporate governance 
for non-listed corporations. 
2. Infringement of the Law as Cause of Action 
Returning to the motivating hypothetical, Saad has been, inter alia, deprived of a fundamental 
right enshrined in the Law, the right to access the corporation’s books and records. As demystified 
in the preceding chapter, the Law entitles the shareholders to a number of sacred rights to ensure 
that the shareholders play their roles without the burden to contract for these rights.754 If these 
rights are violated, it is incumbent upon the corporate judiciary to remedy the complaining 
shareholder. 
Furthermore, the judicial remedy may vary based on the nature of the violation, so the courts 
have wide discretion to select what remedy is best to apply as a matter of fact. In Saad’s situation, 
for instance, the commercial court may order the corporation to allow the complaining shareholder 
to access its books and records. It may go farther to nullify the corporate decision if the 
complaining shareholder establishes that the corporation’s denying him access led to a 
misinformed vote.755 Evidently, the corporate judiciary has always shown willingness to uphold 
the statutory shareholder rights earnestly.756 
                                                 
754 See supra Chapter 4, Part II. 
755 Article 110 establishes, inter alia, the shareholder’s right to request nullification of violating corporate 
decisions.  
756 E.g., Case No. 597/ 2/ Q [ق/٢/٥٩٧], Jeddah Commercial Court, Second Circuit (H 1438 [corresponding 
to 2017]). [on file with the author].  
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Similar to the right to access the corporate books and records, the corporate judiciary may order 
the corporation to enable shareholders to exercise other statuary rights, such the right to attend and 
vote in shareholder meetings.757 The obstruction of these rights permits the corporate judiciary not 
only to invalidate whatever decisions resulted from those meetings but also to penalize the 
obstructing individual. All in all, the shareholder’s action to request the judicial enforcement of 
the statutory rights when infringed ensures the implementation of the shareholder’s roles according 
to the Law on the one hand and fosters the business environment abiding by laws and regulations 
on the other. 
3. Oppression as Cause of Action 
The oppression concept as defined by several U.S. states is absent from the Saudi corporate 
laws. As explained earlier, the oppression is oftentimes a result of either a squeeze-out action 
forcing the minority shareholders to exit the corporation for unfair value or a freeze-out technique 
employed to deprive the minority shareholders of returns (salaries or dividends) on their 
investments (as in the case of Saad). The enfeebled shareholders seek out equitable reliefs for the 
oppressive conduct. Nevertheless, in the absence of the statutory and judicial definition for 
oppression, there is much ambiguity in terms of when legitimate actions taken by the controlling 
shareholders would constitute a form of oppression in Saudi courts. In the hypothetical, Saad is 
deprived of all financial returns on his investments. Whether such denial is by the book, the nature 
of the close corporation involves the judicial lens to look holistically at such issues in their context. 
Notwithstanding the dire need for the statutory recognition of the special nature of the close 
corporations, the corporate judiciary should develop the concept of the oppression as a judicially-
created doctrine to protect the minority shareholders. One solid foundation upon which this 
                                                 
757 See supra Chapter 4, Part II, 1 & 2. 
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doctrine should be tailored is the theory of right abuse alongside the corresponding Islamic maxim 
of Al Darār Yuzal (harm must be removed).758 
Another robust basis for oppression as a cause of action is the statutory principle of shareholder 
equality. The appropriation of corporate profits by some shareholders in the form of salaries and 
rewards runs afoul of the fundamental equality doctrine the Law underscores in multiple stances.759 
Furthermore, the equality premise finds its strength in the fact that it is a peremptory law that may 
not be contracted out or derogated by any means of agreement. Therefore, it is true that the majority 
rules the corporation, yet such control has to be consistent with the equality and fairness principles 
among shareholders.760 Otherwise, biased decisions favoring a group of shareholders over others 
will be challenged in a court of law and violating officers may face harsh penalties.761 
B. Judicial Remedies 
Asserting the shareholder’s right to bring a direct or derivative action against the corporation 
or its management is a significant step to effectuate the judicial intervention ex post, to remedy 
injured shareholders, and upholding the Law. In Saudi Arabia, the judicial intervention in 
oppression-related claims may be in the form of invalidation of the corporate resolution that results 
                                                 
758 For further information on the theory of right abuse, see Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old 
Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389, 434 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive 
Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L. J. 37, 98 (1995). 
759 See, e.g., article 110 asserts the equality of rights and obligations rendered by shares. Article 111 
requires that⎯in case of the redemption of share⎯ redemption be made by drawing or another way that 
guarantees fairness among all shareholders.  
760 It is important to note that there are two sorts of equality, equality of shares and equality of 
shareholders. What the Law mandates is the equality of shares, which can been accentuated by one-share-
one-vote rule. This principle of equality differs from the equal treatment of shareholders. which would be, 
if applied, inconsistent with principles and view of western economy of corporations (e.g., majority 
rules). See Nicola De Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth: Fairness v. Precise 
Equality, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 853, 894–895 (2009).  
761 Contra Nicola De Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth: Fairness v. Precise 
Equality, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 853, 919–920 (2009) (advocating for the permission of unequal treatment 
so long as it accomplishes economic results and claiming that “strong equal treatment rule does not avoid 
all oppression of minorities). 
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in oppressive conduct, court-ordered payment of dividends, or⎯in rare circumstances⎯ the 
dissolution of the corporation. That being said, a court-ordered buy-out remedy, which is prevalent 
in some jurisdictions, is unavailable in Saudi courts due to its incompatibility with Sharia. In 
principle, the shareholder may not be forced to sell her shares or obligated to purchase another’s 
shares.762 
1. Judicial Dissolution 
Unlike voluntary dissolution by a vote of shareholders, the Law grant courts the power to 
liquidate and dissolve the corporation against the will of its shareholders or management 
(compulsory liquidation).763 Since this remedy involves the death of the corporate legal person, 
commercial judges have held the request of the judicial dissolution to stringent standards. These 
standards include the prosperity of the corporation, the size of shareholding under oppression,764 
and the availability of other remedies to the oppressed shareholders. These standards have been 
utilized by the courts worldwide to mitigate not only the economic but also the noneconomic losses 
and to balance the shareholders’ reasonable expectations.765 
Returning to the hypothetical discussed above in which Saad (oppressed minority shareholder) 
thinks about requesting judicial dissolution, the commercial judge would be likely to dismiss 
                                                 
762 The rationale behind the nullification of mandatory buyouts is that at least one party to the transaction 
is bound to the deal by force and not by his free will, which makes the transaction lack the fundamental 
condition of voluntary affirmation and acceptance. 
763 Article 205 (2). 
764 Unlike other jurisdictions (i.e., Nevada, Ohio and Connecticut), the Saudi Law does not impose a 
percentage as a prerequisite to initiate a judicial dissolution, which, I believe, offers greater protection for 
minority shareholders regardless of how many shares a complaining shareholder has. Cf. Harry J. 
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation 
Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 40 (1987). 
765 Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 
15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990) (likening dissension in close corporations to dissension in a marriage as in 
both situations “complex emotional and financial relationships exist that courts cannot easily dissolve 
without losses.”) 
  
199 
Saad’s request for the judicial dissolution, given the corporation’s prosperity and profitability, or 
at least would not find the judicial dissolution to be the most appropriate, equitable remedy. The 
prosperity and profitability factors influence the availability to grant the shareholder’s request to 
dissolve the lucrative business. However, assuming that Saad and his brother acted as a group, the 
judicial dissolution may be justified on the grounds of deadlock, at least in theory.766 
All in all, even though the judicial dissolution is a statutory remedy that is available to the 
dissenting shareholders, the courts have absolute discretion whether to grant such a relief. Except 
in rare circumstances (i.e., deadlocks), courts may find compulsory dissolutions inequitable, and 
thus grants another, yet less aggressive remedy. 
2. Invalidation of Corporate Actions 
Another statutory relief the Law empowers the judiciary to grant is to invalidate the corporate 
action or resolution the court determines to be against the Law. In several stances of the Law, the 
Saudi legislature gives the power to the judicial authority to invalidate corporate actions, whether 
in the form of a contract, resolution, or provision. For example, Article 99 stipulates the 
shareholder’s right to request the invalidation of an assembly resolution running afoul of the 
corporation’s constitutional documents.767 Another example is that if the board member fails to 
comply with the disclosure requirements concerning a related-party transaction, the Law allows 
the corporation or any stakeholder to petition the court to invalidate the suspicious contract. 
                                                 
766 Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close 
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 34 (1987) (supporting the judicial dissolution of 
successful corporation on the grounds of deadlock instead of limiting this remedy to only corporations on 
the brink of insolvency). 
767 As a matter of statute of limitation, the Law dismisses invalidation requests after the lapse of one year 
from the issuance of the resolution. See Article 99. 
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3. Court-Ordered Payment of Dividends 
Another alternative remedy the court may order⎯instead of dissolving the corporation⎯is to 
order the corporation to pay dividends.768 As explained earlier, one issue minority shareholders in 
close corporations confront is that the dominant shareholders secure returns on their investments 
in the corporation in forms of salaries and rewards and thus withhold the distribution of dividends, 
leaving the minority with no returns on their capital investments at all. Nevertheless, this remedy 
is not stipulated in the Law, but rather it is a judicially-created relief. The plaintiff (the minority 
shareholder) has to show that although the corporation gains profits, the management (i.e., the 
dominant shareholder) declines to distribute dividends, as in the motivating hypothetical. 
The premise of this remedy can be traced to the central component of the statutory definition 
of the corporation, the sharing of profits and losses. If the corporation is making profits, 
yet⎯without proper justification⎯it denies some of its shareholders returns of their capital 
investments, the judge has the power to intervene to remedy the deprived shareholders. One 
drawback of this remedy, however, is that it is contingent upon how the judge construes and apply 
the Law and whether he is willing to make such an order. Given the fact that the Saudi judiciary 
is not precedent-oriented, the uncertainty to prevails in these claims may make shareholders 
reluctant to initiate them in the first place. In addition, the absence of this relief in the Law raises 
concern about its availability, whereas the concern should be whether the circumstances justify 
such a relief, as in the judicial dissolution. 
                                                 
768 In search for answers, I had an informal meeting with a senior judge at the Dammam Commercial 
Court, where I asked him several questions about the court’s roles in some corporate instances, one of 
which was withholding dividends. He answered me confidently that in such cases the judge might order 
the corporation to distribute dividends despite the fact that such a power was not stipulated in the Law.  
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C. Overall Assessment 
Thus far, the judicial role in the private enforcement cases may not be as well-defined and 
predictable as it should be. As per the Law, the court has undisputable powers to adjudicate cases 
where the subject is an infringement of the law that has caused harm to the plaintiff (i.e., the 
minority shareholder). It also asserts the court’s power to remedy the complaining shareholders 
with the invalidation of corporate resolutions and actions or⎯in some harsh instances⎯ with the 
dissolution of the corporation. In the absence of the statutory definition of oppression, however, it 
remains questionable whether a by-the-book action could be challenged in a court of law. Such 
recognition may only come from the statutory distinction between the public corporations (which 
the Law mainly focuses on regulating) and the close corporations. In addition, the Law fails to 
recognize other equitable remedies in cases of dissensions and clashes among shareholders, or at 
least to give the power to the judiciary to fashion equitable remedies on a case-by-case basis, which 
produces judicial uncertainty about how to resolve such issues. With no evidence to support the 
court-ordered payments, for example, there is no statutory or judicial ground upon which the 
shareholder may confidently bring a lawsuit against a legitimate corporate action. 
Conclusion 
In reviewing the judicial role in the public and private enforcement, one may conclude that as 
the commercial judiciary develops, the legislative body seems to overlook the supplementary and 
gap filling role the judicial body could play. The judicial branch should have statutory leeway to 
assess whether the shareholder has committed oppressive conduct and thus determine what 
remedy is equitable. The ambiguity of the judicial role regarding some corporate affairs generates 
unpredictability and uncertainty that adversely impact the corporate arena in the region. Prior to 
2015, the chaos of the judiciary might have been understandable as the judicial jurisdiction was 
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disputed. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the commercial courts after 2015 and the 
appointment of specialized judges, the Law should broaden and entrust the judiciary with more 
powers to review and determine other disputed corporate affairs (e.g., director’s compensation) 
instead of being limited to what the current Law asserts for it.  
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Concluding Chapter 
 
 
“The close corporation, long the orphan of corporate law.”769 
 
 
Part One: Summary 
This research analyzed and examined the corporate governance structure offered by the Saudi 
Companies Law of 2015 as a device to protect the interests of the minority shareholders in close 
corporations. It began with an exploratory dive into the terminology of close corporations and 
minority shareholders, and it highlighted the most pervasive issues associated with this group of 
shareholders in this form of enterprises. Despite the tradability feature of shares, shares in close 
corporations lack access to a secondary market, which makes it difficult for shareholders to exit 
the corporation for fair value. Due to the small number of shareholders and the interpersonal 
relationships among them, furthermore, the shareholders often have the expectation that they 
would run the business and participate in its management, obviating the principle of majority rule. 
Therefore, once this expectation of the minority shareholder is frustrated, clashes and tensions 
among shareholders will arise, crippling the business and destroying the social and familial bonds. 
Another commonplace issue is the majority shareholder opportunism and oppression, which, as 
explained earlier, may be in the form of freeze-out or squeeze-out conduct. Three strategies have 
been implemented to overcome these issues and protect the minority shareholders from any 
oppressive or opportunistic conduct, either statutorily, judicially, or contractually. 
Chapter two offered a general overview of the legal framework for corporations in the country 
and the structure of its ownership as it has played a vital role in shaping the current Law and 
favoring the shareholder-oriented corporate law. It is crucial to understand the backstage story of 
                                                 
769 Abram Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1960). 
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the corporation to evaluate the core subject of the research better and assess the circumstances that 
contributed to the contemporary form of corporate law and corporation. 
Chapter three provided an in-depth analysis of the regulatory frame for close corporations, 
including its incorporation, management, and supervision. It comprehensively scrutinized the roles 
of the board directors and the shareholders under the Law, and it highlighted some criticism of 
some rules and possible ripple effects they would generate when they were applied. This chapter 
showcased the excessive use of mandatory rules to regulate the corporate affairs as a unique aspect 
of the Companies Law of 2015, which was the main reason why this research focused on the 
statutory protection of minority shareholders as a strategy to overcome the close corporations’ 
issues. 
Chapter four showcased how the implementation of several rules of the Law address some 
issues of the minority shareholders in close corporations. It started with a thorough explanation of 
the rights the Law asserts for the shareholders, and how certain statutory rights constitute a potent 
arsenal for the minority shareholders against the shareholder opportunism. Other rules of the Law 
come to protect the shareholder’s expectations as these rules activate the shareholder’s role in the 
management through the right to elect directors and the mandatory use of the cumulative voting 
system. Another statutory solution to the dilution of shareholder’s interests is the strict quorum 
requirement for a share issuance by the Law along with the assertation of the preemptive rights for 
shareholders. To mitigate the side effects of the reality of share unmarketability, the research 
underscored several rules of the Law regulating the share transferability and ensuring that shares 
of joint-stock corporations are eventually tradeable even if they are subject to permissible 
restrictions. Also, other rules of the Law constitute protection for the minority shareholders as they 
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strictly regulate related-party transactions and corporate repurchases in the fight against the 
shareholder opportunism and reinforcement for corporate integrity and fairness. 
As part of the argument with which the research began, chapter five analyzed the enforcement 
component of the Law and examined its efficiency to uphold the Law in one hand and penalize 
those who violate it on the other. It bisected the enforcement element into public and private, and 
it explained in length the authorities in charge of each sort of enforcement. Moreover, as part of 
the enforcement, the research shed light on the judicial role in implementing the Law and on the 
statutory remedies it has. 
Part Two: Results and Recommendations 
After a thorough investigation and analysis of the minority shareholders status under the 
Companies Law of 2015, the research concludes with several results and recommendations. It is 
wished that this study contributes to the ongoing debate over the protection for the minority 
shareholders in close corporations and propose⎯as one of the research questions⎯a host of legal 
measures to bring about the necessary improvements for the existing laws and regulations. 
First of all, the minority shareholders of close corporations are susceptible to several risks 
caused by the exceptional nature of the close corporation. Unless the minority shareholders bargain 
for their protection, they are vulnerable to shareholder oppression and opportunism. The reality 
deficits, therefore, necessitate the establishment of a protective system of the minority 
shareholders’ interests. The source of this protection may vary from laws and regulations or 
judicial rulings or a combination of both. It mainly depends on the sophistication of the legal 
system and the institutions of the country. As for Saudi Arabia, such protection is best to be derived 
from the statutory laws given the legal structure and the limited role of the judiciary to establish 
such protection in the status quo. 
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Nevertheless, one disappointing finding is that despite the satisfactory level of protection for 
the minority shareholders in joint-stock corporations (public and close), the Saudi legislators have 
yet to realize the close corporations as separate entities⎯with their issues and ways of governing⎯ 
from public ones. The Ministry of the Commerce and Investment (by its regulatory role) issued 
some regulatory and procedural rules for the unlisted corporations, yet these rules hardly cover the 
issues of the minority shareholders. Instead, they provide instructive and implementing steps on 
how to apply the rules of the Law, which, similar to its predecessor, has ignored recognizing the 
close status for joint-stock corporations. The absence of the close corporations in the Law reflects 
the gap in the Saudi legal scholarships that fail to distinguish between the public and private 
corporations. During 2015 and 2016, four out of six GCC countries⎯namely Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait⎯ updated their corporate legislations by introducing 
new corporate laws. Three of which (the Emirati, Qatari and Kuwaiti corporate laws) have treated 
the close corporation as a different entity that requires special rules, making the Saudi Companies 
Law the only in the region that has no mention of the close corporation. Thus, a supplementary 
regulation or some reforms to the current laws are of the dire need to recognize the close 
corporations as entities that, despite their similarities with public corporations, have distinct 
features (e.g., lack of marketability, small number of shareholders, and stable shareholdings) 
requiring a regulatory framework different from the existing one. 
That being said, the Law falls short of regulating some close corporations’ affairs. Such affairs 
include the shareholder deadlock and squeeze-out regulations. The Law provides no mechanism 
to resolve the shareholder deadlocks, which commonly occurs in a two-shareholder corporation. 
If the shareholders fail to resolve the deadlock contractually, it is incumbent upon the law to 
propound some mechanisms that would protect profitable businesses from dilapidating. 
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Furthermore, unlike other corporate laws, the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 has no right or rule 
by which the 90% shareholder would exclude the minority shareholders from the corporation. That 
contributes to the problem of the minority shareholder control and opportunism, as discussed 
below. 
Moreover, the research found that the Law promotes an effective reporting system coupled 
with statutory rights for shareholders to stay informed and make informed decisions. Through case 
laws, the right to access corporate information and inspect the corporation’s books and records has 
always been honored and upheld. As a director of the corporation, the Law specifies directorial 
duties to report to shareholders as a separate organ about corporate activities and potential self-
dealing, which makes directors an indispensable player in the statutory protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests. 
As a matter of conceptual view, the research found that the use of prescriptive and mandatory 
rules in regulating the internal affairs of the corporation may result in opportunistic and abusive 
behaviors by minority shareholders. There are scenarios where theoretically majority shareholders 
rely on the cooperation of minority shareholders. For share issuance, the Law requires, for 
instance, the approval of at least 75% of the shares in a special shareholder assembly attended by 
at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares. Unless the dominant shareholder possesses 75% of 
the outstanding shares, he has to seek assistance from minority shareholders to issue more shares. 
To address this issue, the research suggests that the Law impose a duty on shareholders to prevent 
them from abusing their voting rights in harming the general welfare of the corporation or to the 
detrimental of the corporation or its dominant shareholder. Another solution is to subject the 
unfounded refusal to issue some shareholder resolutions to the judicial scrutiny and statutory 
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sanctions. For example, the court may consider their votes as inconsistent with the overall interest 
of the corporation. 
Moreover, with the legislative absence in reforming and addressing the needs of close 
corporations, the study calls for widening the role played by the judiciary in protecting minority 
shareholders in Saudi close corporation. Courts should advance to widen their repertoire of 
remedies when it comes to tensions and clashes among shareholders in close corporations. In 
reviewing the judicial role in the enforcement of the Companies Law, one may conclude that as 
the commercial judiciary has been developing, the legislative body seems to overlook the 
supplementary and ‘gap filling’ roles the judicial body could play. Ideally, with the establishment 
of commercial courts in late 2017 and the appointment of specialized judges, the Saudi legislature 
should broaden and entrust the judiciary with more powers to review and determine corporate 
disputes (e.g., opportunistic and abusive behaviors by minority shareholders) instead of being 
limited to the boundaries of the current CL. Also. It should have statutory leeway to assess whether 
a shareholder has committed oppressive conduct and thus determine what remedy is equitable. 
Part Four: Concluding Remarks 
As Saudi Arabia continues to advance its transformative 2030 Vision and enact laws and 
regulations deemed necessary to accomplish its economic and social goals, this study contributes 
to the improvement of the current laws and a prescription to fix the regulatory framework of one 
of the predominant business vehicles, close corporations. A robust legal system is a crucial element 
in any endeavor to boost economic prosperity and captivate foreign direct investments. 
Nevertheless, these changes have yet to be implemented in a way that ensures the stability of the 
market, gains reliability of its business owners, and reinforces the predictability of its judiciary. 
Hence, with more data in the near future, further studies ought to focus on the impacts and 
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ramifications of some mandatory rules of the Law (e.g., the regulatory cap on director 
compensations) on the corporation’s performance and its management freedom. 
This research contributes to the ongoing debates over contractual and legislative approaches 
as it provides a case study of a legislative approach to minority shareholder protection. Albeit some 
of its shortcomings, it proves that company laws may have a stronger protective role than what 
contractarians and advocates of the contractual approach claim. Countries with similar features ( 
weak institutions and developing judiciary) may find the corporate governance in this research an 
effective approach to protecting minority shareholders in close corporations, while importing 
corporate governance of advanced economies (the U.S. and the U.K.) require more than laws. 
In the end, by analyzing and criticizing the statutory protection for minority shareholders in 
Saudi Arabia, this research is a humble contribution to the international debates over minority 
shareholders’ protection as well as to the national endeavors to modernize the country and update 
its legal system. 
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